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MR. COLERIDGE'S REPORT (J)

OF MR. PITT'S SPEECH IN PARLIAMENT OF FEBRUARY 17, 1800, ON THE CONTINUANCE OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE.

(Tuesday, February 18, 1800.*)*

THE honourable gentleman calls upon ministers to state the object of the war in one sentence. I can state it in one word: it is Security. I can state it in one word, though it is not to be explained but in many. The object of the war is security: security against a danger, the greatest that ever threatened this country; the greatest that ever threatened mankind; a danger the more terrible, because it is unexampled and novel. It is a danger which has more than menaced the safety and independence of all nations; it is a danger which has attacked the property and peace of all individuals; a danger which Europe has strained all its sinews to repel; and which no nation has repelled so successfully as the British; because no nation has acted so energetically, so sincerely, so uniformly on the broad basis of principle; because no other nation has perceived with equal clearness and decision the necessity, not only of combating the evil abroad, but of stifling it at home; because

no nation has breasted with so firm a constancy the tide of jacobinical power; because no nation has pierced with so stedfast an eye, through the disguises of Jacobinical hypocrisy; but now, it seems, we are at once to remit our zeal and our suspicion; that Jacobinism, which alarmed us under the stumbling and drunken tyranny of Robespierre; that Jacobinism, which insulted and roused us under the short-sighted ambition of the five Directors; that Jacobinism, to which we have sworn enmity through every shifting of every bloody scene, through all those abhorred mockeries which have profaned the name of liberty to all the varieties of usurpation; to this Jacobinism we are now to reconcile ourselves, because all its arts and all its energies are united under one person, the child and the champion of Jacobinism, who has been reared in its principles, who has fought its battles, who has systematised its ambition, at once the fiercest instrument of its fanaticism, and the gaudiest puppet of its folly!

The honourable gentleman has discovered, that the danger of French power and French principles is at an end, because they are concentred, and because to uniformity of design is added an unity of direction; he has discovered that all the objects of French ambition are relinquished, because France has sacrificed even the *appearances* of freedom to the best means of realizing them; in short that now, for the first time, Jacobinism is not to be

dreaded, because now, for the first time, it has superadded to itself the compactness of despotism. But the honourable gentleman presses hard, and requires me to be definite and explicit. What, says he, do you mean by destroying the power of Jacobinism? Will you persevere in the war, until you have received evidence that it is extinct in this country, extinct in France, extinct in the mind of every man? No! I am not so shamefully ignorant of the laws that regulate the soul of man. The mind once tainted with Jacobinism can never be wholly free from the taint; I know no means of purification; when it does not break out on the surface, it still lurks in the vitals; no antidote can approach the subtlety of the venom, no length of quarantine secure us against the obstinacy of the pestilence.

Those who are now telling us, that all danger from revolutionary principles is passed by, are yet endeavouring to call up again the very arguments which they used at the commencement of the war, in the youth and rampancy of Jacobinism; and repeat the same language, with which they then attempted to lull the nation into security, combined with the same arts of popular irritation. They are telling us, that ministers disregard peace; that they are prodigal of blood; insensible to the miseries, and enemies to the liberties of mankind; that the extinction of Jacobinism is their pretext, but that personal ambition is their motive; and

that we have squandered two hundred millions on an object, unattainable were it desirable, and were it not unattainable, yet still to be deprecated. Sir, will men be governed by mere words without application? This country, Sir, will not. It knows that to this war it owes its prosperity, its constitution, whatever is fair or useful in public or domestic life, the majesty of her laws, the freedom of her worship, and the sacredness of our firesides. For these it has spent two hundred millions, for these it would spend two hundred millions more; and, should it be necessary, Sir, I doubt not that I could find those two hundred millions, and still preserve her resources unimpaired. The only way to make it not necessary is to avail ourselves of the hearty co-operation of our allies, and to secure and invigorate that co-operation by the firmness and vigour of our own conduct. The honourable gentleman then comes back upon me, and presses me upon the supposed dissonance between our views and those of our allies. But surely there may allowably exist in the minds of different men different means of arriving at the same security. This difference may, without breaking the ties of effective union, exist even in this house; how much more then in different kingdoms? The Emperor of Russia may have announced the restoration of monarchy, as exclusively his object. This is not considered as the ultimate object by this country, but as the best means and most reliable pledge of

a higher object, viz. our own security, and that of Europe; but we do not confine ourselves to this, as the only possible means.

From this shade of difference we are required to infer the impossibility of cordial co-operation! But here the honourable gentleman falls into a strange contradiction. He affirms the restoration of monarchy an unjust object of the war, and refuses expressly and repeatedly to vote a single farthing on such a ground; and yet the supposed secession of Russia from the allied powers, the secession of that government, whose *exclusive* object is the restoration of monarchy, is adduced by him as another and equal ground for his refusal. Had the Emperor of Russia persevered in directing his utmost forces to the attainment of that object, to which Austria will not pledge herself, and which the honourable gentleman considers as an unjust object, then the honourable gentleman would have been satisfied. But I will not press too hard on the honourable gentleman, or lay an undue weight on an inadvertence. I will deal most fairly with him. If I did believe, which I do not, that Austria saw no advantages in the restoration of monarchy, yet still I would avail myself of her efforts, without changing my own object. Should the security of Britain and of Europe result from the exertions of Austria, or be aided by her influence, I should think it my duty to advise his Majesty to lend the Emperor every financial assistance, however those

exertions and that influence might spring from principles not in unison with our own.

If the honourable gentleman will tell me, that the object of Austria is to regain the Netherlands, and to reconquer all she may have lost in Germany and Italy, so far from feeling this as a cause of distress, I feel it a ground of consolation, as giving us the strongest assurance of her sincerity, added to that right which we possess of believing Austria sincere, from our experience that Austria, above all, must know the insecurity of peace with Jacobins. This, Sir, would be a ground of consolation and confident hope; and though we should go farther than the Emperor of Germany, and stop short of Russia, still, however, we should all travel in the same road. Yet even were less justifiable objects to animate our ally, were ambition her inspiring motive, yet even on that ground I contend that her arms and victories would conduce to our security. If it tend to strip France of territory and influence, the aggrandisement of Austria is elevated by comparison into a blessing devoutly to be wished! The aggrandisement of Austria, founded on the ruins of Jacobinism, I contend, Sir, to be a truly British object. But, Sir, the honourable gentleman says, he thinks the war neither just nor necessary, and calls upon me, without the qualifying reservations and circuitous distinctions of a special pleader; in short, without BUTS or IFS, to state the real object; and affirms that in spite of these buts and ifs, the

restoration of monarchy in France is the real and sole object of ministers, and that all else contained in the official notes are unmeaning words and distinctions fallacious, and perhaps meant to deceive. Is it, Sir, to be treated as a fallacious distinction, that the restoration of monarchy is not my sole or ultimate object; that my ultimate object is security; that I think no pledge for that security so unequivocal as the restoration of monarchy, and no means so natural and effectual? *but* if you can present any other mode, that mode I will adopt. I am unwilling to accept an inadequate security; but the nature of the security which it may be our interest to demand, must depend on the relative and comparative dangers of continuing the war, or concluding a peace. And *if* the danger of the war should be greater than that of a peace, and *if* you can shew to me that there is no chance of diminishing Jacobinism by the war, and *if* you can evince that we are exhausting our means more than our enemies are exhausting theirs, then I am ready to conclude a peace without the restoration of monarchy.

These are the *ifs* and the *buts*, which I shall continue to introduce, not the insidious and confounding subtleties of special pleading, but the just and necessary distinctions of intelligible prudence; I am conscious of sincere and honest intentions in the use of them, and I desire to be tried by no other than God and my country. But are we not weakening ourselves? Let any man calmly, and

with the mind of an Englishman, look round on the state of our manufactures, our commerce, on all that forms and feeds the sources of national wealth, and to that man I can confidently leave the following questions to be answered. From the negotiations at Lisle to the present moment has England or France weakened itself in the greater degree? Whether, at the end of this campaign, France is not more likely to suffer the feebleness ensuing on exhausted finance than England?

If Jacobinism, enthroned in Bonaparte, should resist both the pressure of foreign attack, and its own inherent tendencies to self-destruction, whether it must not derive such power of resistance from the use of such revolutionary and convulsive efforts, as involve, and almost imply a consequent state of feebleness? And whether, therefore, if any unexpected reverse of fortune should make it expedient or necessary for us to compromise with Jacobinism, it would not be better for us to compromise with it at the end of the campaign, than at present? And by parity of reasoning, whether it be not time (even on the supposition that Jacobinism is not to be routed, disarmed, and fettered); yet, that even on this supposition, the longer we defer a peace, the safer that peace will be!

Sir, we have been told that Jacobinism is extinct, or at least dying. We have been asked too, what we mean by Jacobinism? Sir, to employ arguments solely to the purposes of popular irritation is a

branch of Jacobinism? It is with pain, Sir, that I have heard arguments manifestly of this tendency, and having heard them, I hear with redoubled suspicion the assertions, that Jacobinism is extinct. By what softer name shall we characterise the attempts to connect the war by false facts and false reasoning with accidental scarcity? By what softer name shall we characterise appeals to the people on a subject which touches their feelings, and precludes their reasoning? It is this, Sir, which makes me say, that those, whose eyes are now open to the horrors and absurdities of Jacobinism, are nevertheless still influenced by their early partiality to it. A somewhat of the *feeling* lurks behind, even when all the *principle* has been sincerely abjured. If this be the case with mere spectators, who have but sympathised in the distance, and have caught disease only by *looking on*, how much more must this hold good of the actors! And with what increased caution and jealousy ought we not to listen to the affirmation, that Jacobinism is obsolete even in France! The honourable gentleman next charges me with an unbeseeming haughtiness of tone, in deeming that the House had pledged itself to the present measure by their late vote for the continuance of the war. This is not accurate. I did not deem the House pledged: I only assigned reasons of *probability*, that having voted for the continuance of war, they would deem themselves inconsistent if they refused assent to those measures by

which the objects of the war were most likely to be realised. My argument was, not that the House had pledged itself to this measure directly, but only as far as they must perceive it to be a means of bringing the war to that conclusion to which they have pledged themselves: for unless gentlemen will tell me, that though they cannot prevent votes in favour of the war, they will yet endeavour to palsy the arm of the country in the conduct of it; and though they cannot stifle the vast majority of suffrages to the plan, they will yet endeavour to way-lay it in its execution; unless the gentlemen will tell me so themselves, I will not impute it to them. (Here Mr. Pitt made a short reply to some observations of Mr. Bouverie in the early part of the debate, and then proceeded.) It was said of himself and friends (and often said) by a gentleman who does not now commonly honour us with his presence here, "We are the minority who represent the opinions of the country." In my opinion a state of universal suffrage, formal or virtual, in which, nevertheless, the few represent the many, is a true picture of Jacobinism. But, however this may be, if smallness of number is to become a mark and pledge of genuine representation, that gentleman's friends must acquire the representative character in a continual progression; for the party has been constantly decreasing in number, and both here and out of this House, they are at present fewer than they ever were before. But they vote for peace, and the

people wish for peace; and therefore they represent the opinions of the people. The people wish for peace — so do I! But for what peace? Not for a peace that is made to-day and will be broken to-morrow! Not for a peace that is more insecure and hazardous than war. Why did I wish for peace at Lisle? Because war was then more hazardous than peace; because it was necessary to give to the people a palpable proof of the necessity of the war, in order to their cordial concurrence with that system of finance, without which the war could not be successfully carried on; because our allies were then but imperfectly lessoned by experience; and finally, because the state of parties then in France was less Jacobinical than at any time since that æra. But will it follow that I was then insincere in negotiating for peace, when peace was less insecure, and war more hazardous; because now with decreased advantages of peace, and increased means of war, I advise against a peace? As to the other arguments, it is of less consequence to insist upon them, because the opposition implied in them holds not against this measure in particular, but against the general principle of carrying on the war with vigour. Much has been said of the defection of Russia, and every attempt made to deduce from this circumstance, so misnamed, causes of despair or diminished hope. It is true that Russia has withdrawn herself from confident co-operation with Austria, but she has not withdrawn herself from concert with this coun-

try. Has it never occurred, that France, compelled to make head against armies pressing on the whole of her will be weakened and distracted in her a moveable maritime force? What may ultimate extent of the Russian forces engaged in this diversion, we cannot be expected to know, cut off as we are from the continent, by the season and the weather. If the Russians, acting in maritime diversion on the coast of France, and increased by our own forces, should draw the French forces from Switzerland and Italy, it does not follow that the Russians may not be greatly, and perhaps equally useful to the objects of the campaign, although they will cease to act on the eastern side of France. I do not pretend to know precisely the number and state of the French armies, but reason only on probabilities; and chiefly with the view of solving the honourable gentleman's difficulty, how the Russians can be useful, if not on the continent. It is unnecessary to occupy the time and attention of the House with a serious answer to objections, which it is indeed difficult to repeat with the same gravity with which they were originally stated.

It was affirmed, gravely affirmed, that £12,000,000 would be wanted for corn! I should be happy, if, in the present scarcity, corn could be procured from any, and all parts of the world, to one-third of that amount. It will not be by such arguments as these, that the country will be induced to cease a war for security, in order to procure corn for

subsistence. I do object, that there is unfairness both in these arguments in themselves, and in the spirit which produces them. The w ow reviled as unjust and unnecessary; an to prove it so, appeals are made to circ s of accidental scarcity from the visitation of the seasons. The fallacy of these reasonings is equal to their mischief. It is not true that you could procure corn more easily if peace were to be made to-morrow. If this war be unjust, it ought to be stopped on its own account; but if it be indeed a war of principle and of necessity, it were useless and abject to relinquish it from terrors like these. As well might a fortress, sure of being put to the sword, surrender for want of provision. But that man, Sir, does not act wisely, if, feeling like a good citizen, he use these arguments which favour the enemy. God forbid, that an opposition in opinion among ourselves should make us forget the high and absolute duty of opposition to the enemies of our country. Sir, in the present times, it is more than ever the bounden duty of every wise and good man to use more than ordinary caution in abstaining from all arguments that appeal to passions, not facts; above all, from arguments that tend to excite popular irritation on a subject and on an occasion, on which the people can with difficulty be reasoned with, but are irritated most easily. To speak incautiously on such subjects, is an offence of no venial order; but deliberately and wilfully to con-

nect the words, war and scarcity, were infamous, a treachery to our country, and in a peculiar degree cruel to those whom alone it can delude, the lower uneducated classes. I will not enlarge upon that subject, but retire with a firm conviction that no new facts have occurred which can have altered the opinion of this House on the necessity of the war, or the suitableness of similar measures to the present to the effectual carrying of it on, and that the opinion of the House will not be altered but by experience and the evidence of facts.

(Saturday, February 22, 1800.)

IT has been the fate of our Minister, that he has almost uniformly stated some reason for the continuance of the war just on the eve of the event which flatly contradicted that reason. He was urging Parliament how rich in zeal Austria was, and how fit therefore it must be that a loan should be granted to the Emperor, just at the time that the Emperor himself was making peace; or (to use the phrase of a noble lord) had turned Jacobin. He is now pursuing the same conduct, and repeating the same language; and now likewise, there is no mean probability, that the Emperor is carrying on secret negotiations. Even so late as the debate on the dispatches from France, the formidable and flourishing state of the Chouans was urged as a

main argument for the rejection of the French proposals: and lo! the Chouans are pacified and disarmed, and their chiefs destroyed or reconciled. And still the minister talks as fluently of a moveable maritime force, as if an army of forty or fifty thousand Russians could remain hovering on the Western coasts of France, as easily as half a dozen fishers' skiffs! Thus too, Austria and Bavaria are coupled together, joint objects of a weighty subsidy; while it is reported in the last Paris papers, with every appearance of probability, that Bavaria will not receive our subsidy, and is in reality perhaps more afraid of the ambition of Austria, than of the Jacobinism of the Chief Consul. This report we cannot indeed trace to any source so authentic, as that we dare vouch for its accuracy; but we do think it entitled to a high degree of credit. It is well known that the Court of Bavaria is intimately connected with that of Russia; that in the weight of Russian influence, and in the presence of the Russian armies, she had expected and sought protection from the views of more than *one* powerful neighbour. "The aggrandisement of Austria, founded on the ruins of Jacobinism," may, or may not be, "a truly *British* object; but most certainly it is not a *Bavarian* object. The Russians having seceded, how, except by an honest neutrality, can Bavaria have any security, that, in the events of the campaign, Austria may not yield her up to France, or France give her in compromise to Aus-

tria? But will a neutrality secure her? We answer, that neutrality will give her a common interest with Prussia, and the North of Germany, and of course entitle her to the same advantage of common defence. Besides, it is in the highest degree improbable that the causes, which have produced the effect of withdrawing the zealous Paul I. from co-operation with his politic brother Emperor, should be wholly foreign to the interests of the Elector. But it may be objected, that no injury is done by our having shewn ourselves willing and able to support our allies; by our having evinced that, if the great cause of monarchy *is* given up, *they*, and not *we*, were in fault. But is it no injury to the honour of Parliament, that in a continued succession of instances, Parliament should appear to the people at home, and to all Europe, blind to events, which all but itself had anticipated and calculated upon? Is it no injury, at a time when it is above all things necessary for national quiet and content, that the Parliament should maintain even the *minutiæ* of dignity and independence—at such a time is it no injury to us, that the Parliament should appear as the easy organ of ministers, giving credit to no facts, but those which *ministers* submit to them, seeing with *their* eyes, and hearing only with *their* ears, like a hollow statue in the oracular temples of the antients?—This is no ordinary time. Far be it from us to deduce arguments of irritation from the internal calamity which threatens us; but

we *do* affirm, that such a calamity does afford a powerful reason for the desirableness of a peace, were it only on this account, that, *however falsely*, the lower and uneducated classes *will* connect it with the war! Is the minister "so shamefully ignorant of the laws that regulate the soul of man," as not to know that the most prominent circumstance which co-exists with any great calamity, will always and necessarily be considered by the many, as the *cause* of that calamity? If *we* were required to state and *particularise* the object of peace, we should blush to pretend to be able to *particularise*, and then to answer by a vague and *general* phrase. Yet if we *would* use a general phrase, we too would state it to be *security*. "Would a fortress (says the Minister), sure of being put to the sword, capitulate for want of provision?" Is it possible (we reply) that any but children can be deluded with so puerile a sophism as that which is made up by connecting and confounding a metaphor and a reality? The want of provision, ministers themselves assure us, is an undoubted and threatening reality! but that we are sure of being put to the sword—this is too absurd even to admit of a *metaphorical* explanation.—Will a peace annihilate our population, our commerce, our insularity, our navies? We must conclude, that ministers attribute to peace all those "contagious blastments," or their conduct and their reasons become alike unintelligible. But it is done! ministers have dashed

the budding olive-branch to the ground; and if, by the natural magic of that very act, it should, like the rod of Aaron, be turned into a serpent, they will then snatch an apology from the effects of their own insolence. If, in the events of the campaign, France should be successful, she will become ambitious; if she should be defeated and endangered, she will become Jacobinical; and this ambition, and this Jacobinism, the legitimate offspring of the continuance of the war, will have an imaginary *pre-existence* assigned them, and be confidently adduced by ministers as justifications for their having rejected a peace!

(Wednesday, February 26, 1800.)

OUR readers will have observed, that the Minister concluded his speech on Monday night, without the usual eloquent peroration, and was content to practise one species of his art magic; that namely of telling fortunes by the casting of figures. We must consider, therefore, the budget of this year as a comet without its tail, but are by no means disposed, on this account, to regard it as the less ominous or alarming. The circumstance was, no doubt, intended to convey the idea, that *facts* declared the solidity of our financial system so perfectly that any subsequent declamation could only weaken their effect. "It will strike astonishment" (say the friends of the Minister) "into the bosoms

of our enemies, that in the eighth year of the war the government should have to impose taxes to no greater amount than the sum of £350,000. The only fresh taxes are the new tax on tea, and that on the articles of British distillery." How gladly should we join these gentlemen in their joy and exultation, would they but instruct us how to acquire that same serviceable treacherousness of memory by which *they* have forgotten the continuation of the income tax! What if a quack, newly arrived from America, on being questioned concerning the state of health in some particular part of that continent, should answer—"O! we are uncommonly well there, thank Heaven, and *my* grand infallible preventives! There's nothing new in the way of disease, except indeed a sort of cough attended by a slight attack on the spirits."—"*What! are you quite free from the yellow fever?*"—"Nay, nay; not from the yellow fever! But then *that's* nothing *new*, you know."—When the collector knocks at the door, the industrious man will not find one pang less at his heart, or one penny more preserved in his purse, because the tax which he is to pay was *first* levied in 1799, and only *continued* in the present year. The professional man, who is prevented by it from looking forward to leisure in his old age; the tradesman, whose profits are eaten up, and whose affairs are exposed to an injurious publicity by it; the poor annuitant, who must give up for the shedding of blood, and the restoring of

the Bourbons, that part of his pittance, which he would otherwise have laid aside for his children or widow; these will feel the income tax always new; every year some new circumstance, domestic sickness, or public scarcity, will cause it to be paid with new sensations, with new aversion. Why have we so few new burthens in this year? Because an attempt is to be made to perpetuate the income tax, that heaviest of all burthens; that income tax, which the minister *smuggled* into a law, under the false cover, that it should be of short duration. The breaking of a solemn pledge is made a subject of exultation, and the honey of praise extracted from the night-shade of perfidy. But it has been ever the conduct of the minister to procure powers under colourable pretexts for a limited time, and afterwards to pass them into perpetual laws; or to answer the same purpose, by having them renewed at stated periods in the Medea cauldron of a confiding majority! Thus, in the Russian and Spanish armaments in the years 1790-91. New taxes were raised, like a toll-gate at a subscription bridge, which were to pay the entire expenses of those armaments in a few years, and then to be discontinued; but these, too, are permanent. Thus, too, the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, which is to *cast its skin* annually, and undergo a mimic death only to insure itself a perpetual existence.—Alas! we follow the superstition of antient Rome, that once in a time of alarm believed a serpent to

be Æsculapius! — The Minister tells us, that in the next year the income tax will become more productive; and that it may be so, he will probably pursue his old system of killing two birds with one stone, and make regulations that will at the same time increase the power and influence of the Administration. But he must remember, that what almost all will attempt to do, many will do successfully, and that he first gave the lesson of deceit. We should not therefore be surprised, if the tax should become yearly less, instead of more productive. But *while* it continues, in the name of common sense, let the creatures of government be silent concerning the lightness of the fresh burthens! While it continues, the whole science of financial phlebotomy may safely lie idle! The minister has no need to open new veins, he has already touched an artery.

BONAPARTE,

IN HIS RELATIONS TO FRANCE.

(Tuesday, March 11, 1800.*)*

IT is too common to mistake for the causes of the late revolution in France the accidents which determined the manner and moment of its explosion. The arrival of Bonaparte from Egypt, his ambition, his temerity, and his good luck, were indeed indispensable as occasions and subordinate

agents; but would of themselves have been as powerless, and of as rapid extinction, as the sparks from a sky-rocket let off in a storm of rain. The real causes of the usurpation must be sought for in the general state of the public feeling and opinion; in the necessity of giving concentration and permanence to the executive government; and in the increasing conviction that it has become good policy to exchange the forms of political freedom for the realities of civil security, in order to make a real political freedom possible at some future period. The reasons for preferring a new power under a new title to the restoration of monarchy were many and irrefragable.

First, the attempt could be realised without any approximation to that most dreadful of all revolutions, a revolution of property; a fact, the knowledge, and deep feeling of which, attach all the new rich men to the Chief Consulate. Now in all great cities in all countries, much more therefore in a revolutionary country, the possessors of wealth newly acquired will be more powerful than men of hereditary wealth, because they are more pliant, because they are more active, and because, in consequence of having experienced a greater variety of scene and circumstance, they have, collectively, more talent and information. Add to this, that in France, the men of hereditary wealth are of very various creeds respecting the restoration of monarchy; but the new rich men *can* have but one creed

on that subject, and of that one creed they are not only unwavering believers, but likewise zealous apostles.

Secondly, a Chief Consulate admitted a choice of person; a circumstance of incalculable significance in the present affairs of France. It is, we confess, a grievous error to calculate on the virtue and wisdom of any nation; but still we cannot, with ministers, expect such excess of folly in the French, as to believe (however as Englishmen we may wish it), that (menaced as France now is by the boundless ambition of Austria, and stripped of her navy, her commerce, and her colonies, by the monopolising marine of England), the majority of the French nation will consent to entrust the supreme power to a weak man, the puppet of priests and irritated nobles, and bound by an unnatural weight of obligation to the natural enemies of his country. In conniving at the usurpation of Bonaparte, they have seated on the throne of the republic a man of various talent, of commanding genius, of splendid exploit, from whose policy the peaceful adherents of the old religion anticipate toleration; from whose real opinions and habits the men of letters and philosophy are assured of patronage; in whose professional attachment and individual associations the military, and the men of military talent, look confidently for the exertions of a comrade and a brother; and, finally, in whose uninterrupted felicity the multitude find an object of superstition and

enthusiasm. The Patriots of France, who mourn that their country is too unregenerate to be capable at present of genuine republicanism, are not however ignorant or insensible of the immense difference between the rank and prosperity of Great Britain under Cromwell, and its degradation, weakness, and national depravity, under the brotheller, that —— of Sidney and Russell, its restored monarch.

Thirdly, a Chief Consulate was the only conceivable means of uniting the parties in France, or at least of suspending their struggles. Even if we should concede (what appears to us an absurdity), that the majority in that kingdom are as decidedly in favour of Louis XVIII. as in the first years of our revolution the majority in this kingdom were in favour of the Pretender; still, however, the restoration of the monarch would leave the minority irreconcileable. It would leave no possibility, it would permit no hope, of the realization of their projects at some more distant period. But the Chief Consulate is a much more malleable thing. It pretends to no sacredness; it is no Nile, made mysterious by the undiscoverableness of its fountain-head; it exists, because it is suitable to existing circumstances; and when circumstances render it unnecessary, it is destructible without a convulsion. The Republicans, the Jacobins, and even the *patriotic* Royalists, can still hope, can still contemplate the usurpation, as only the transient means of a permanent end. How well this delusion is

adapted to human nature, how quietly a suspension and re-suspension of our freedom is submitted to, where a *formal* repeal would be resisted with life and property, we in this country are now suffering under the proof. It is well known, that a considerable part of the submission to William the Third was owing to the hopes, which the Jacobites conceived from his successor. In all innovations in human affairs, that change bids fairest to be permanent, which permits to the discontented a hope of further change; still more so, when, as in the present case, it may be made appear even as the means of that further change.

These seem to us the causes, which placed Bonaparte in the Chief Consulate. Of his own share in that event we have repeatedly declared our abhorrence; but it is required of us by truth and common justice to admit, that since then, his interests, and those of his country and of Europe, have run completely parallel. The first and chief article of the test required of those whom Bonaparte employs in the service of the republic, is, not that they shall have such or such opinions, but that they shall assent to the necessity of suspending the operation of such and such opinions, wherein they run counter to the existing circumstances. By this toleration he has collected around his immediate interests all the talent of France; and as man is a placable being; as abstract notions give way to surrounding realities; as assumed opinions soon become real

ones ; and the *suspension* of a tenet is a fainting-fit, that precedes its death ; it is probable, that by this toleration he may really reconcile those whom he has brought together, and convert this armistice of factions into a permanent peace. Meantime, it is undeniable, that already his commanding genius has introduced a new tone of morality into France, and that it is now fashionable to assume the rigid and simple character of the Great Consul. Vice cannot now perpetrate its orgies under a gauze cover, as during the monarchy ; or in the open air, as during the dynasty of the Jacobins. It must now shut the door, and draw the curtains. This may be hypocrisy ; but let it be remembered, that however execrable hypocrisy may be in the individual, yet in a nation at large it is a symptom of convalescence. Perhaps even in individuals, in every reform from vice there is a middle, a transient, and half conscious state of hypocrisy. Now for the first time since the revolution, neither the savage sansculotterie of the Jacobins, nor the intensely selfish frivolity, so fashionable during the weak government of the Directory, is tolerated — but a composed and serious manner is demanded from men, even as a test of good breeding, in the present awful pressure of France upon all the world, and of all the world upon France. In his individual character and conduct, the Chief Consul has hitherto supported the part of a man ambitious of greatness : too intensely pre-occupied to be otherwise than

austere in morals; too confident in his predestined fortune to be suspicious or cruel; too ambitious of a new greatness for the ordinary ambition of conquest or despotism. He has opened the prisons and the churches; he has recalled the zealots, if only they were lovers of their country; and the priests, if only they were quietists; and both by consular edict, and private example, has endeavoured to persuade his fellow-citizens not to yield themselves up to their dissensions as politicians, till they had first submitted themselves to the kindly operation of their common sympathies, as men. In this usurpation, Bonaparte stabbed his honesty in the vitals; it has perished — we admit, that it has perished — but the mausoleum, where it lies interred, is among the wonders of the world.

(Wednesday, March 19, 1800.*)*

PLUTARCH, in his comparative biography of Rome and Greece, has generally chosen for each pair of lives the two contemporaries who most nearly resemble each other. His work would perhaps have been more interesting, if he had adopted the contrary arrangement and selected those rather, who had attained to the possession of similar influence or similar fame, by means, actions, and talents, the most dissimilar. For power is the sole object of philosophical attention in man, as in inanimate nature: and in the one equally as in the other, we

understand it more intimately, the more diverse the circumstances are with which we have observed it co-exist. In our days the two persons, who appear to have influenced the interests and actions of men the most deeply and the most diffusively are beyond doubt the Chief Consul of France, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain; and in these two are presented to us similar situations with the greatest dissimilitude of characters.

William Pitt was the younger son of Lord Chatham; a fact of no ordinary importance in the solution of his character, of no mean significance in the heraldry of morals and intellect. His father's rank, fame, political connections, and parental ambition were his mould;—he was cast, rather than grew. A palpable election, a conscious predestination controlled the free agency, and transfigured the individuality of his mind; and that, which he *might have been*, was compelled into that, which he *was to be*. From his early childhood it was his father's custom to make him stand up on a chair, and declaim before a large company; by which exercise, practised so frequently, and continued for so many years, he acquired a premature and unnatural dexterity in the combination of words, which must of necessity have diverted his attention from present objects, obscured his impressions, and deadened his genuine feelings. Not the *thing* on which he was speaking, but the praises to be gained by the speech, were present to his intuition; hence he associated

all the operations of his faculties with words, and his pleasures with the surprise excited by them.

But an inconceivably large portion of human knowledge and human power is involved in the science and management of *words;* and an education of words, though it destroys genius, will often create, and always foster, talent. The young Pitt was conspicuous far beyond his fellows, both at school and at college. He was always full grown: he had neither the promise nor the awkwardness of a growing intellect. Vanity, early satiated, formed and elevated itself into a love of power; and in losing this colloquial vanity he lost one of the prime links that connect the individual with the species, too early for the affections, though not too early for the understanding. At college he was a severe student; his mind was founded and elemented in words and generalities, and these too formed all the super-structure. That revelry and that debauchery, which are so often fatal to the powers of intellect, would probably have been serviceable to him; they would have given him a closer communion with realities, they would have induced a greater presentness to present objects. But Mr. Pitt's conduct was correct, unimpressibly correct. His after-discipline in the special pleader's office, and at the bar, carried on the scheme of his education with unbroken uniformity. His first political connections were with the Reformers, but those who accuse him of sympathising or coalescing with their intemperate or

visionary plans, misunderstand his character, and are ignorant of the historical facts. Imaginary situations in an imaginary state of things rise up in minds that possess a power and facility in combining images. — Mr. Pitt's ambition was conversant with old situations in the old state of things, which furnish nothing to the imagination, though much to the wishes. In his endeavours to realise his father's plan of reform, he was probably as sincere as a being, who had derived so little knowledge from actual impressions, could be. But his sincerity had no living root of affection; while it was propped up by his love of praise and immediate power, so long it stood erect and no longer. He became a member of the Parliament—supported the popular opinions, and in a few years, by the influence of the popular party, was placed in that high and awful rank in which he now is. The fortunes of his country, we had almost said, the fates of the world, were placed in his wardship—we sink in prostration before the inscrutable dispensations of Providence, when we reflect in whose wardship the fates of the world were placed!

The influencer of his country and of his species was a young man, the creature of another's predetermination, sheltered and weather-fended from all the elements of experience; a young man, whose feet had never wandered; whose very eye had never turned to the right or to the left; whose whole track had been as curveless as the motion of a fas-

cinated reptile! It was a young man, whose heart was solitary, because he had existed always amid objects of futurity, and whose imagination too was unpopulous, because those objects of hope, to which his habitual wishes had transferred, and as it were *projected*, his existence, were all familiar and long established objects! — A plant sown and reared in a hot-house, for whom the very air that surrounded him, had been regulated by the thermometer of previous purpose; to whom the light of nature had penetrated only through glasses and covers; who had had the sun without the breeze; whom no storm had shaken; on whom no rain had pattered; on whom the dews of heaven had not fallen! — A being, who had had no feelings connected with man or nature, no spontaneous impulses, no unbiassed and desultory studies, no genuine science, nothing that constitutes individuality in intellect, nothing that teaches brotherhood in affection! Such was the man — such, and so denaturalised the spirit, on whose wisdom and philanthropy the lives and living enjoyments of so many millions of human beings were made unavoidably dependent. From this time a real enlargement of mind became almost impossible. Pre-occupations, intrigue, the undue passion and anxiety, with which all facts must be surveyed; the crowd and confusion of those facts, none of them seen, but all communicated, and by that very circumstance, and by the necessity of perpetually classifying them, transmuted into words

and generalities; pride, flattery, irritation, artificial power; these, and circumstances resembling these, necessarily render the heights of office barren heights, which command indeed a vast and extensive prospect, but attract so many clouds and vapours, that most often all prospect is precluded. Still, however, Mr. Pitt's situation, however inauspicious for his real being, was favourable to his fame. He heaped period on period; persuaded himself and the nation, that extemporaneous arrangement of sentences was eloquence; and that eloquence implied wisdom. His father's struggles for freedom, and his own attempts, gave him an almost unexampled popularity; and his office necessarily associated with his name all the great events, that happened during his Administration. There were not however wanting men, who saw through this delusion; and refusing to attribute the industry, integrity, and enterprising spirit of our merchants, the agricultural improvements of our land-holders, the great inventions of our manufacturers, or the valour and skilfulness of our sailors to the merits of a minister, they have continued to decide on his character from those acts and those merits, which belong to him and to him alone. Judging him by this standard, they have been able to discover in him no one proof or symptom of a commanding genius. They have discovered him never controlling, never creating, events, but always yielding to them with rapid change, and sheltering

himself from inconsistency by perpetual indefiniteness. In the Russian war, they saw him abandoning meanly what he had planned weakly, and threatened insolently. In the debates on the Regency, they detected the laxity of his constitutional principles, and received proofs that his eloquence consisted not in the ready application of a general system to particular questions, but in the facility of arguing for or against any question by specious generalities, without reference to any system. In these debates, he combined what is most dangerous in democracy, with all that is most degrading in the old superstitions of monarchy; and taught an inherency of the office in the person, in order to make the office itself a nullity, and the Premiership, with its accompanying majority, the sole and permanent power of the State. And now came the French Revolution. This was a new event; the old routine of reasoning, the common trade of politics were to become obsolete. He appeared wholly unprepared for it: half favouring, half condemning, ignorant of what he favoured, and why he condemned, he neither displayed the honest enthusiasm and fixed principle of Mr. Fox, nor the intimate acquaintance with the general nature of man, and the consequent *prescience* of Mr. Burke.

After the declaration of war, long did he continue in the common cant of office, in declamation about the Scheldt and Holland, and all the vulgar causes of common contests! and when at last the immense

genius of his new supporter had beat him out of these *words* (words signifying *places* and *dead objects*, and signifying nothing more), he adopted other words in their places, other generalities—Atheism and Jacobinism—phrases, which he learnt from Mr. Burke, but without learning the philosophical definitions and involved consequences, with which that great man accompanied those words. Since the death of Mr. Burke, the forms and the sentiments, and the tone of the French have undergone many and important changes: how, indeed, is it possible that it should be otherwise, while man is the creature of experience! But still Mr. Pitt proceeds in an endless repetition of the same *general phrases*. This is his element; deprive him of general and abstract phrases, and you reduce him to silence. But you cannot deprive him of them. Press him to specify an *individual* fact of advantage to be derived from a war, and he answers, Security! Call upon him to particularize a crime, and he exclaims—Jacobinism! Abstractions defined by abstractions! Generalities defined by generalities! As a minister of finance, he is still, as ever, the man of words and abstractions! Figures, custom-house reports, imports and exports, commerce and revenue—all flourishing, all splendid! Never was such a prosperous country, as England, under his administration! Let it be objected, that the agriculture of the country is, by the overbalance of commerce, and by various and complex causes, in

such a state, that the country hangs as a pensioner for bread on its neighbours, and a bad season uniformly threatens us with famine — This (it is replied) is owing to our PROSPERITY—all *prosperous* nations are in great distress for food!—still PROSPERITY, still GENERAL PHRASES, unenforced by one *single image*, one *single fact* of real national amelioration; of any one comfort enjoyed, where it was not before enjoyed; of any one class of society becoming healthier, wiser, or happier. These are *things*, these are realities; and these Mr. Pitt has neither the imagination to body forth, nor the sensibility to feel for. Once indeed, in an evil hour, intriguing for popularity, he suffered himself to be persuaded to evince a talent for the Real, the Individual; and he brought in his POOR BILL!! When we hear the minister's talent for finance so loudly trumpeted, we turn involuntarily to his POOR BILL —to that acknowledged abortion—that unanswerable evidence of his ignorance respecting all the fundamental relations and actions of property, and of the social union!

As his reasonings, even so is his eloquence. One character pervades his whole being. Words on words, finely arranged, and so dexterously consequent, that the whole bears the semblance of argument, and still keeps awake a sense of surprise; but when all is done, nothing rememberable has been said; no one philosophical remark, no one image, not even a pointed aphorism. Not a

sentence of Mr. Pitt's has ever been quoted, or formed the favourite phrase of the day — a thing unexampled in any man of equal reputation. But while he speaks, the effect varies according to the character of his auditor. The man of no talent is swallowed up in surprise; and when the speech is ended, he remembers his feelings, but nothing distinct of that which produced them — (how opposite an effect to that of nature and genius, from whose works the idea still remains, when the feeling is passed away—remains to connect itself with the other feelings, and combine with new impressions!) The mere man of talent hears him with admiration — the mere man of genius with contempt — the philosopher neither admires nor contemns, but listens to him with a deep and solemn interest, tracing in the effects of his eloquence the power of words and phrases, and that peculiar constitution of human affairs in their present state, which so eminently favours this power.

Such appears to us to be the prime minister of Great Britain, whether we consider him as a statesman or as an orator. The same character betrays itself in his private life; the same coldness to realities, and to all whose excellence relates to reality. He has patronised no science, he has raised no man of genius from obscurity; he counts no one prime work of God among his friends. From the same source he has no attachment to female society, no fondness for children, no perceptions of beauty in natural scenery; but he is fond of convivial indul-

gences, of that stimulation, which, keeping up the glow of self-importance and the sense of internal power, gives feelings without the mediation of ideas.

These are the elements of his mind; the accidents of his fortune, the circumstances that enabled such a mind to acquire and retain such a power, would form a subject of a philosophical history, and that too of no scanty size. We can scarcely furnish the chapter of contents to a work, which would comprise subjects so important and delicate, as the causes of the diffusion and intensity of secret influence; the machinery and state intrigue of marriages; the overbalance of the commercial interest; the panic of property struck by the late revolution; the short-sightedness of the careful; the carelessness of the far-sighted; and all those many and various events which have given to a decorous profession of religion, and a seemliness of private morals, such an unwonted weight in the attainment and preservation of public power. We are unable to determine whether it be more consolatory or humiliating to human nature, that so many complexities of event, situation, character, age, and country, should be necessary in order to the production of a Mr. Pitt.*

* "To-morrow of Bonaparte:" was the notice appended to the article — to-morrow, and to-morrow and to-morrow! Mr. Gillman mentions that the surmise of a visit from the French Minister, then at our Court, was sufficient to put a stop to the publication of the promised character; accordingly it never appeared.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MORNING POST OF 1799, 1800,

JUDGED, CHIEFLY FROM INTERNAL EVIDENCE, TO BE PROBABLY MR. COLERIDGE'S. (K)

(Saturday, December 7, 1799.)

YESTERDAY we gave from the French account the sketch of the new constitution. We have little doubt that this sketch will be discovered to be grossly inaccurate; yet, on a subject so deeply interesting, no man can wholly suspend his reasonings and opinions. Assuming, therefore, (although as a mere hypothesis), that the French reports are true in the main points, we may pronounce the outline of their future government a most interesting production, and in a high degree instructive, concerning the present opinions of the leading men in France. The prejudices of superstition, birth, and hereditary right, have been gradually declining during the four last centuries, and the empire of property as gradually establishing itself in their stead. Whether or no this too will not in a distant age submit to some more powerful principle, is, indeed, a subject fruitful in *dreams* to poetic philosophers, who accuse themselves with reasonings on unknown quantities; but to all present purposes it is a useless and impertinent specu-

lation. For the present race of men Governments must be founded on property; that *government is good in which property is secure and circulates; that government the best, which, in the exactest ratio, makes each man's power proportionate to his property.* In America, where the great mass of the people possess property, and where, by the exertion of industry, any man may possess it in its most permanent form, this principle may, perhaps co-exist with universal suffrage; but not so in old and populous countries, in which land is of high value, and where the produce of individual labour can hardly be large enough to admit of considerable accumulation. Artificial power must be here balanced against physical power; and when the physical strength of a nation is in the poor, the government must be in the hands of the rich. These truths appear to have determined the present ruling faction in France, in the production of the new constitution. In England, power is taken from the multitude by absolute exclusion and legal incompetency; in France, the statesmen are endeavouring to realise the same effect more *complaisantly*, by a system of *filtration;* for in this view only is the new constitution intelligible. The original motion is, indeed, to be given to the people; but is modified so often by so many after impulses, that it is at last wholly swallowed up and lost. The multitude only throw in the shuttle-cock; the rich men hold the battle-dores, and play the game, till in its due time

the shuttle-cock once more falls to the ground, and once again the multitude perform the same most *important* office! If this were possible, and if it had been well planned, we should have been foremost to have given it the suffrage of our approbation, as a system which stole away the artificial powers of the state from those who already possessed the physical strength, without, however, tearing from them the soothing idea of self-importance. But to us it appears that the whole merit of the new constitution consists in its general intention; the execution is most miserable. The plot is as perplexed as that of a Spanish comedy; and, like that, formed, it should seem, purposely to admit the greatest possible number of *intrigues*. To us, at least, it brings with it not the faintest promise of permanency. We will subject it to a detailed examination. France, it seems, is to be divided into twenty-five prefectures, which are to be subdivided into cantons and districts. The inhabitants of these, in order to become active citizens, must pay twelve days wages. If it were expected that the labouring poor would really, from pure patriotism, and out of their own purses, pay this purchase-money, it were, indeed, a cruel and detestable tax. But we presume that it is hoped that a multitude will be thus excluded, and the others will be paid for by richer men; and thus the people rendered either inert, or subjected to the influence of the wealthy. Had Sieyes been anxious to introduce a system of corruption among his fel-

low-citizens, it were not easy to conceive a more happy expedient. At the moment of a general election, will the vanity of a Frenchman suffer him to remain a mere looker-on? He will give his vote for pay, rather than declare his insignificance, by not giving his vote. If for a moment we dismiss this fear of bribery and *clientism*, if the rich should not buy up the suffrages of the poor, what can be the result but turbulence and sedition? To pay the thirtieth part of their income to the privilege of giving a single vote, is an oppressive burthen; not to give their votes an intolerable exclusion; and thus the very first process of the constitution creates a whole class enemies to it. The power is offered to them only the more insultingly to make them feel their impotence.

This we consider as applicable only to these times of agitation, when faction, novelty, terror, and extravagant hope, suffer no part of the French community to remain purely passive. If we could conceive of this constitution, as having survived its infancy, which we believe impossible; if we could conceive it sanctified by time, and in full possession of the power derived from the opinion of its power, it would still remain an objection, that it invited corruption. In peaceable æras it does not need the repressing influence of a contribution to preserve the mass of legal voters in their natural inertness: the sole effect were this, that the same evil would be realized in France, which England sees in its

pot-boiling boroughs. — Votes would be collected from the wealthy indeed, but only as far as they employed their wealth to the production of perjury and debauchery in the minds of those, whose morals are of more especial importance to the well-being of society. So much for the ground-work of the new constitution. We must next suppose these active citizens met in the principal town of their canton, in order to reduce themselves to an hundred, and this hundred met once more to reduce themselves to ten. Milton has described the Pandemonium as a very orderly meeting; and he has not transgressed against probability, for there was no *election* going forward. Those who know some of the boroughs of England will best estimate the consequences of a contested election on the morals of the voters. If it be found that habits of intoxication and proneness to riot have adhered to such places; if aversion from regular industry have distinguished the lower classes, and hereditary feuds the higher, and all this in a dispute whether A. or B., with whose persons and characters a vast majority of the voters were utterly unacquainted, should deliver in to the Minister his yea, yea, and no word beside; if this be the result with us, in a people comparatively phlegmatic, and on an occasion almost ridiculously unimportant; what may we not anticipate of a contest in France, in which all the voters *may be* and many *must be*, at once voters and candidates. It is perhaps impossible for any body of

men, who have *met together*, to preserve a perfect calmness of intellect, however remote the object of their meeting may be from their self-interests; so contagious is passion, so solitary a thing is reason! What then can we expect of a convention, in which personal envy, and personal vanity are superadded to the influences of corruption, love of change, and political dissension? We might almost as easily suppose the brute agitations of a chaos capable of arranging themselves into an organised world, as such a cluster of such assemblies capable of forming a wise legislature. There are but two modes in which such assemblies can be conceived as subsisting; under the influence of military terror; or under the absolute universality of the most sordid corruption, in which votes should be openly considered as marketable articles, rising and falling, as at a stock-exchange. But we will suppose this strong process completed, and 5,000 "picked and chosen" men the result. From these the constitutional jury of 80 are to elect the Executive and the Legislature; and after the election, to watch over their proceedings, fill up their vacancies, and, by a species of ostracism, to *absorb* any man of dangerous influence into its own body. Who is this constitutional jury? Are they to be elected? And by whom? Are they self-originated? Or, do the three Consuls assume the revolutionary privilege of giving the beginning to an order, which is afterwards to perpetuate itself? To these questions the chasmy

and incoherent accounts of the French papers afford no solution; and it would be temerity to hazard a conjecture on the subject. We remember nothing analogous to such an order in antient or modern times, unless it may be supposed to bear some distant resemblance to the Ephori of Sparta. It has, indeed, all the originality of a monster. The power attached to it is strange and enormous. It is to do nothing; but they who are to do all are to be its creatures, and absolute dependants. The division of the Legislature into the Senate and Tribunate, the latter for the purposes of discussion, the former invested with the power of decision, seems to have a mingled tendency.

A legislature of silent listeners may probably pass laws with greater calmness, and more prospective wisdom, than a body of men perpetually heated by disputation; for every man is in some measure prejudiced in favour of arguments which he himself has adduced. And even the circumstance of their voting by ballot may, to a certain degree, prove preventive of faction. But, on the other hand, the individuals that compose it are too much withdrawn from that best and most salutary species of *ephorism*, the opinion of the public; and the public speakers are degraded into mere advocates, the certain effect of which will be, to take all majesty from their eloquence, and thus injure and mutilate the most impressive organ of national instruction. Public speaking is far, very far, from the meanest

or least important utility of a legislature. The debates of the House of Commons have educated the people of England in the science of politics more widely and fundamentally than all the works of all our writers.

Of the Executive, the accounts are so very imperfect, that it is scarcely possible to form a judgment of it. Whether the Grand Elector, the two Consuls, the six Members of the Council of State, and the nine Ministers, are to form one body; or, whether their powers are to be balanced against each other, is less uncertain. It appears improbable to us, that this constitution will be accepted by the French people, if their acceptance of it be considered as a necessary preliminary; or that it will continue, if imposed upon them without their assent. One error appears to us to pervade the whole, viz. the assumption, that checks and counter-checks can be produced in legislative bodies, merely by division of chambers and diversity of titles, where no real difference of interest exists in the legislature,* as individuals, except that transient one arising from their functions. It appears to us simply a skein of threads, tangled rather than divided. The public, however, will wait for more accurate information, nor pass sentence of absolute condemnation on so scanty a stock of facts: yet, we believe, that few are so wholly unacquainted with the nature of the

* Legislative in the original.

human mind, as to expect very sanguinely a system productive of quietness from intrigues, or a constitution favourable to genuine liberty from a commander in chief.

(Tuesday, December 24, 1799.)

WE augur well from the pleasure so generally felt from the belief that Mr. Sheridan will not suffer the events of the late expedition to lie wholly enwrapped in ministerial mystery. No man is more worthy the honourable task, than one who has shewn himself so eminently qualified to feel with reason, and to reason with feeling; while by the lighter, though not less fascinating charm of his wit, he breaks the spell of sophistry, and exposes to scorn the low *cant* of those *poor creatures*, who style themselves after Jesus, for no better reason which we can discover than that *the disciples of Loyola* had done so before them; men whose delicate religion is frightened into hysterics by the transient babble of Gallic infidelity, yet can contemplate with untrembling nerves ten thousand of their fellow-subjects sacrificed in a disastrous expedition; as if our *consecrated banners*, like those of Mahomet, gave immediate passports into Paradise to all who perished beneath them. We participate in the public pleasure; and are satisfied that every effect will be produced which splendid talents and undoubted integrity *can* produce under *existing cir-*

cumstances. Yet there is something so awful and imposing in the actual union and visible co-operation of great minds, that we cannot but feel regret at the continued secession of Mr. Fox. We have ever considered this as a delicate subject, on which the best and wisest men may be allowed to differ. Mr. Fox certainly did not retire, merely because his enlightened eloquence produced no immediate effect on an audience, with whom arguments will not always prove current coin, merely because they are unanswerable. The debates on the war with Russia established the fact, that a minister, with firm and overflowing majorities, may yet be compelled to retreat from his purposes, when the arguments of his opponents have convinced a majority *out-doors*. Besides, it is not Mr. Fox's excellence to amuse predisposed followers with lofty, well-compacted periods, that seem so much like sense, that they do as well. His is a rememberable eloquence: his arguments live in the minds even of those, over whose prejudices they cannot effect an immediate conquest, and operate for years, after they were first adduced, with a liveliness, which only uniform professions and opinions the most definite can lay claim to. His speeches had always a solid worth, which remained when the fashion and beauty were gone: and therefore, imperfectly as his sentiments were *reported*, he had still the nation at large for his audience. He retired, because that noblest audience was too violently heated

and alarmed. He retired, and ceased to speak, in order that what he had spoken might be the more willingly recurred to, the more seriously reconsidered; but he retired, well knowing that national errors can never be permanent, and waiting for the symptoms of convalescence. Mr. Fox cannot, he cannot wish to deny himself to the nation for ever: the sole question is, have any events occurred which may render the present time auspicious for his reappearance. With a diffidence and hesitation which we always feel when our opinions are in opposition to those of so great a man, we presume to think that *there have*. He would come forward at a time when proud threats and confident promises have been followed by results the most calamitous and degrading; when the truth, *that heavy charges must attach somewhere*, is too glaring to be *disbelieved* by any; when (for so it is rumoured) ministry themselves meditate an escape by the poor intrigue of a half-submission: he would come forward, while yet the wound is bleeding beneath the public eye, and in that cause of humanity, of which our countrymen, with all their prejudices, have lost neither the sense nor the feeling. He would come forward at a time in which his well remembered predictions have received their fullest and most palpable accomplishment. The new confederacy of monarchs has proved more short-lived than the former; and experience of the past has been demonstrated to be (what Mr. Fox has always stated it) a poor and

inefficient counter-balance to ambition, jealousies, and court intrigues. In the mean time, the absurd pretensions of French liberty, which alarmed us, as wholly unfit for our nature, and incompatible with the other governments of Europe, are, for these very reasons, dying a natural death, and, therefore, proved to have been unfit subjects for alarm. The nation begins now to be sensible that French Atheism and French Anarchy will find a place only in the page of the historian, when the enormous debts which it incurred to prevent their propagation will be felt at every cottager's table, at every shopkeeper's fire-side. It begins to be sensible that, like a child, it has been running away from the yelping of a cur, and standing for security at the heels of a vicious horse. In the mean time, it is more than it ever was plausible, at least, that the new French government wish for peace; and that, if peace be not made with Austria, the exorbitancy of *French* ambition will not have been the only impediment. Amid these events (if we may be permitted to use a holy language) "we remember that he told us how these things should come to pass." The Roman Senate, in its adversity, thanked their General, for that, he had not despaired of the commonwealth: and we cannot suppress our earnest wishes, that Mr. Fox may speedily find it wise to earn a similar suffrage from the English nation, and give them new hopes, by shewing that he ventured to hope himself.

THE FRENCH CONSTITUTION.

(Friday, December 27, 1799.)

ECCE *iterum Crispinus!* In the present dearth of foreign and domestic news, the public find an interest even in a new French constitution! Our readers have learnt, that the candidates for all offices, national, departmental, and those of the sub-departments, are to be gradually obtained by a series of honourable *decimations*. We have before objected to this system of election by primary, secondary, and tertiary assemblies (in all which the same persons are at once candidates and voters), from its pernicious *moral* tendency. We believed, and we still continue to believe, that such an arrangement must necessarily tend to exasperate those *political* agitations, so inseparable from important elections, by the super-addition of violent *personal* passions. If this has been proved to have been the case in the Primary assemblies under the former constitution, if those were found to generate and diffuse the spirit of intrigue, and the disposition to innovation, the argument of course applies threefold against the present constitution: — a constitution, too, which makes such enormous sacrifices to the wish of producing stability and preventing innovation. In favour of this arrangement it may be said, that it confirms and realises two opposite ad-

vantages, and both of the highest importance. It takes from the people the all-unsettling power of acting from immediate and momentary impulses, while, at the same time, by the stimulation of hope, and the sense of personal self-importance, it impels every individual to be a *citizen*, suffers no man to remain dead to the public interest, and thus elevates the selfish into a social principle, without detriment to social peace. And truly, if (after the process of *filtration* had been compelled) the persons thus chosen by the electing assemblies to be the candidates for the different functions, were once again presented to the people, and finally appointed by their individual votes, collected *without assemblage*, we should admit this to be an important improvement on the system of universal suffrage, and perhaps the best possible form of a representative system, not expressly founded on property. But the conservatory senate makes the final election; a circumstance which not only alters, but absolutely reverses the effect. To have been chosen by our fellow citizens and neighbours as a good and prudent man, and again re-chosen by them as best and wisest among the good and prudent, this were indeed a noble aim for the noblest ambition! But to receive a legislative appointment from a senate of eighty nobles, from a body excluded equally by its *paucity* and its *privileges* from all acquaintance and fellow-feeling with the competitors or their constituents; this none but intriguers could hope for, this no honest

pride, no honourable ambition would desire. A constitution founded on such a basis seems to possess the unfortunate prerogative of combining the injustice of the most absolute, with more than the insecurity of the most popular, governments. The despotisms of the world have hitherto endeavoured to keep their subjects in inaction; they excite few hopes, and have therefore little to fear from the resentments of disappointment. In a Democracy every man may hope and struggle; but if he be disappointed, he must waste his anger on his rivals: for anger towards a populace is too ridiculous a thing to be often indulged, too impotent to be dreaded; but a cabal of eighty nobles is a fair and palpable object of hatred; a conspicuous target, to which the poorest aims may direct a successful shaft. In a nation of twenty-five millions, a nation characteristically enthusiastic and volatile, such a body must, and indeed ought to, become an object of jealousy and suspicion; and at every election may create such enemies, not only nine tenths of the competitors (supposed the flower and pride of wealth or talent), but likewise all of the people who had wished or expected the choice to have fallen differently from the real event. The only argument, therefore, from which the justice or policy of such an order could deduce a shadow of justification, is fairly adducible against it; for from the common instincts of human nature, it militates against that permanence and security from change, to which

alone it can appeal as a sufficient reason for its existence.

A respectable Morning Paper has observed, that "the present plan, by which the representative system is consecrated, narrows excessively the exercise of the right of election." We should have chosen to express ourselves otherwise: we should have said—"the present plan, by which the representative system is secretly assassinated, wholly takes away from the people the exercise of the *power* of election, while most absurdly, or jesuitically, it pretends to admit the *right*." A Senate elected by Bonaparte and Sieyes can only be considered as the accomplices of Bonaparte and Sieyes. We are justified, therefore, in considering the Executive government and the Senate as one and the same body. This body possesses all the influence of France, appoints all the offices throughout all the nation, civil and military, legislative or judicial, lucrative or honourable. Supposing that this vast and enormous influence were only powerful enough to bring in one man in ten among the candidates returned by the successive assemblies, (a supposition absurd and incredible!) yet this would be still sufficient. The Senate, by choosing the tenth part of the candidates, might constitute a Legislature entirely of its own creatures. The whole process of popular election is therefore a mere trick—a miserable masquerade domino, to throw around the nakedness of despotism. The same respectable

paper asserts, that " without providing in words, that property shall have exclusive advantages in the new *scheme*, it secures the fact. The list of *Eligibles* will contain all the men of eminence and property; and the Conservative Senate, amidst an ample choice, may select as members of the Legislature, the men distinguished for talents or influence. While none are excluded, the great must thus be necessarily preferred." Consistently with the talent and good sense, which in general pervade the opinions of our fellow-journalist, we are unable to understand this otherwise than as a trope of irony. Whom may these high-passioned eighty nobles select, but their own creatures? For surely the writer did not assume disinterestedness and clear-sighted patriotism, as postulates and axioms—ideas involved in the very notion of a self-elected, self-perpetuating senate of eighty nobles? If indeed the legislative and judicial functions become marketable articles, the richest man will of course be the buyer, provided they will return good interest for the money; and the rich man, without talent, pride, or principle, can consent to receive his absolute creators for his unconditional masters. Is it unknown to this writer, that in a country celebrated far and wide for religion, gentlemanly honour, diffusion of property, and attachment to law, sequaciousness the most blind and unconditional has been commonly demanded from, and promised by, men of rank and property, previously to their being

permitted to be *elected* into a legislative function? and for what one assignable reason are we to hope better things from the accomplices of Sieyes and Bonaparte? It appears to us that the men of property will be too wise to buy, at any heavy sum, places in a silent legislature, empowered only to decide on laws proposed to them by a commander in chief; their very decisions too annulable by the Senate, their creators. The men of property will rather buy laws of the government in *prospectu*, and needy men will hire themselves as the mechanic legislators, necessary, in this business of law-making, to the government only as the bellows-blower is to the organist. The work *must* be done; but any fellow may do it.

The whole first chapter of the constitution we do indeed consider as the mere ornamental outworks of a military despotism. No real power is left to the people.

We have dwelt on this first chapter long, but we trust not disproportionably, having considered all the following chapters (except that which relates to prejudicial arguments and civil security) as containing nothing essential which is not involved in the consequences of the first. The first chapter brings forward the undeniable truth, that the government of France is to be an oligarchy, supported, and only supportable, by the military, who are therefore placed entirely and absolutely under the command of the Chief Consul, Bonaparte; all

which follows we regard as mere theatrical evolutions of a figure dance. We shall, however, not leave any part of this most interesting production wholly unconsidered. Our readers will not conceive of it as occupying too large a portion of our attention, if only they reflect *on* the intimate connection in which the subject of the French government stands with that of peace. If the French people accept, or rather submit to, this constitution, all danger from French principles is passed by; the volcano is burnt out, and the snow has fallen round the crater.

(Friday, January 3, 1800.*)*

NO answer to the letter from the French government, soliciting a negotiation for peace, has yet been sent by the British Cabinet. Ministers are greatly embarrassed by this measure; if they refuse to treat, they know the resentment of the nation will be roused, and if they treat, the allies may become suspicious of our intentions, and may cool in the cause. No further particulars have transpired relative to the French dispatches. They have excited a general sensation, and this in our opinion is a circumstance of more favourable omen than the dispatches themselves. We have been so long at war, and to deny its justice and necessity has been so industriously represented as Jacobinism, that it had become doubtful whether or no there

might not be a large number who had *forgotten*, and some perhaps who were *afraid*, to put the question — When shall we have peace? War and the republic are terms which have been so constantly associated together, that while the latter existed, the former seemed taken for granted: as if the French Republic were aught but a mere *term*, and that too a term of most variable signification; a term which almost every year has borne a different meaning.

It has been uniformly our creed, that in the present age of the world all extravagant principles must be necessarily short-lived; and that we only prolong their life by refusing to let them die a natural death. But even if there had existed such danger from French principles as had rendered a dignified neutrality impossible or impolitic for this country, still, however, both wisdom and humanity call upon us to inquire whether or no such danger has not ceased to exist. In the earlier stages of the revolution, the French legislators endeavoured to erect a government on the foundation of *personal rights*. This absurd and impracticable doctrine the French Jacobins disseminated with that ardour which novelty and fanaticism never fail to impart. A panic of property was struck throughout England! Humanity and compassion were called in to awaken national hatred, and religion was made an accessary: till at last the fears of the one party became as extravagant as the hopes of the other. Surely

it is now time that these fears should cease. The principles which caused them have been long out of fashion even in name. Spite of the oaths of fidelity to them made by their pretended or real enthusiasts, they never were and never could be practised. The doctrines of liberty and equality, in their wild and dangerous extent, were long ago renounced by the Directory: and then most when France was most victorious — a clear proof that their renunciation was effected by other causes than the war. The present faction have constituted a government in direct opposition to these doctrines; a government more jealous of popular power than our own. They have, indeed, admitted the sovereignty of the people, as a title by courtesy. But it is a mere title; and to adduce it against negotiation with them, were as childish and insolent, as it was in the French negotiators to adduce his Majesty's title of King of France as an objection to treating with Lord Malmesbury. We deem the present constitution of France founded on the most tyrannous oligarchy; the warmest advocate of the monarchy cannot see its monstrous defects more clearly than we have done, or express his opinions more decisively. But let us not be misunderstood. The nature of a government, considered simply and in itself, is no argument either for or against the possibility of peace with it. Let the Emperor of Russia be as wise, as righteous, as heroic a monarch as our minister has chosen to paint him, still, however, no

Englishman but would shudder at the Russian form of government, if it were introduced into England. Yet, who is mad enough to deem this an objection against our alliance with the Emperor of Russia? The French tolerate atheism and deism; the Emperor of China tolerates both, and idolatry to boot —and yet we send flattering embassies to him. We have made treaties with the Arch-pirate of Algiers, and with the Delai Lama of Thibet. And why? Because we have nothing to do with the wickedness or absurdity of a government, except as far as they are dangerous to ourselves. What are the present principles of the French government? Those of a military oligarchy — equally abhorred by every party in this country, and concerning the propagation of which it were idiotcy to entertain any alarm. It were a paradox too bold even for ministerial sophistry, that Jacobinism in England is to be destroyed by making war on a government which is itself exerting a tyranny to destroy it in France. The truth is, that whatever nomenclature the French Executive may adopt, France itself has fallen back into its ancient character of an ambitious, intriguing military power; and its ambition is to be guarded against by this country, equally under a monarchy as a republic. But ambition forms no reason against fair negotiations for peace, which, if once concluded, would be found the securest provision against it. *And is France the only ambitious Power on the Continent?*

We hope most earnestly that the public voice may become decisive, and make itself audible. The desire for peace is as wise as it is general. For what danger can follow from it? Our empire in the East is secured almost beyond the possibility of attack: — Jacobinism in England can scarcely be said to exist, otherwise than as an abusive epithet; and it is disowned in France, its birth-place and nursery. French principles have lost all their popular allurement; the insolence of French conquest has been repressed; and the French nation wish for peace so ardently, that even the promise of pacification seems almost to reconcile them to a dictatorship. Never was a moment, when peace promised so much, or threatened so little — never, we may add, a moment, when war threatened so much, and made promises so valueless and improbable. Her factions suspended by national danger, and her pride insulted by rejected proffers, France will have placed herself like an army under the first military genius of the modern world! The fear of a threatened invasion will have restored to him all his popularity! And the man, who has achieved by his exploits the splendour of a hero in romance, wields at his will the whole force of a romantic people, and unites in his single government the despatch and unity of a despotism, with the enthusiasm and resources of a republic.

(Monday, January 13, 1800.)

ON Saturday night we received the Paris journals to the 8th inst. The armies in all parts have gone into winter quarters; consequently of them little new intelligence can be expected. The head-quarters of the army of Italy are removed from Sospello to Antibes in France. The ostensible reason of this movement is an epidemic distemper which rages at Nice; how far this is the real cause, and how far danger from the enemy co-operated, we know not. The French were in quiet possession of Genoa on the 28th ult. Morean has taken the command in Switzerland, and is making new dispositions there. All is quiet down the Rhine; but vast and fearful preparations are making on both sides for the ensuing campaign. Attempts are made, at Vienna, to reconcile the Archduke and Suwarrow, with what probability of permanent success, a man may presume to decide on grounds of *human nature*, with less risk of disappointment, than Mr. Pitt in his speculations on *human nature* in Holland. Without pretensions to Mr. Pitt's or Abbé Sieyes's *psychological* talents, we dare believe, that such reconciliations are necessarily hollow and short lived; and this, as Mr. Pitt says, "*on grounds of human nature.*" The French government has decreed a new organization of their artillery, by which they have gained so many battles. The war with the Chouans was renewed on the 5th,

if indeed it was ever suspended. Report says, that the combined fleets at Brest, will soon put to sea. The Admirals Bruix and Lacrosse have left Paris. Bournonville is on his way to Berlin, as Ambassador there. Carnot, it is said has returned to Paris. — Not a word appears in the French journals respecting the negotiations with this country! They seem quite ignorant of it! But by far the most interesting feature in these papers is that presented by the discussions in the Tribunate. The government claimed for itself the power of resuming its proposals *ad arbitrium*, and of returning them unaltered; and likewise the power of defining arbitrarily the time, within which the Tribunate should have completed its deliberation, which is no less than the power of rendering their deliberations at will nugatory and ridiculous. What if they proposed a law consisting of an hundred points, and allowed, as in the present instance, three days for deliberation? or one day?

These proposals, which occasioned these discussions, are important in themselves, as evincing in the new government a spirit of encroachment on the shadowy privileges of its own creatures; but they are still more important, as displaying the indefiniteness arising out of the obscure brevity of the new constitution; and as furnishing one fact more, for the absurdity of any *constitution* whatever, in the French sense of the word. It is supposed paramount to the Legislature, and regulative

of its proceedings; but the first law which a Legislature passes explanatory of its meaning supersedes it, as a constitution, and makes it thenceforward a common legislative act; and yet without such explanatory laws, the question of what is constitutional would admit of no decision. If this new constitution should continue (which we believe impossible), we venture to prophesy, that, compared with it, the Apocalypse itself will have been barren in the production of controversies. What Sieyes meant might be learnt perhaps; but the real question will ever be, what the people, when they acceded to it, supposed Sieyes to have meant? And this can never be decided. As exhibiting an illustration of this truth, therefore, these proposals, and the discussions which followed, will excite, in the minds of men of reflection, no mean interest; but more important still is the opposition to the proposals — the manner of it — and the sensation which it appears to have created. In the foreground, and the principal figure in the foreground, is Benjamin Constant: and all the artillery, in the uses of which *some regular governments* are so dextrous, has been played off against him. We have given as specimens a quotation from Rœderer, and a paragraph from the *Journal des Hommes Libres*. The former attacks him with arguments applicable only against systematic oppositions, and takes no notice that these very arguments had been first adduced by Constant himself. (But this is a common trick

among the agents of *more regular governments*). The second heaps calumnies on the man and his connections; and boldly questions his constitutional eligibility to the Tribunate, he being a Swiss by birth. This paragraph is extremely interesting as throwing considerable light on the state of parties and public opinion in France. The minority, in which Constant voted, appears respectable in number as well as talent; and his opinions on the subject of opposition are so judicious, and so far superior to any thing lately produced in French debates, that we deem it our duty to state them as fully as possible. Of Bonaparte, he, and the other speakers who voted with him, speak with temperate admiration; but it is observable, that the whole Tribunate appear to have listened with impatience and disgust to the long, and adulatory panegyric passed on him by Riouffe in his answer to, or rather personal attack on, the opponents of the proposals then discussed. It is cheering to observe, that scarcely any form, however defective, of deliberative and public assembly can be permitted without some efforts of free and manly thought being produced. Let them be as transient and void of immediate effect, as bubbles, yet still they prove the existence of a vital principle; they are the bubbles of a fountain, not such as rise seldom and silent on the muddy and stagnant pools of despotism.

(Wednesday, January 15, 1800.)

IN our Paper of Monday, we mentioned, that the subject of the Union is to be left unnoticed in the Speech, with which the Lord Lieutenant will this day open the Irish Parliament; and that this circumstance had been construed in many circles as presumptive evidence that the question of an Union was suspended for the present, if not entirely dropped.—A ministerial Paper of yesterday says—"It is, we believe, true, as stated in an opposition paper of yesterday, that the speech of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, upon the opening of the Session to-morrow, will not mention any thing respecting the measure of an Union.—There are no doubt good reasons for this omission. We can assure the public, however, that the measure is not less ripe for being brought forward; and, if we are not misinformed, it will, soon after the meeting of the Irish Parliament, be introduced into the House of Commons there in the shape of a message from the King." Thus we find our intelligence confirmed, and accompanied by an assurance, the accuracy of which we see no reason to question. All, indeed, who, from observation of parliamentary intrigues, have attained any degree of *weather-wisdom* as to changes in the political atmosphere, were prepared to interpret the Lord Lieutenant's silence as a sufficient indication that all the power and all the artifices of ministerial influence were at work to

ripen the project, which has some *crude* parts still, though it is certainly "not the less ripe," from its not being formally pre-announced by the Viceroy.

On the general policy of this measure, we have never ventured an opinion: though the means which have been adopted to carry it into effect have received from us all the abhorrence which we could express! (For no safe expression could convey all which we felt and still feel.) The vindictive turbulence of a wild and barbarous race, brutalised by the oppression of centuries, was to be coerced; and no better expedient suggested itself than to permit, or at best to connive at, a system of *retaliation!* To give an example of horrors, under the pretext that they were only following one; by the vices of a government, to occasion the vices of popular rage, and by retaliations, to inflame that rage into madness; to *iron* and *strait-waistcoat* the whole country by military law, and then gravely intreat the inhabitants to exercise their free will and unbiassed judgments; these were the measures intended to smooth and prepare the way to a great national union, founded in assent, and cemented by affection! However wise and benignant the plan might have been in itself, it certainly becomes questionable whether it may not be unsafe and impolitic at present, in consequence of the agitation produced by the mad and sanguinary precurrences. This consideration has doubtless influenced many in their opposition to it; while others have found their na-

tional pride attacked, and stabbed in the vitals by the idea, that their country was to lose its individual being and character, and without heart or lungs of its own, to be fed, like a wen, by the circuitous circulation of a nobler body. Yet still, when we contemplate the materials of which the Orange Confederacy is composed, we experience some degree of surprise at the strength and obstinacy of their opposition. A virtuous *opposition* it cannot be! We know that faction too well. With them public depravity is not softened down even by the hopeful vice of hypocrisy: — general sympathy in corruption supersedes the necessity of a vizard. Jobbers, place-hunters, unconditional hirelings, whatever their immediate conduct may be, they will gain no credit from honest men for their motives. Desperate state-harpies, they are now opening against ministers the ravenous mouths, that had been even now devouring ministerial bounties; and presume to fight for their country with talons impeded by their country's spoils; polluted by their country's blood! *Timeo Danaos vel dona ferentes.* These men recall to our mind the fable of the magician, who, having ordered his ministering imps to destroy the infernal abodes, was himself torn in pieces by them, and carried off in a whirlwind.

The reason why the union is to be preceded by no allusion from the Lord Lieutenant in his speech, is derived from the number of election writs which it will be necessary to issue after the meeting of

Parliament. More than twenty seats will be vacant, and all in the government interest. Some of the former members for these seats have died; others have gotten places, and must be re-elected; and some in honour have resigned, rather than obey the desires of their patrons.—The accession of the new members will secure, it is supposed, a majority. But this plan the Anti-Unionists hope to defeat, by moving a question on the Union this day, in order that they may negative it before the ministerial forces can be fully mustered. But ministers have confident expectations that, even in the present state of their forces, they possess a small majority, which will be made decisive by the arrival of their new recruits, and re-elected friends. The Anti-Unionists are certainly numerous and even more perhaps than their numbers justify, certain of success; but should ministers render their cause once hopeless, by however small a majority, the *conversions* will be rapid, and the new converts as zealous, as if each were to be made Secretary of War, or Minister of Foreign Affairs. Such we believe to be the plan of the campaign, which will this day commence. A question the most important that can occur in the annals of nations is to be decided; it will be lost or won by half a neck. But whether lost or won, depends not so much on the justice of the cause, as on the success of the previous intrigues among the jockies!

(Thursday, January 30, 1800.)

WE can fully sympathise with the public in their anxious expectations and curiosity concerning the motion (and consequent debate) on the Chief Consul's proposals. The disappointment of Monday was repeated yesterday, and the motion is once more deferred to Monday next; nor do we see any reasons, which authorise us to promise ourselves, that our hopes on Monday next will not be compelled to submit to a further procrastination. The causes assigned for these repeated delays have been various. Mr. Pitt is said to be indisposed, and as great a variety of disorders have been attributed to him, as a quack medicine professes to cure,—hoarseness, blue devils, spasms in the stomach, &c others have stated the absence of Mr. Dundas as the cause, and there seems to be some reason for this opinion, as he is not expected in town till the end of next week. But we suspect (and have reason for our suspicion) that certain parliamentary intrigues are going forward, and not yet concluded; and that the country gentlemen (and some others, who have been styled independent members) are dissatisfied with the vulgar arrogance with which the French proposals have been rejected, and alarmed by the nature of the motives, which are circulated, as the real causes of the support of the ministers in the continuance of the war, and which go to a complete sacrifice of the permanent and

landed interest of the country to the moneyed and commercial interests. This, however, is *made certain*, by the late debates in the House of Lords, that many who now vote with the Minister, vote with mistrust and hesitation; and even if no *facts* should openly appear in the House of Commons on the ensuing debate to the same import; yet let it be remembered, that many and *volcanic* revolutions may be fermenting under ground, while the *surface* remains undisturbed. The debate in the House of Lords, we cannot but consider as a confession of a complete defeat on the part of ministers in point of argument, otherwise it were scarcely conceivable, that even Lord Grenville could lay the whole proof of the identity of the present French government with that of the Jacobins, on their non-acknowledgment of the aggression, when, as we have before stated, no precedent exists in all history, ancient or modern, of such an acknowledgment having been made; otherwise it were scarcely conceivable that even a Lord Grenville could have been childish enough to have enumerated all the crimes and follies of France, and have dropped all those of her enemies; as if all her enemies had been immaculate, or as if their crimes and follies had had no influence in producing or continuing those of the French government:—otherwise, we repeat, it were scarcely conceivable, that even Mr. Pitt's Vicegerent, in a House of Lords, could have the folly to state, that the stability of a treaty could depend on the life or

character of Bonaparte, without proving that any treaty had been ever violated by a French government, simply, because it had been concluded by its predecessors; or, that any treaty had ever been observed by *any* government, longer than its own interests induced, and the strength of its rival compelled, the observation.

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE.

(Tuesday, January 28, 1800.)

IT is said "that the first reply of our Government has put an end to the pretensions of the Chief Consul to write directly to our king; and the not less impudent one of addressing monarchical and legitimate governments with the revolutionary and insulting preface of Liberty, Equality, and the Sovereignty of the People."

To the former part of this curious sentence we make no objection. It suggested itself to us on the first perusal of the Chief Consul's Letter, how amusing it would seem to some future historian, while he contemplated retrospectively the beings whose strong arm had given its projectile force to the political world; how *amusing* it would appear that Bonaparte should have pretended to have written directly to OUR KING! To the former part of the sentence, therefore, we make no objection; but

the subsequent words are not equally admissible. "Impudent!" Wherein consists the impudence of using the forms prescribed by that constitution, in virtue of which he announced himself Chief Consul? Would it not have been impudence in *him* to have omitted them? Talleyrand and Lord Grenville are both Ministers of Foreign Affairs; the rank of both is equally incapable of being misunderstood; to Talleyrand's letter, therefore, there needed no explanatory superscription. But the title of Chief Consul is a new one; and surely, it was modest and conciliating in Bonaparte to preface a letter to our Sovereign Lord the King by an acknowledgment, that he did not address him as a personal equal, but as the ambassador and subject of a higher power, viz. the collective majesty of the French nation. Let those who are angry at the application of the word "majesty" to a whole people, examine the meaning of the word *etymologically* and *historically*, and they will find that it was only *transferred* to a single person, and that it originally meant the power and dignity resident in the majority of the common weal. Our king is the lawful representative and *personification* of this power and dignity; which he superscribes *inclusively* in his own superscription. But this highest honour Bonaparte did not presume to claim, and wrote therefore to the king of England, in the name, and as the *servant*, of the French nation. But it was impudent, it seems, thus to address

monarchical and *legitimate* forms of government! Legitimate is too vague a word to be understood without a definition: the Jacobites were indefatigable in bandying it against the House of Brunswick, and those attached to the old constitution of Poland have applied it against the two Emperors of Russia and Germany; a term so vague signifies nothing but the passion of the man that uses it. The epithet "monarchical," however, needs no definition: and in a Poet Laureate's Ode, when the verse demanded a dissyllable, the word "monarch" might pass unexplained, as well as undefined. But there is no *licentia prosaica;* and we would fain admonish the hirelings of ministers, that, however strongly their wishes tend that way, yet, thank Heaven, it is still our possession, as well as birth-right, that we have a KING, and no *Monarch!* The 24th and 25th statutes of Henry VIII. declare the crown of England Imperial, and the King *Emperor* of the realm; and after the Union, our ministers (who are partial to precedents drawn from reigns *so favourable to liberty*) will, it is said, renew the title. But even that detestable tyrant Henry the Eighth, is no where styled a *Monarch*, or his government monarchical. Our king is not the sole supreme power; but as Bracton observes (Lib. 2. c. 16), *Rex habet superiorem Deum, item Legem, per quam factus est Rex; item curiam suam, viz. Comites et Barones, quia comites dicuntur quasi Socii Regis, et qui habet Socium habet Magis-*

trum: et ideo si Rex *fuerit sine fræno*, i. e. *Lege, debent ei frænum ponere.*" — Therefore, however hateful the word "liberty" may be to the creatures of a minister, who has *alarmed* a nation out of its best and dearest liberty, that of the press, yet still to our *kingly*, not *monarchical* government, it is an address of brotherhood, not insult. Equality, likewise, if it have any signification different from that equality which we possess (viz. the subjection of all to the same laws), ought to give us no greater offence than the phrase of "Federal Republic" in the American State-papers. For America, as well as France, has excluded an hereditary nobility: and the word "Republic," in the modern sense of it, implies this exclusion. But what other equality, than that which results from such exclusion, has any French government recognised? "The Sovereignty of the people;"—this perhaps is the stumbling-stone of offence! This, however, is expressly recognised by the ministers in their own Note. "Though Majesty makes no claim to prescribe to France what shall be the form of her government, or in whose hands she shall vest the authority necessary for conducting the affairs of a great and powerful nation." What is meant by the word "France?" Assuredly no constituted power; for the acknowledgment of any such power, as existing in that country, is avoided through the whole Note with a studied accuracy, and a *pettifogger's* cunning. It must mean, therefore, the people of

France; and in them it expressly affirms the *imprescriptible* right of conferring the Supreme Power. But a power must be possessed before it can be conferred; and in this by undeniable consequence is involved the Sovereignty of the People. These are not our doctrines, this is not our belief; but we affirm that it is the sole meaning of which the words in the Note are susceptible. But so it is ever! Babœuf and Mr. Windham are both in extremes; and extremes meet! Perhaps, one reason why Talleyrand omitted to superscribe his letter with the phrases in dispute, is to be found in this very passage. The titles were already allowed; to repeat them, therefore, became superfluous; they might be suppressed without being omitted, and exist virtually, like a grammatical *subauditur*, or like an admitted postulate, in the implicit and cryptical syllogisms of the old logicians.

(Thursday, February 6, 1800.)

THE sensation excited in the public mind by the debate on Monday has been as great as the importance of the occasion had led us to expect. The result of that debate does not, we trust, consist in the state of the votes in that assembly in which it was held. The public will review the arguments, and their suffrages are alone of ultimate importance. They will perceive by the speech of the Minister, that war is to be continued with the French Re-

public, till we have overthrown it, or till it has baffled and disgraced us. An awful sentence! But by what arguments has it been supported? The French have broken treaties; we, therefore, can make no treaties with the French. But did not all our allies, at the commencement of the war, enter into solemn treaties not to lay down arms but by mutual consent? And did they not all break this treaty? What is the whole history of modern Europe, but a succession of wars, originating in broken treaties? It is absurd to apply that against a treaty of peace with one country, which does not apply against even a treaty of alliance with all other countries; and yet, as Mr. Fox well observed, the moral character of our friends and fellow labourers is assuredly of more importance to us than that of those whom we wish only not to be our enemies. Let any man mention any act of folly, treachery, or oppression in the French Republic, and we pledge ourselves to find a *fellow* to it in our own allies, or in the history of the line of princes, upon the restoration of whom an honourable peace is now made to depend. To us the turn of the debate on Monday is matter of hope and exultation. The harangues of the ministers were absolute confessions of weakness. Long and tedious details of French aggressions, which, if they had been as fair and accurate as they were false and partial, would still prove nothing; violent personalities on Bonaparte, and as violent panegyrics on the superior science, talents,

and humanity of the conqueror of Warsaw and Ismail; and the old delusive calculations about French resources, calculations always accompanied by prophecies, which prophecies have been always, even to a laughable degree, falsified: these formed the substance and contents of the ministerial orations. More than one half of Mr. Pitt's speech was consumed in the old re-repeated tale of the origin of the war. This can be nothing more than an appeal to passion. For let us suppose for a moment, that we and not the French were the aggressors, the unprovoked aggressors; that they were innocent, and we guilty—yet how would this affect the subject of peace? Is any man so contemptibly ignorant of the rules and first foundations of State morality, as to affirm that because our Ministers had entered into a war knavishly, that therefore the people were bound in honour or honesty to conclude a peace ruinously? The interest of nations, the true interest, is and ought to be the sole guide in national concerns; and all besides is puerile declamation, only serviceable as covering a defeat, and preventing the appearance of an absolute rout, such as would have been implied in silence. What two nations were ever at war, and did not obstinately charge the aggression, each on the other? Has not this been matter of course since the time that the introduction of the Christian Religion has made the governors of mankind afraid to state conquest or glory as their motives? And to adduce

this as a political reason against the propriety of concluding a peace, or even of entering on a negotiation! This, the truth or falsehood of which is absolutely indifferent to the great question! O shame! shame! — Are the principles of French government dangerous, and such as are alluring enough to be susceptible of propagation? Yes! says Mr. Dundas! for though all the rights of election are removed, and though the Legislative and Executive is the farthest possible removed even from the forms of popular freedom, still the municipalities remain the same as in the time of Robespierre! Had the kings of Europe refused to treat with the Protectorate of England, which they were never mad enough to do; had the kings of Europe refused to treat with *our* great usurper and regicide, Cromwell, they might, on Mr. Dundas's argument, have *refused* likewise to *treat* with the country after the Restoration. For though the government and the governors were all changed, still the country was a regicide republic; for it had its old vestries, and the very same modes of electing its constables and church-wardens!

Mr. Pitt railed most bitterly at the character of Bonaparte, and charged all the treaties, that were broken, to him, upon no other ground, for the greater part, than that he was instrumental in making them! But the truth is, Mr. Pitt knows Bonaparte to be sincere, and, therefore, will not negotiate; because that negotiation would lead to a peace, which peace

would baffle that idle hope of restoring the French monarchy, which, spite of the document sent to Petersburgh, is and has been the real object of Ministers, both in beginning and continuing the war. If Mr. Pitt believed Bonaparte really insincere, we venture to affirm, that he would have accepted his proposals; for according to his own confessions he must have known, that the result of them would have been to have united all parties, and to have facilitated his own schemes of extra-regular finance.—Mr. Pitt built up his periods, as usual, in all the stately order of rhetorical architecture; but they fell away at once before that true eloquence of common sense and natural feeling which sanctifies, and renders human, the genius of Mr. Fox. Like some good genius, he approached in indignation to the spell-built palace of the state-magician, and at the first touch of his wand, it sunk into a ruinous and sordid hovel, tumbling in upon the head of the wizard that had *reared* it.

(Wednesday, February 12, 1800.)

THE intelligence brought by the last Hamburgh mail of the recall of the Russian troops, and of their secession from the war, in conjunction with Austria, is believed by the best informed persons, though ministers affect to entertain a contrary opinion; and the advocates for the war, who had built so confidently on the power of past experience, in

precluding discord and jealousies among the combined Powers, feel an approaching discomfiture of their hopes. It is probable, that on the first open jarring between the two Imperial Courts, our Ministers sent over such proposals to both, as they deemed certain of producing a reconciliation; and in the interim, in virtue of that figure in poetry and rhetoric, by which the present tense is used for the future, they affirmed the wished for reconciliation realized. But this will not have been the first time, that the impolite obstinacy of events has given the flat contradiction to those inspired historians, who, like our Ministers, venture to relate beforehand, Past experience, to be effective, must have made the mind *dispassionate;* otherwise, it is but as the torch in the hand of a blind Cupid, which may guide others, but is useless to himself. But unfortunately, the past experience in the present case has been made up of the most rankling passions, the wounds of which may skin over, but seldom heal up. It has been made up of jealous rivalry between ambitious generals, and public attacks on the nicest feelings of soldierly honour. — These are real efficient, lasting causes, the true and vital springs of human conduct; compared to which the speculations of a common interest will be ever found to be shadows in the distance, yea, almost abstractions! Of the character of that righteous and magnanimous Emperor, Paul the First, it behoves us to speak most cautiously. — It is however generally under-

stood, that his imagination teems and buzzes with activities of equivocal generation, and that he is ambitious to stand out in *alto relievo* on the walls of the temple of Fame, as the heroic restorer of the feudal honours in Europe. That he will therefore stand by and merely *look* in upon the important game between England, Austria, and France, we confess to be highly improbable. But suppose that the regress of his troops should once more be countermanded, will Austria think herself secure in future, after such specimens of political coquetry? And will Russia be prevented from perceiving that she is playing a game against herself in aiding the plans of Austria? And what lesson ought we to learn from this? Will the Anglo-Russians remain exempt from jealousies? Is there that similarity of manners and character between British and Russian officers, which we doubt not subsists in every respect between British and Russian statesmen? Let us recollect the calumnious attack of the Russian General on our brave countrymen and commanders in the Dutch expedition, and deduce the probable cordiality and harmony of future co-operation. This too is past experience.

A SECOND ESSAY ON THE INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE.

(Monday, February 17, 1800.)

THE frequent allusions to the intercepted letters and the evident stress laid on them by the Ministers, during the debate in the House of Commons on Monday se'night — is this a circumstance which should scare us from the farther investigation of the authenticity of these letters? We have no wish to apply to the Minister the words which he applied to Bonaparte: "it remains with us to investigate whether we can place that confidence in his language, which is absolutely necessary, before we can venture to rely on him." No! we are willing to believe, that ministers are incapable of a direct and wilful violation of the laws of truth. The affair of the bills falsely dated from Hamburgh was indeed an instance of gentle *equivocation;* but it were prudish to call a venial *finesse* of trade by the harsh name of forgery. We believe ministers incapable of a direct falsehood, but are they therefore incapable of being deceived? Do not their passions, and their wishes, render them open on all sides to delusion? But hitherto, however, with the exception of one instance, we have steered clear of the ministers. The authority of government is expressly given to the third part only of the corres-

pondence; and we have not yet emerged from the First Part. The First Part we have shown to possess no species of testimony. What is its internal evidence? This point we shall examine, undeterred by the dread of *their* abuse, from whose praises alone we could apprehend any injury to our characters. We affirm again that sentiment with which we introduced this examination, that were we believers in the authenticity of these letters, and nowise sceptical, still we should deem such a scrutiny as the present, the best, the most effectual, and most honest mode of evincing their authenticity. "True religion," (says a great Christian Philosopher) "is more indebted for the clearness of its evidence to its adversaries, than to its defenders." Quintilian recommends as a duty of the first importance in a good advocate "*in aliam ei personam transeundum est* agendusque adversarius, *proponendum, quidquid omnino excogitari contra protest, quidquid recipit in ejusmodi disceptatione natura. Optimus est in dicendo patronus incredulus.*" Let us not then be blamed, if being sceptical, we attempt that as a *duty*, which it would have been for the *interest* of the cause to have done, had we been believers. We shall therefore proceed fearlessly "interrogare quam *infestissime* ac premere," if only on this account, that "*dum omnia quærimus, aliquando ad verum, ubi minime expectavimus, pervenimus.*" And first in the examination of the internal evidence of this correspondence,

we are impelled to remark with the Editor, that one thing has struck us, in looking over these letters, as a singularity not easily to be accounted for. It is that there should not be a single letter, no, not a single line, from any man in the ranks! How is this? "Are they interdicted from writing, lest they should disclose too much?"—(We should suppose, that a fierce and mutinous army, who amused themselves, as we are told in the correspondence, with calling their officers, as they passed them, "Jack Ketches of the French," would not be so easily interdicted from that, which their natural affections must so impetuously have prompted. And what more could they disclose than the officers have done? Is it possible that any man in the ranks could write more like a well-paid Anti-Jacobin, or reason more like an emigrant, than the majority of the letter-writers have done?)—"Are they—but we can form no satisfactory conjecture on the subject." We will endeavour to suggest one conjecture to the Editor's imagination. The names of a few officers might be easily gained, and their connections in France too might be known, by the emigrants employed in the Mediterranean in manufacturing the "last dying words," and the "more last dying words," and the "more last dying words still," of the French army in Egypt. But the names of the men in the ranks could not be so easily learnt, and (as the lists are in possession of the government in France) to have *invented* names

might have furnished occasion for unpleasant detections. We will content ourselves with letters from officers. The three first letters are written immediately after the arrival at Alexandria; and contain the merest *generalities*. It appears to us little less than impossible, that men just arrived in Egypt, with imaginations in a state of great excitement, could have been so little impressed by particular images, or have given so few images of particular things. Nothing is painted, as an eye witness *fresh* from the scene would paint it; nothing described in the order of time, as it met the eye. On the contrary, where description is *attempted*, it gives us the idea of one who has heard a story, or read a book, and then repeats to a third person what he has heard or read according as his memory suggests it, with *artificial* arrangements, and not with the natural ones of time and place. All is written exactly as an emigrant would write for Jaubert and Louis Bonaparte, not as they would themselves have written. This fact of mind has been most acutely applied by Sir Isaac Newton and Dr. Hartley, in proof of the authenticity of the Gospels. St. Matthew, an eye witness, narrates in the natural order; St. Luke, who compiled his Gospel from the accounts of others, arranges his narration more artificially. The fact, however, is far more striking, and even obtrusive in these letters, than in St. Luke's Gospel; and yet Jaubert and L. Bonaparte are intended to write as eye-witnesses! The third

letter is indeed a curiosity; scarce a sentence in it but has a ministerial purpose. Jaubert is made to puff by implication the Knights of Malta, and to infer the miseries occasioned by the conquest in which he has been assistant. "Malta is without a supply of provisions, and with an immense population, which was wholly supported by the order." In the next page (*i. e.* p. 32,) he writes Anti-Jacobin squibs. "You will laugh outright, perhaps, you witlings of Paris, at the Mahometan Proclamation of the Commander in Chief. He is proof, however, against all your raillery; and the thing itself will certainly produce a most surprising effect. You recollect that produced by the magic cry of *Guerre aux Chateaux, Paix aux Cabanes!*" Admirable! a Republican compares the first enthusiastic outcry of revolutionary fanatics to a Mahometan proclamation of "a cold-blooded philosophist."—The violent dragging together of these two ideas is precisely that which we might expect from an emigrant still smarting even to madness in consequence of that magic cry! Indeed the writer himself seems to be aware that he has transfused too much of his own feelings, and qualifies it with "as I have been rather too open in this letter, you will oblige me by throwing it into the fire as soon as you have read it." Besides, Jaubert had "perished in the explosion of the l'Orient," and it is worthy of remark, that the greater number of those officers *selected for correspondents*, are allowed to "have

perished." All is excellently well contrived, except that the contrivance is somewhat too palpable. — The fifth letter commences the tale of miseries; the sixth rises in pathos; the seventh is from a very *cautious* gentleman, and is intended to hint the suspicious tyranny with which all letters were examined by the agents of the General. It is rather unfortunate, that all the other letters, so profusely anti-gallican, seem in direct contradiction to this seventh letter. But it is not possible to heap every kind of vice on a man's character, without incurring some trifling contradictions; and these must be excused. The ninth proves Bonaparte's dishonesty; and General Damas (if he have not unfortunately perished) might be a candidate for the office of note-writer to the new budget of correspondence from Seringapatam! He writes like a veteran Treasury hireling, vide p. 79. The 12th letter is independent of its complaints and apprehensions, intended farther to evince that Bonaparte is an avaricious monopolist! Mercy on the man! What a bundle of incompatible villanies have they strung together, and christened by his name! Frantic, cold-blooded, avaricious, visionary, &c. &c. &c.!!! The rest of the letters have, almost without exception, each its *purpose;* and the common purpose of all is to describe " an accumulation of misery and despair, the inveterate hostility of the Arabs, the treachery of the Egyptians, the destructive warfare of the Mamelukes, together with the nauseous and peculiar

diseases of the country, the intolerable heats and pestilential winds, the devouring myriads of venomous insects, and the stench and putrefaction of ten thousand stagnant pools." It may be answered that these letters have been selected from a multitude, as answering each its purpose. Supposing the *truth* of this account, yet what less does it amount to than a confession of *virtual* forgery? From a large mass of letters, to select those only that suit a purpose, and to omit all those which might thwart it, constitutes what the old casuists style a " lie by omission."

To the curious coincidence of two men, both of the same name, and both writing a hand undistinguishably similar: and to the *late* discovery, that their names are not the same, but that the one was Boyer, and the other Royer—to this curious coincidence, and ingenious discovery, we have already paid the tribute of our admiration in our first essay In that essay, we likewise pressed on the attention of our readers the superfluity of general reasonings, observable in the whole of these letters, and the paucity of particular incidents. To this it has been objected, that these incidents are probably among the omissions; and we reply to the objection, that this grand Panacea for all possible cases of improbability is excellently well-contrived, save only that the contrivance is somewhat too palpable! We shall not weary our readers with any detailed examinations of the Second Part: because it stands

in point of external testimony exactly on the same grounds with the First Part; and because all our remarks on internal evidence apply to both *totidem verbis*. Indeed, this Second Part seems to have been published purely *for the benefit* of the Editor; and we congratulate the Minister on possessing a means of rewarding his creatures, so little burthensome to himself or the public. The Third Part is of higher importance, and stands on other grounds. The investigation of this shall appear on the first open day.

(Thursday, February 27, 1800.)

BY the last news from Paris, we are assured the Emperor of Germany is indignant at the attempt of Prussia to mediate between him and France. — It is more than probable, both that Bournonville took with him to Berlin definite propositions of peace, and that these propositions have met the approbation of the Prussian Court. If this should be confirmed, and if the propositions made by France, and delivered in by Prussia at Vienna, should be rejected; and if it should appear evident that this rejection originated in the ambition of the House of Austria; Prussia, by the joint necessities of honour and self-preservation, must become a party in the war. Beyond all doubt the young King will previously use all possible means of pacification. The ultimate success of these attempts is

an object of our anxious hopes, but it lies far beyond the ken of our foresight. In the mean time it cannot be disguised that the nobles in the less civilized parts of the Prussian dominions look with jealous eyes on their King's partiality to a system of reformation; that his attempts to ameliorate the wretched situation of the oppressed peasantry have been crossed and thwarted by them; and that his determination to subject all ranks equally to a legal taxation has been received by them, as such schemes have been always received by privileged orders. "How" (observed our great Milton) "can such men not be corrupt, whose very cause is the bribe of their own pleading?" The officers, however, who are all nobles, the whole army, and the people of course, throughout Prussia, are attached to the young King with an enthusiasm unexampled since the time of the Great Frederic, who, say the Prussians, is now for the first time no longer Frederic the *Unique*. The exquisite beauty, the simplicity, and pure domestic character of the Queen, render this attachment more intense, and throw around it the rich colouring of a chivalrous passion. A fragment from one of Wieland's celebrated "*Dialogues between you and me*," has appeared in an evening Paper. In these dialogues, published so early as March, 1798, Wieland had indicated the expediency of making Bonaparte Dictator in France.—One of our foreign Ministers accompanied the extract with a commentary, in which he expressed his belief, that this prophecy was not the result of conjectural

sagacity, but that which had arisen out of communications with Sieyes, or some other of the new philosophers, and that it is another proof of the existence of the conspiracy developed in the books of the Abbé Barruol. To have conjectured that the dead calm of real slavery should succeed to the tempests of a nominal freedom, and that the mastership should fall to the man who had been crowned by victory and the sciences with a two-fold laurel, required, we should suppose, no peculiar illumination. If, however, these dialogues do indeed expound the Book of Fate, an unfulfilled prediction may be added to the one already verified; for in the same work a hint is thrown out, that the young King of Prussia is to confer a new constitution moulded after the British on the whole North of Germany, and to merit by his docility in the school of existing circumstances, and by his mild equity, the peculiar praise of Marcus Aurelius. This, of course, would not be effected without a quarrel with Russia and the Emperor. In other respects he might make the attempt without much hazard. The events of the French revolution have so much strengthened monarchy, and depreciated plans for political liberty, that a patriot king would run much less risk of eventual deposition, than of seeing his charters returned, like those of Honorius by the Gauls, as likely to occasion an useless expense. Desire has perished with Hope; and Hope has died of a dead palsy, occasioned by excess of stimulation!

BONAPARTE, IN HIS RELATIONS TO ENGLAND.

(Thursday, March 13, 1800.)

AMONG the first public acts of Bonaparte, as Chief Consul, were his pacific overtures to Great Britain. He had assumed a new office, had advertised himself in a new character, and imposed a new constitution. In all this he had gratified the ruling propensity of the French nation, to whom a certain degree of novelty, by whatever means it is procured, appears to have become a necessary stimulus. Not to have evinced himself ambitious of peace would have been inconsistent, and have betrayed as opprobrious a slovenliness as that of the scene-shifter, who left a camp standing in front, after he had changed the side-wings to a temple of Janus. His conduct, therefore, was equally the dictate of individual interest, and enlarged political wisdom. For pacific overtures, whether they were successful or unsuccessful, would have a necessary tendency to unite the real lovers of their country. If they were welcomed on the part of the enemy, and led to a final pacification of the two countries, the greatness and reality of the blessing (a blessing too bestowed so undeniably by *his* zeal and moderation) could not fail to give a permanent popularity to his government. If they were repelled, after every honourable

pledge of their sincerity had been afforded, a national unanimity in the vigorous prosecution of the war was to be expected, both from a sentiment of the indignity sustained by the repulse, and from the demonstrated unavoidableness of the evil. Add to this, such repulse on the part of Great Britain could only be occasioned by the avowed determination of her Minister to restore monarchy and the hereditary Noblesse in France, and would therefore remove from the character of the Chief Consul all suspicions of a concealed attachment to Feudalism. It might, indeed, have been urged by the advocates for the war in France, that the avowed hatred of the English Minister to the existence of a French Republic rendered a peace with England insecure and dangerous; and that in the present unsettled state of French parties, it was better that the revenues of Great Britain should be expended in expeditions to Quiberon, Holland, and the West Indies, than in the corruption of Frenchmen, and those counter-revolutionary intrigues, to which a nominal peace would but facilitate the means instead of removing the propensity. On these grounds the same reasoners had justified the policy, though not the insolence of the Directory in their negotiations at Lisle. The Chief Consul could not but be aware of that portion of truth which was conveyed in these representations, but considering that the former governors of France had given real cause of offence to Great Britain by national denunciations, equally intempe-

rate with those of the English Minister, he waived the objection. He pleaded for mutual forgiveness and reciprocal amnesty—or if these blessings could not be realized, he was at least assured of evincing that the fault was now confined to the enemy. Accordingly, he commenced his proposals for peace by an absolute renunciation of Jacobinism, admitting his Majesty to be the lawful Sovereign of a free and happy nation; and then proceeded to disavow all projects of aggrandizement by conquest, affirming that both countries were already more powerful than their own true interests made requisite.—These respectful and even complimentary proposals were rejected in an answer, the policy and grammatical syntax of which were equally incomprehensible. Our Minister seems to have been animated by the spirit of an angry woman, who shuts the door with a fling against a rival, but first however eases her temper by a fit of scolding. Bonaparte was too great a man to be made angry by such anger. That respect which the dignity of the British nation demanded, was not to be withheld in consequence of the vulgar heat and insolence of the Cabinet at St. James's. In proof of that respect, and of his sincerity in his former proposals, he made a second overture with a scrupulous observance of all accustomed diplomatic forms—forms, arbitrary indeed, and of little importance; but which, from that very circumstance, it is even more puerile to object to, than to insist upon. He was

again repelled, and in the same tone; and a public declaration made, that the restoration of monarchy in France was the only possible condition, or, (which differs in reality but in words) the sole *definable* condition of peace. The after language of Ministers in Parliament, and of the Ministerial slave-gang out of Parliament, our posterity will probably be preserved from knowing, by its intense stupidity. But the Chief Consul has never forgot *his* character, or suffered his Ministers to forget theirs. No single inflammatory, no one resentful expression has been uttered, or authorized by the French Government; they have been either employed in removing false prejudices against the English ministry, as in the case of the French prisoners in England, or have been wholly silent. Conciliatory language may lead to peace, but abuse and recrimination can be of no service to the conduct of war.—It was a real and important concession to the merits and intentions of Bonaparte, that the Government, which were making the restoration of the old feudal system in France their sole and ultimate object, had considered *him* as the greatest obstacle to the accomplishment of that object; that his usurpation they had passed slightly over, but of his attachment to liberty and progressive amelioration they had proclaimed an overflowing conviction by their charges of Jacobinism; and that they had closed their high, though involuntary panegyric, on his genius and humanity, by pro-

nouncing him a complete contrast to that redoubtable conqueror of Warsaw and Ismail, Prince Field-Marshal Suwarrow. We sincerely wish for the sake of our country and of mankind, that these praises may be confirmed by the event; but we must wait, ere *we* can give our full assent to them.

(Saturday, March 15, 1800.*)*

YESTERDAY we again received French Papers, and up to the 13th inst. The Spring of the year approaching, in which nature begins to reproduce, and man recommences the work of destruction, each successive communication, however undecisive the facts communicated may be, cannot but rise in interest. It is therefore a pleasing superstition, not wholly unworthy of a momentary indulgence in a generous mind, to regard the late unwonted rapidity of intercourse as a happy omen. These Papers convey to us two facts that *confirm* our remarks of yesterday, rather than afford materials for any new observations. Bonaparte has addressed the people of France on the wisdom and duty of preparing for war, by personal enthusiasm and financial sacrifices; and uses as motives of inducement, not the ordinary appeals to terror or indignation, but the more sublime and humane excitement of hope. In consequence of the official communications, a deputation waited on the Chief Consul, to convey the wishes and approbation of

the Tribunate. Bonaparte replied, that all was to be anticipated from the dispositions of France, should she be compelled into a war; *that however all probabilities of peace had not vanished; and that the Consuls still entertained the hope of concluding it speedily, without fresh sacrifices on the part of the French.* The Consuls here allude, no doubt, to certain propositions of peace sent to the Rhine from Paris, and from thence conveyed to Vienna by the Austrian General Stippohuts. To these no answer has been yet received, but a favourable one is expected.

The temper of the French nation seems to be precisely that which was predicted, as the natural consequences of an earnest and repeated wish for a general peace having been rejected untried, and with repeated contumelies. They appear to have become that which involves only a verbal contradiction, enthusiastic moderates. We see not, what one interest any continental Power can have in continuing the war. It were idle to suppose, that our allies contemplate our monopolizing commerce with our feelings, or even without some alloy of feelings diametrically opposite. Austria has, indeed, ambitious projects to realize; and it is therefore necessary that France should place her vast strength in the attitudes that may most convincingly display it; while she still confines herself to terms, the refusal of which cannot but connect the North of Europe still more closely with her interests.

Russia, her only remaining continental enemy, is too suspicious of Austria, too remote from any sympathy in her general principles, and probably too much engaged in nearer anxieties, to be relied upon by the Emperor as an effective ally. The Emperor can now treat on high and honourable conditions: the events of a campaign cannot *add much* to the advantages which he may now gain without it; and it may *detract* all: it may give France new allies, and facilitate new revolutions, more formidable than the French, because conducted on principles less distant from the habits and opinions of the great mass of mankind. We think, therefore, that Austria will finally consent to peace; for though ambitious, she is not mad! But this country, whose navy, whose colonies, whose commerce have been almost doubled by the war, what is to be hoped from this country? We will hope this — we will hope of the good sense, which has distinguished Englishmen, that they will have learnt that commerce and commercial prosperity is an accompaniment and an accessary of a real and national prosperity, but by no means the essence and self-sufficient constituent of it. We will hope, that they will not justify the sneer of those who have compared us to Midas, whose touch turned every thing to gold, and who wanted bread in the midst of it. It is, however, proper, that we should state to our readers, that the accounts from Germany and France tend to the idea of the approaching recommencement

of the war. Both the French and Austrian armies are preparing to meet. But when we reflect that these accounts are for the most part created by military movements, which the simple uncertainty of a peace would alone produce and render politic, we are inclined to consider the declarations of the Chief Consul, and the palpable interests of the contending powers, as more than balancing the evidence.

(Monday, March 17, 1800.)

PREPARATIONS continue to be made for two expeditions, which, according to report, have very different objects. One, it is said, is destined for the Mediterranean, and another for Holland or the western coasts of France; and the preparations for both carried on at the same time cover each other, confounding and perplexing those who attempt to discover, by particular circumstances, the point of attack. The first expedition is to be commanded by General Sir Charles Stuart, aided by the gallant General Moore, scarcely recovered from his wounds, by Generals Simcoe, St. Clair, &c. General Stuart has commanded in Minorca and other hot climates; General Moore served in Corsica, the West Indies, &c, and the character of the whole of the staff supports the probability that the Mediterranean is to be the scene of the enterprise. We naturally ask what is its object in the

Mediterranean? Some say Genoa, which must be attacked from the sea; but we have ships enough near that city, and there are Austrian and Italian troops in the neighbourhood sufficient for such an enterprise. Malta may be *an* object in such an expedition, but it cannot be *the* object, especially since the Emperor of Russia has claimed it. Corsica, Cadiz, Toulon; if it were necessary, we could give reasons to show none of these are the object; nor can any wise object be pointed out in the Mediterranean, except Egypt.

That this is the point of attack has appeared a reasonable conjecture for some time, but we have refrained from being the first of the public journals to mention it; not that we see any danger in its being noticed, since it is publicly spoken of, and believed in well-informed circles, and the French government is unable to send to Egypt any assistance. Our Cabinet, we believe, begin to suspect that the *intercepted correspondence* was a *hoax* of the French republicans, to prevent England from sending troops against them in Egypt, by persuading us the French were perishing of all the plagues possible to be imagined. We know, that a year ago, the advice of military men to government was, not to send troops against the French in Egypt, but to hem them in there, and suffer them to perish by disease, the sword, and famine. This advice would have been wise, if the intercepted correspondence

had told truth; but we suspect it is found to be false, fabricated for the purpose of deluding us, and filled with the grossest abuse of Bonaparte to disguise and make palatable the poison.

If it be true that the French have deluded us with a false opinion of their weakness in Egypt while they really were in full possession of the country; if it be true that their chief and only dread was the English, to keep whom away they fabricated the correspondence; and if they are now, with an appearance of success, negotiating a peace with the Porte, which will leave them in tranquil and permanent possession of Egypt; then an expedition against the French in that country becomes not merely a diversion of war, but a just and necessary undertaking. Were the French left in possession of Egypt, they might in time expel us from our Eastern possessions, and annihilate our Indian commerce. With Malta and Egypt, France might almost monopolise the commerce of the East. The wisdom, the necessity, the indispensable necessity, of depriving the French of the means of striking so fatal a blow to the power of England, are unquestionable.

Orders have been issued to the officers on leave in Great Britain and Ireland, from regiments at Gibraltar and Minorca, immediately to take their passage for these garrisons, in a ship which is appointed to convey them. It is probable that the expedition will chiefly consist of English troops,

seasoned to the climate, taken from Portugal, Gibraltar, Minorca and Sicily, and that they will be replaced by the regiments now sending from England, among which are two battalions of the 4th foot, two of the 5th, three of the 9th, two of the 17th, one of the 31st, two of the 35th, two of the 40th, two of the 52nd, making sixteen battalions, provided the health of the 31st regiment, which we lament to learn has been and continues sickly, should be sufficiently re-established. It is said that Egypt cannot be General Stuart's object, as the troops he takes with him have been completed from the English militia, who engaged not to serve out of Europe; but if these troops only replace others in Portugal, Gibraltar, Minorca, and Sicily, the engagement with them will not be broken. We confess ourselves not possessed of the slightest information as to the object of the expedition. Our remarks are only such as any thinking man might make upon this general and very interesting topic of conversation.

REVIEW OF A PAMPHLET

BY ARTHUR YOUNG, ESQ., F.R.S., AND SECRETARY TO THE BOARD OF AGRICULTURE, ENTITLED "THE QUESTION OF SCARCITY PLAINLY STATED, ETC."

(Thursday, March 27, 1800.)

THE public are well acquainted with Arthur Young. Formerly agasp for reform, he now raves against all reformation, as dogs contract the hydrophobia from excessive thirst. We impeach him not of insincerity; a proneness to charge either church or state prophets with the guilt of conscious imposture we hold an unequivocal symptom of a vulgar and unreflecting mind. Arthur Young sympathized with his country in a sentiment of horror against the excesses of the French revolution; he was aware that some portion of this horror would attack all those who, like himself, had blown the trump of gratulation on the first approach of that revolution; and he hastened to avow his recantation in a work almost lyrically unconnected, and set to a more boisterous music than would have suited any species of the Lyric, except the *Palinodia*.

> Quid amplius vis? O mare! O terra! ardeo,
> Quantum neque atro delibutus Hercules
> Nessi cruore
> Quæ finis? aut quod me manet *stipendium*?
> Hor. Epod. 17.

The Minister accepted and rewarded his conversion, and thereby secured its permanence. Opinions that are the tenure by which a man holds the comforts and luxuries of a good fortune, are commonly very sincere opinions; though it were as absurd to attribute any moral worth to such sincerity, as to believe that there is any *religious* merit in the *unusual* strictness with which the poor of this kingdom observe the present Lent. Self-interest is a chilling principle; but is of excellent use to ministers in the condensation and phialling of any hot vapour that suits their purposes, and which might otherwise have passed off "*tenues commixtus in auras.*" But though we consider Arthur Young at present as little less than a "gentleman in the confidence of government," to use the courteous phrase of a learned judge, yet still he is a man of undoubted information, and, in his particular and most important province, entitled on all occasions to the most respectful attention. We procured his present pamphlet therefore with eagerness. "The Question of Scarcity plainly stated, and Remedies considered," and this too by Arthur Young, excited in us not only curiosity, but a deep and serious interest. We had ever considered the subject as intimately connected with all the main evils, and nominal properties of the nation. We can scarcely describe the sensation which we experienced in reading the first sentence of the advertisement prefixed to the pamphlet. "The Author of these papers has but

one motive in printing, which is that of convincing the people, that the evil they suffer at present is to be attributed only to the unfavourable seasons." We however suspended our feelings, and proceeded to the pamphlet itself, which we do not hesitate to recommend as the most masterly confutation of this first sentence, that we could have hoped or almost wished for. He has proved indeed (what we never doubted), that the attacks on millers and monopolists are unfounded, inflammatory, and impolitic; that there exists a real and alarming scarcity; and that the unfavourable season has produced it. But is this "*the* evil, which the people suffer at present?" Is it not an evil, a gigantic evil, that in a country in which unfavourable seasons are so often to be expected, an unfavourable season should produce a real and alarming scarcity? and is this evil "to be attributed only to unfavourable seasons?" The pamphlet itself furnishes us with the best and completest answer to these questions.

The work is introduced by some very just observations on the errors arising from the fear of aggravating the evil by sounding alarm, from the generalizing of individual experiences, and from confining the inquiries on the subject to the *proportion* of the crop, and not paying a sufficient attention to the price." "It should seem" (observes Mr. Young) "as if men would be pretty well satisfied, provided they could prove the deficiency to amount only to a fourth or a fifth, forgetting that

the people are suffering a very heavy distress, whatever that proportion may turn out; of what account to them your fine speculations in arithmetic, while they pay five pounds a quarter?" He proceeds to state the average crop of the kingdom, which he concludes to be near twenty-four bushels an acre, and certainly not to have *increased* in quantity for the last twelve years (p. 83), and then, under the head of Population, gives it as his opinion, and as having been proved by the indefatigable researches of Sir John Cull, that within the years 1787 and 1797, the people have increased *one third*. We have not facts enough before us to determine on the probability or improbability of this assertion. If true, it is a most alarming truth; and whether true or false, it is worth our while to observe that it occurs in the 17th page of a pamphlet written for the sole purpose of proving that the evil is owing entirely to an unfavourable season!!

Mr. Young shews next, by a mass of authorities, the existence and degree of the deficiency of the last crop, and gives extracts, arranged in tables, from the answers to his circular letters, with the names of the correspondents — with the most noticeable miscellaneous circumstances furnished by each correspondent. The *result* is melancholy, no less indeed, than (to quote the words in p. 29), that "famine stares us in the face." Next follow observations on the *consumption of wheat*, and on the STOCK IN HAND LAST HARVEST. This

last subject is treated with great acuteness and accumulation of just reasonings and interesting facts. The observations on the small effect of speculations and monopolies are excellent; one paragraph is too *curious* not to be quoted. " But suppose corn in autumn and winter is cheaper than it ought to be, from little and poor farmers carrying too much to market, the consumption of the people will be in some measure proportioned to the price, *and they will be eating more than the crop allows.* Now I ask whether it is not, in such a case, much to be desired, that jobbers, or millers, or monopolisers, should take advantage of the price, and lay in great stocks?" We do not dispute the conclusion; but what a confession is implied of the misery of the people at large; that bread must be kept from them, as gingerbread and sweetmeats from children, lest they should *over-eat* themselves, In the villages in the north of Germany *white* bread, in various forms, is put up to sale at the fairs, as a dainty; but we never understood before, that bread itself was so *tempting* a viand in our own country. On the contrary, we should have supposed, that if bread were cheap, the only result would be, that the people, who are now but half-fed, would then have their belly-full, and that those who have now enough would employ the spare money in adding to their meals the rarities of beef and mutton. If the people eat more bread than comes to their share, in the cheap months, it is an unde-

niable consequence that at other times they have not bread enough to eat. The next head is entitled *quantities calculated* — from which we shall quote the following sentences without further annotation than that it is true of an enlightened country in consequence of an unfavourable season; and yet that country is puffed up with the self-conceit of its *prosperity!* "If the rich feed the poor, *which is very much the case at present*, the *price* is no longer bounded by the faculties of the poor, for the wealth of the whole kingdom comes into competition for food: as long as such demand continues, *prices* may rise. And this has been the case for the last five months. — Had *the poor in many of the counties been left without this support and assistance of the rich, they must have perished for want of food, till numbers had lessened to the proportion of the supply.*"

The last, and of course the most important article is, the REMEDIES.—There are, 1. The encouragement of potatoes by a premium (with a justification of premiums, in answer to the disciples of Adam Smith). The prohibition of oats for the feed of horses kept for pleasure: which, he affirms, would of itself have prevented the evil. There are immediate *remedies*. As *alternatives*, and as necessary to prevent a relapse, he recommends, and very ably comments on, the following means:—1. Ascertain the prices of corn. 2. A general inclosure. 3. Give land to the cottagers. 4. Parochial assistance in

food to be in rice, soup, and potatoes. 5. Number the people. 6. Register the acres of wheat and rye sown. And afterwards we find a proposal for something like a public granary of rice "by inducing the East India Company so to provide themselves as to render an act feasible, which should direct, that as soon as wheat shall rise, on the average of the kingdom, £4 per quarter, and so long as it remains at or above that price, the company should sell rice in hundred weights, to all persons demanding it, at 25*s*. per hundred weight, or any other price which shall, on an average of years, be adequate."

We shall conclude with three short quotations, briefly remarking on each. The first is in page 83. —"Had the people and acres been numbered in 1788, and again in 1798, and the one found to increase nothing, but the other one-third, who could be surprised at scarcity?" And this is said by the man, whose sole motive for printing is to shew, that all *the evil* we are suffering (not the immediate high price, but all THE EVIL) is to be attributed entirely to an unfavourable season!!—The second is from page 69.—"The farming bailiff I sent to the Duke of Liancourt ten years ago, is now in London, having left France but a fortnight, and has given me many accounts of French husbandry," one circumstance of which deserves notice—"*that every scrap of waste and neglected land is converted into little possessions by the poor, and*

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cultivated most assiduously; much by means of potatoes."—We recommend to Mr. Arthur Young to annex this quotation from his own work as a motto to the next edition of his—"*The example of France a warning to Britain!*"—We have, alas! too often mistaken newspaper anecdotes of rogues in Paris for the annals of the French nation since the revolution; and in our rage against a phantom of Jacobinism, have shamefully neglected to calculate the blessings from the destruction of Feudalism. The voice of liberty shall not be blasphemed by us, because the Noahs of the revolutionary deluge, who first planted it, were made drunk by its untried fruits.

The third and last quotation is on an awful subject; we take it from page 85.—"*It is the hand of the Almighty which has afflicted the nation.*"—As men and Christians, how can we suppress the indignant feelings which this sentence excited in our inmost soul? By the author's own confession immense tracts of land are lying waste; the evil which we are suffering might have been wholly prevented by suspending the use of oats for our pleasure horses; the money which our expeditions to Quiberon and Holland cost us would have purchased rice enough to have kept the cheek of every cottager's child fat and rosy, and have made the deficiency of our crops an unfelt evil; and yet we are gravely assured, that it is the hand of the ALMIGHTY which affects us; and among other

reasons for *infidelity* and *atheism*. The hirelings of ministers, and the supporters of a sanguinary war, under the blasphemous plea of a war for the religion of Jesus;—*these* are not infidels, not atheists — only the *occasion* of infidelity, the *causes* of atheism. — The hand of the Almighty afflicts us! — Thou Eternal Goodness! — far rather art thou by gentle and fatherly premonitions drawing us back from the brink of that abyss, to which an evil spirit has been luring us; and a placeman dares draw off our eyes from our own follies and those of our rulers, and proclaims to a suffering nation, that it is thy hand alone which has afflicted them!

(Monday, April 21, 1800.)

IT has been too readily taken for granted, because France is more tranquil than she has been since the commencement of the revolution, that Bonaparte is supported by the voice of the people. The system he has pursued is well calculated to gain the esteem of men of property, and of persons in easy circumstances, who, relieved from the perpetual terrors in which they have hitherto lived, must look up to him as their protector. The same feeling which has secured Mr. Pitt in power, must secure Bonaparte. In this country men of property have been falsely and artfully alarmed; they have been prejudiced against the friends of our constitutional liberties, and persuaded to cling

to Mr. Pitt as their best guardian; how justly, the income tax, and other such measures, may explain. Property will maintain both Mr. Pitt and Bonaparte in authority, if they use their power with moderation, unless some sudden, unforeseen event should give a shock to public opinion. — The known genius of Bonaparte warrants expectations of his success in the field; his overthrow is not likely to be effected either by military reverses, or the dissatisfaction of the upper classes of the people. Thus far Bonaparte has the voice of the country; just as far as Mr. Pitt, but no further. For it is not to be supposed that all the Jacobins in France are reconciled to his government. The numbers of men, who as members of the assemblies, as public speakers, clubbists, agents and agitators of all sorts; men who live but in turbulence and party broils; who are spread over all France; and possessed of an influence in every corner, can poison the minds and influence the passions of the multitude, it is not to be supposed that these men are friendly to Bonaparte. The public disgust at the late government, the calamities and confusion it brought upon France, make the nation give the Consulate a trial, in hopes of a happier system, and prevent its enemies from exercising their influence with success. The military, too, overawing the people, prohibit all freedom of discussion, with too stern a front to allow the rise of any serious opposition to government. But outward tranquillity may exist without content; and

the mass of the French people may be as little pleased with the Consulate, as the Irish nation are with the military and flogging system by which they are held in subjection.

The quiet state of France cannot therefore be taken as full proof of the submission of all parties, and of the popularity of Bonaparte's government; —on the contrary, we suspect, the men whose importance it has annihilated brood over their grievances, and wait only for a favourable opportunity of overthrowing the present system, and bringing its champion to the scaffold. But there is no prospect at this time of such an opportunity presenting itself. Bonaparte obtained his power by the most flagrant violation of all principles of civil and political liberty; his government is an usurpation, and the constitution under which he pretends to rule is a gross mockery of freedom. — The means by which he obtained his power and the pretended restraints he has placed upon it, shall never cease to meet the severest censure in this paper; but we must, in justice, assume a different tone, when speaking of his late conduct. If we were to admit that the revolution of the 18th Brumaire, and the mock constitution to which it gave birth, were necessary for the salvation and happiness of France, then Bonaparte's measures in every instance would claim approbation; but we cannot make an admission so fatal to the cause of liberty. To approve of a general, at the head of his grenadiers, dispersing the representa-

tives of the people, however unworthy; to approve of such a mock constitution, and of substituting a military force for the civil power; to approve of a military despotism instead of a republic, however ill constituted and ill conducted, would be inconsistent with all notions of liberty. None but bigots to the French revolution, or bigots in their hostility to Mr. Pitt (two very distinct kinds of bigots) can give such approbation. Bonaparte's measures, since his return from Egypt, may be necessary to the ultimate establishment of freedom in France; but we must see that freedom exists before we can excuse them.

But while we state our objections to the means by which Bonaparte has arrived at his present power, we must acknowledge that he has made a wise and moderate use of it. He is a despot indeed, but not a tyrant. This is the distinction which we take upon his conduct; and it may be necessary for our readers to mark it, that they may detect those who, accusing us of inconsistency, have no other rule themselves, than that of censuring or approving in the lump all political men, of advocating the cause of a party, and justifying its errors with the same zeal as its wisest proceedings. Bonaparte is endeavouring to heal the wounds of the revolution; he has associated in his government all the men of abilities and moderation; he has repressed public vice, tolerated religion, and relaxed the severe laws against emigrants and other

unfortunate persons of that description: he has forborne from any measures of terror or extortion in finance; and if he has not been so successful as he wished in recruiting the armies, it is a proof that he has not used cruel or tyrannical measures for that purpose: he has sought peace in the spirit of peace with humbleness and conciliatory language. The whole system he has adopted is that of a mild despotism in respect to the interior of France, and of a wary and moderate government in respect to her foreign affairs.—The wisdom of his proceedings induces men to submit in France, though they feel no spirit of enthusiasm in his favour.— The emigrants speak of his genius with admiration, and of his views with hope: Englishmen the most alarmed at the French revolution, and the most friendly to the war, feel their fears subside in consequence of his conduct. He has given repose to men's minds, if not to the armies directed by governments. Every man can perceive that the public apprehension of danger from France exists no more now than it ever did in any common war. Bonaparte has buried under his new constitution the principles of revolutionists; but he excites the hopes of almost all descriptions of men; even the royalists do not despair of some amelioration of their condition. He has palsied the hostility of all parties, if he has gained the enthusiastic support of none. His is a government of experiment rather than of popularity. His object is to give tranquillity, and gain the con-

fidence of temperate, wise men, rather than to fanaticise factions, and to rule by public delirium. It was that mode of government which exhausted France, and rendered the revolution an object of terror both at home and abroad; and Bonaparte must maintain himself without having recourse to it, in order to succeed in the system he has begun.

It is unnecessary to speculate upon the duration of the government of France, or upon the changes it may undergo. Our present object is to draw a distinction between the detestable means by which Bonaparte has obtained power, and the wise and mild use he has made of it. Whether he will act with true greatness, and make the happiness of the nation, rather than personal power, his object, is a question which time alone can decide. Upon that question depends the character of his present conduct. If it be necessary for the public welfare to deposit the whole authority of the state in the hands of one man, Bonaparte is the person of all others to whom such a trust should be confided. He is without a rival in renown; no one can attempt to cope with him in personal influence; his great genius points him out as the man who is best able to restore to France peace and prosperity; and to give repose and confidence to Europe. If his virtues be as great as his genius, he may do for the old world what Washington has done for the new.

(Wednesday, August 6, 1800.)

THE comparison which Mr. Fox, in his celebrated Letter to the Electors of Westminster, makes between the war of the Crusades, and the present war, has been very much misunderstood, and a paper of Friday repeats the error.

It has been too fashionable among those who call and believe themselves the friends of liberty, to name *the present war a crusade.* In so doing, they appear to us to be paying the present war (contrary to their own intentions) a very high, and, in our opinion, a very undeserved compliment. A new religion had fanaticised whole nations. Men bred up in the habits of a wild and roaming freedom, had been brought together by its influence, and taught to unite the energies of a savage life with all the harmony and calculable coincidences of a machine. But this religion was deadly to morals, to science, to civil freedom: no society could be progressive under its influence. It was favourable to superstition, cunning, and sensual indulgence; but it bore no fruit, it yielded no marriageable arms to the vine; it sheltered no healing plant. The soil was grassless where it grew; the fox made its nest at the root, and the owl screamed in its branches. —Such was the religion of Mahomet. The situation of the countries subject to our righteous ally, the Grand Seignior, form the best commentary on the Koran. Yet the first disciples of this religion

had conquered Asia, had made formidable acquisitions in Europe, and even mastered Spain; they made it a prime article of their creed, that they were commissioned by Heaven to force their religion on all nations by the sword. Our ancestors were at length roused to resistance. Such was the commencement of the Crusade. Never was a war, in the best sense of the word, so holy: it is, perhaps, the only war in history in which defence by anticipation was no trick of statesmen, but the demand of nations, the impulse of a general inspiration.—If therefore the present war be unnecessary in its origin, unprovoked in its primary movements, let us call it any thing: ONLY NOT A CRUSADE.

The Crusades were as favourable in their effects, as they were honourable in their causes. Then first did Europe feel, and become conscious of the blessing of a common religion, and of civil institutions, differing only as the branches of one family, "*qualis decet esse sororum.*" The warriors brought back from the holy land imaginations highly excited, minds enlarged by the contemplation of a scenery and of customs so new to them, and manners polished beyond the experience of former ages. A new æra commenced in the world; a new sun rose on our social habits, on the tone of governments, and on the nature of our literature. The monkish legend, and obsolete miracle gave way to Knights, and Giants, and Genii; and enthusiasm and imagination, mutually feeding each other, were brought

to act on the side of gentleness and public justice. Unless therefore it shall be admitted, that Suwarrow and his Russians have returned home poets and gentlemen; or that our Bond-street officers have been transmuted, by the alchemy of our expeditions, into the chaste, gentle, and sober knights of ancient chivalry; let us call the present war any thing: ONLY NOT A CRUSADE.

These Crusades were likewise the parents of all the freedom which now exists in Europe. The pecuniary distresses of the monarchs and nobles compelled them to part with many and various privileges; the anarchy, which prevailed during their absence, procured to the lower classes many others. Commerce was diverted from the Venetian and Genoese monopolisers; and there began to arise in all countries, but more especially in England, that greatest blessing and ornament of human nature, an important and respectable middle class. The monarch became more an officer, and less a person; the nobility were seen gradually to draw nearer to the class of the people; and long before the first dawn of religious reformation, the poetic genius imported from the last had prepared the way for it, by continued and successful satires on the absurdities and crimes of the Priesthood. Unless therefore it be admitted that the *direct* object of the present war is to lay the foundations of a greater freedom than we before enjoyed; unless it be admitted, that it has tended to prevent commerce from being a mo-

nopoly of one nation; unless it be granted, that it, viz. this present war, spite of the assessed and income taxes, is peculiarly favourable to the increase and permanence of a middle class; that it militates against all attachment to kings as persons, and nobles as *privileged* classes; and to the Roman Catholic superstitions, as absurdities; unless all this be conceded by the friends of Freedom let them call the present war any thing: ONLY NOT A CRUSADE.



MONOPOLISTS AND FARMERS.

AN INQUIRY INTO THE TRUTH OF THE POPULAR OPINION CONCERNING THESE CLASSES OF MEN. (L.)

(Friday, October 3, 1800.)

No. I.

AN Evening paper which distinguishes itself by its regular pretensions to impartiality, has in these last months played a part so cruel in itself, so destructive of social peace, and so treacherous to the cause of freedom, that the writer of the ensuing inquiry feels himself authorized to denounce its conduct to the public in that way in which alone the conduct of a newspaper ought to be denounced, that is, by an attempt to evince the falsehood and malignant nature of its opinions. For six [weeks] previous to the appearance of riots and troubles in the kingdom scarcely a day passed but some one paragraph at least appeared in the paper alluded to, affirming, or purporting, that no real scarcity had ever existed in this country; and that all the suf-

ferings of our distressed fellow subjects were attributable solely to the factors that had accumulated, or the farmers that withheld, the grain. If these paragraphs had contained any thing but assertions and idle stories, had there been in any of them even a visible *endeavour* only to substantiate this opinion, by any species of proof, either by collection of facts, or by general calculations, that newspaper would never have been pointed out by the present attack. The author knows too well the complexity of all questions relative to political economy, to convert the blunders or sophisms, in any attempt to solve such questions, into moral delinquency. We shall now attempt to shew the groundlessness of the opinion, and the subserviency of a paper, which has adopted such modes of propagating that opinion, to ministerial projects of war, and novel ways of taxation. The questions, therefore, of which the present inquirer proposes to attempt the solution, are first, Is such a monopoly as could *create* a scarcity, possible? secondly, Does it exist? If we should be called to answer these questions in the negative, we may then ask, Does the scarcity rest with the farmer? and is he the proper object of public obloquy? This first essay will be confined to the two former questions.

First, then, is such a monopoly possible? This may well be doubted. It would beseem those who assert the possibility, to ascertain the existence of warehouses and granaries, belonging to the corn

trade, capable of containing such a quantity of grain. It appears, on the *surface* of the question at least, that grain is an article too bulky, too widely diffused, and too valuable, ever to be monopolised by the large capitalists. The nature of the article renders this in a high degree improbable, independently of any other evidences. We admit, however, that what is very unlikely may nevertheless be true; that fact and probability do not always go hand in hand. But then the burthen of the proof lies with those who assert the reality of a thing so improbable, and not with those who assert the falsehood of it. Now not a shadow of evidence has been adduced, not a single calculation entered into to prove, that subtracting the capitals employed in our enormous commerce, manufactories, and agriculture, there would remain (in the simple corn trade) enough to buy up the grain of the whole island to such a degree as to convert plenty into scarcity. We are authorized therefore in answering that such a monopoly is not possible.

But let us admit for a moment, that a capital does exist in the corn trade, sufficient to buy up this quantity, and granaries sufficient to contain it, yet would such a monopoly be the interest of the corn-factors? High rents and heavy taxes have contributed, with the healthful variety of their occupations, to make our farmers an eminently shrewd and watchful race of men. The efforts to buy up corn will be almost immediately noticed by them;

the markets will rise; those who are obliged to sell, will sell at an advanced price; and most of the large farmers do not want capital sufficient to enable them to keep the corn themselves in order that they may themselves receive the advantages of the further increase in the price. From the number and the different dispositions of the farmers, it is morally impossible that their grain can be bought up at once or even rapidly; before one tenth part of the desired quantity has been procured the farmers will have taken the alarm; the rich farmers will stand aloof; the monopolists become competitors with the immediate consumers to purchase up what the small farmers bring to market: of course the prices rapidly advance, and the monopolist must at length purchase the corn but little cheaper than he can expect to sell it at. However, we will suppose him and his brethren to have drawn it, at whatever price, into their granaries, and to have withheld it long enough to produce all the effects of a real scarcity. During all this time their stock and capital are lying idle. At length they bring it to market: some time or other they must bring it to market. For, surely, no one will attribute to them the prophetic powers of Joseph in Egypt, that they should foresee seven years of famine, or revenues sufficient to convert for seven years together, preceding the seven years of famine, plenty into a scarcity, little less than famine. They must bring it to market some time or other; and they must

bring it *all* to market; for they have bought it at too dear a rate to make any partial destruction of the article, like that of nutmegs among the Dutch, a possible speculation. Now is it not (evident) that if there be no *real* scarcity in the country, the very act of bringing it back to the markets must very rapidly or perhaps immediately, produce such a sudden fall in the prices, as must be ruinous to the authors of the artificial scarcity? — However gradually they may bring it in, their time is limited, and if there be no real scarcity, in whatever way they bring it in, the effect must ultimately be the same. The longer they delay it, the greater their loss must be; for the high prices of corn will of course occasion an increased production of that article. It appears, therefore, little less than madness to suppose, that it can ever be the interest or wish of any number of men, to monopolize the grain of a country, unless they were seriously convinced that there existed a real and alarming scarcity of that article. If these convictions are well founded, then the men falsely called monopolists, who employ large capitals in buying up corn when it is cheapest, may be fairly reckoned among the most useful and praise-worthy members of society. Their interest preserves them constantly on the watch; their extensive connections and correspondences ensure them the best and earliest information: their consequent measures give the alarm to the farmers to withhold their corn in expectation of

higher prices; and from what is thus bought up and thus withheld, the scarcity is not so much anticipated, as it is diffused over a larger surface of time, and therefore rendered more tolerable. Suppose two ships, each bound on an equally long voyage, both equally without any means of revictualling; suppose the relative quantity of their provisions exactly the same, and that quantity diminished by the same accidents in the same proportion; and suppose that the officers in one ship compel their crew to short allowances six weeks before the other ship; which of the two crews, think you, would suffer the least from famine? which would arrive in harbour in the best plight? what the officers are in the ship, the men called monopolists are in a kingdom; nay, they are far more; for they not only necessitate an early economy, but they sharpen the wits of the men to the discovery of substitutes, and by exciting a spirit of rivalship against themselves, by the circumstance of their profits, they divert large capitals into the importation line, with the accompanying influence, activity and talents of the capitalists which would otherwise be employed in importing wines, perhaps, or logwood, or some other worthless or pernicious superfluity. By these means they actually increase the quantity of provisions in the kingdom, while they diminish the consumption.

But perhaps it may be said that no number of men could buy corn, knowing that there was or would be a

scarcity in that article, yet, as men are apt to believe what they wish, so these men may become the dupes of their own avarice, and produce the scarcity by over-rating it. We answer that the *possibility of creating* a scarcity in such an article as corn, remains unproved: secondly, that it is more likely that, in some years, they may appear to have over-rated the scarcity by the diminished consumption, which they themselves had been the principal means of occasioning; and lastly, that they who accuse them of ignorance or blundering are the farmers, —not their fellow corn-dealers, all who have the best means of estimating the quantity of grain in the country, are silent. The Secretary of the Agricultural Society with great industry procured and published the opinions of the most respectable and independent landlords throughout the kingdom, and of the best [yeo] men in every district; and these were unanimous in the opinion, that there existed an alarming scarcity.

Whether the corn has been kept back by farmers and factors longer than the exigencies of the time required is a question which is satisfactorily answered by the present price of the article after so [bad a] harvest. If there were really so large [a stock] in the country as is rashly [affirmed], so dreadfully unprosperous as [was the season], what will there not be this time next year [Oct.] [after a harvest] of such unexampled prosperity? Does it not stand to reason that the possessors would crowd with it

to the markets before the new wheat is threshed out? Besides, does any one see old stacks of corn in farmers' yards now? There used to be one or more in every respectable farmer's yard,—but now if there exist an instance of it, the possessor is pointed out, and stories invented of his having attracted the fury of a mob, in order that he *may* attract that fury. In short, the exertions of the corn-trade, the custom-house reports of the importations of corn and the suffrages of independent and well informed men, collected throughout the whole kingdom by a national institution, are evidences for the existence of scarcity, and what are the evidences adduced on the other side? We hear of one man having so many quarters of corn, and another having so many quarters of corn — and ought it not to be so? In a community so numerous as this, in an article of the first necessity, can, or ought things to be so balanced, as that the last quarter of old wheat shall be consumed on the day when the new quarter comes into the market? Supposing that the wheat harvest had been a month later, as it well might have been, and as before the setting in of the dry weather, there was every reason to believe it would be, where then would have been the superfluous quantity of old corn? — or supposing that in addition to this, we had had wet weather during the wheat harvest, so that the wheat would not have been in a state to be ground for two or three months to come — where then

would have been the overplus so bitterly complained of? And what if, in further addition, we had had no monopolists to alarm our farmers, to excite early importation, early economy, and providence in substitutes—should we not have been starved?

If the author of this essay were asked — Would you then be a *monopolist*, as it is called, in the corn-trade? He would answer, No! he would *wish* to be of no employment, in which his own welfare was connected with the misery of his fellow-beings, even though that employment ultimately lessened their misery. But he reverences the profession, and pities the individuals. But what are the motives and characters of the individuals to the utility of their profession? There may be, and probably are hard-hearted corn-factors! — some perhaps may become hard-hearted by being corn-factors; but this is no more than is true of surgeons, of all useful men, the most unequivocally useful!

This essay is already prolonged beyond the usual limits of a newspaper. The importance of the subject must be an apology. In the next number we shall consider the nature of that obloquy, under which our farmers labour; as far as they have speculated in the purchases of other men's corn, they are included in the considerations of this essay; in our next therefore we consider them as farmers, as possessors of that corn which they themselves have produced.

No. II. Of Farmers.

(By Mr. Poole.)

(Saturday, October 4, 1800.)

IT is a popular opinion that the present high price of provisions is advantageous to the farmer. This opinion may be collected from the conversation of most men and from a variety of publications. In the account, for instance, of Mr. Young's pamphlet, in the *Monthly Review* of April last, it is asserted, that "It is certain that what are termed scarce seasons" (or in other words, seasons when the price of provisions is high) "always enrich the agriculturist." It is true that this assertion is qualified by the words "what are termed scarce seasons," but by the preceding reasoning in this article, the Reviewer seems to admit that the present is not only what is termed a scarce season, but is actually a scarce season, and indeed we have adduced irresistible evidence to prove that it is so. I make this quotation from *The Monthly Review*, not for want of a variety of other authorities, but because this is a work deservedly of high reputation, generally read, and by which the sentiments of a very large class of men are governed. The truth or error of the axiom are matter not only of great consequence to the welfare of the agriculturist, but to the peace of the community. For, if this axiom should be found to be erroneous, how unjust is the obloquy under which the farmer labours—that he is

growing rich by the misery of his fellow-citizens—that in proportion as their meal is coarse and scanty, his table plentifully abounds; thus making him a butt to the malignant passions of our nature; passions excited to unusual energy by the goading stimulus of necessity. But this is not all; by this opinion being generally received, the farmer is naturally made the object on which his landlord is to act.—*It is much easier to understand an aphorism than agriculture:* and the mind is fond of taking on trust what it readily comprehends, and at once admits it if agreeable to its preceding dispositions. Every gentleman, who looks in a newspaper, reads a review, or pays his bills, can ascertain when provisions are dear, and being furnished with this maxim, he immediately, and, as he thinks, justly, directs his stewards to raise his estates. But every gentleman cannot, or will not, traverse his estates, visit his tenants, sympathise with them in their labours, and learn to understand them; feel with them in their disappointments, and attribute the just proportion of the calamity, which all feel, to that dispensation of God, to that government of our rulers, to which all must submit. It seems highly interesting, then, to inquire into the truth of this opinion, which is so unthinkingly propagated from month to month. The present high price of provisions has been produced by two causes; a failure of good crops, and the existence of war. Of these two causes, the former appears to be by far

the more considerable; and yet the latter is of no mean importance. If we can make it appear that neither the one nor the other of these causes can enrich the agriculturist, we shall clearly deduce, that neither the present high price of provisions can enrich him. We will examine first, how he is affected by a deficient crop; and for this purpose, we will take an individual, and follow him through the argument. He shall neither be one of the largest, nor one of the smallest occupiers. We will suppose, he has a mixed farm of arable, and pasture, containing two hundred acres of land, of the average quality, at two hundred guineas per annum. On this farm, we may reckon twenty acres of wheat per annum. How will plenty, or scarcity, affect this the prime article? I see by the same review, which I before quoted, that Mr. Young, I think, with great exaggeration, states the average crop to be between twenty-two and twenty-four bushels per acre; say twenty-three bushels. If the average be twenty-three, a plentiful crop may be deemed thirty-three, and a scanty crop thirteen bushels per acre. The farmer, in question, in a plentiful year, then, has six hundred and sixty bushels of wheat grown; how does he dispose of this produce?

Bushels

1st. He reserves seed for the succeeding year (or purchases it, which is the same thing,) for twenty acres, which, at two bushels and a half per acre, the common quantity sown, require 50

Bushels

2nd. He reserves for the consumption of his family, suppose one bushel per week. 52

3rd. He reserves wheat for his workmen, at a fixed price. (Most farmers supply their labourers with wheat. Those who do not are obliged, in times of scarcity, to advance the money of their wages, or otherwise they are guilty of a most flagrant iniquity. Nay, it comes home to them at last, for, if they relieve them in neither of these, the only honourable ways, they must relieve them by the poor's-rate, which they themselves generally pay.) On such a farm, as I have supposed, there cannot be less than four labourers, and they and their families will require half a bushel per week. 104

Total 206

These then are the demands which must be supplied, either in times of plenty or scarcity.

Bushels

They amount in this instance to 206
Which subtract from the whole quantity grown . 660

There remain to the farmer to sell 454

In this year of plenty, which we are now estimating, I would willingly state the price of a plentiful year. We will suppose 6*s.* per bushel; 454 bushels of wheat, at 6*s.* per bushel, amount to £136 4*s.* This is when the agriculturist *gets rich*. See how it stands with him in the time of a scanty crop.

	Bushels
He has twenty acres of wheat at thirteen bushels per acre. He has then, in such a year only, of wheat grown	260
His fixed unsaleable consumption, as above stated, amounts to	206
Which subtract from the whole produce grown, leaves to the farmer to sell only	54

Suppose we reckon this at 15*s.* per bushel (which is much beyond the average, even in this the most lamentable of years),

	£	s.	d.
The amount is but	40	10	0
Whereas in a plentiful year, when wheat is sold for 6*s.* per bushel, the farmer received from the produce of the same land . . .	136	4	0
Being	95	14	0

more than he receives in times of scarcity, when wheat is, during the whole year, 15*s.* per bushel.

Have I, in this instance, proved too much? I can find no error in the *data*, and I write from experience. But however different men, all with the best intentions, may vary those *data*, yet the conclusion is so diametrically opposite, in the instance of wheat, to the popular opinion, that no variation in those *data* can shake it. There is another argument of great importance, severely felt by the farmer, when crops of corn are bad, but which is unheeded by those who are not versed in agriculture; *when corn fails, weeds abound* — these not

only exhaust the land as effectually as a good crop of corn, but require great expense to destroy, and often oblige the agriculturist to make a fallow of those lands the ensuing year, when of course they are entirely unproductive. Thus much for wheat, on which depends almost the whole of the question. The great error in most men's feelings, (for they are not reasonings,) on this subject, is, that they forget how little the farmer has to sell, in scarce seasons; how much to reserve for seed, for his own consumption and his labourers; and that the price, as far as relates to this quantity, (fix it at a guinea, or a shilling,) has no influence on his gain and loss.

As for spring corn, the principal article of which is barley, the price of it is varied by so many circumstances, which do not affect the price of the prime necessaries of life, that it seems irrelevant to the present question. Barley is dearer or cheaper by the distilleries being open or shut, a crop of apples, or a failure, &c. But, however, the same train of reasoning which has been applied to wheat, is equally applicable to barley, and to other spring corn, with the single exception, that the agriculturist is not under the necessity of supplying his labourers with barley in the manner he supplies them with wheat, and of course that deduction cannot be made from the saleable part of his produce. But then his own consumption of spring corn is very large, as will appear from the following statement: — We will suppose the average crop of

spring corn to be thirty bushels per acre; a scanty crop, fifteen; a good crop, forty-five bushels per acre. Our farmer, in question, has of course the same number of acres of spring corn as he had of wheat.

	Bushels
In a good season twenty acres at forty-five bushels per acre, produce	900
This he disposes of —	
1st. Seed for 20 acres at 4 bushels per acre . .	80
2nd. Making of malt	100
3rd. Fattening hogs	100
4th. Feeding of horses. (For, if he has no oats and beans, he must purchase them, which amounts to the same thing)	70
	350
Which deduct from 900 bushels, leave to be sold, we will suppose, at 3*s*. per bushel — the amount would be £82 10*s*.	550

In case of a bad year, the whole produce of the twenty acres, at fifteen bushels per acre, is only 300 bushels, fifty bushels less even than his own consumption. It is thus that the corn-farmer gets rich by scanty crops. The truth is, that no price which the community can afford will repay the farmer the loss he sustains by a bad crop; and if, on these melancholy occasions, all suffer, it is he of all who suffers most. Let it be remembered, that this question does not relate to the man who keeps a large stock of *old corn* by him. As far as he is

concerned with this stock, he is not a farmer, but a corn-factor; and, whether he gets or loses by the speculation of retaining his corn, he is to be considered in the same point of view as every other speculator, and incurs the same risk of profit or loss. If he wished to increase his speculation, he might purchase the corn of his neighbours, and add to his own. We have no concern with him but as an agriculturist. — I now come to that part of the subject in which I shall admit, that the farmer is somewhat benefited by the high price of provisions. An extraordinary scarcity of vegetable food naturally raises the price of animal food; and the same seasons which are detrimental to corn are not equally destructive to the growth of animals. This, with the breeder (who fortunately is commonly the corn-farmer,) in some measure, makes up the loss he sustains by corn. — This, however, in a very small proportion; for the rise in price of that quantity of poor stock, which such a farmer sells is, perhaps, not equal to the additional sum he is obliged to pay for the animal food which his family consumes. The force of this argument can be easier felt than submitted to calculation, on account of the difficulty of ascertaining average *data* on the subject. The grazier does not seem to be permanently affected by rise or fall in the price of cattle. On a rise he gains, like every other tradesman, on the stock he has in hand, in proportion to that rise. When that stock is sold, he is obliged to purchase

his poor cattle according to the price for which fat cattle sell, and of course he has then the ordinary rate of profit only: and on the fall of the price of fat cattle he loses on the stock then in hand precisely the same he gained when the rise took place.

We have thus stated the manner in which the agriculturist is affected by a failure of good crops, which is, undoubtedly, the grand cause, or, to speak more truly, the greatest immediate *occasion* of the present dearness of provisions. In the next number I shall inquire how he is affected by the existence of war, and, particularly, how he has been affected by this war, the other, though lesser partner in the production of the calamity in question.

No. III. Of Farmers.

In what Manner they are affected by War.

(Introduction by Mr. Coleridge: the rest of the number by Mr. Poole.)

(Monday, October 6, 1800.)

WAR has been so long classed among the heaviest scourges of the human race, that (as it often happens in other subjects) the general admission of the truth has occasioned almost as general a forgetfulness of the arguments by which it is substantiated. Hence some singular writers, among whom we may rank Lord Kaims and the notorious Mr. Chalmers, have been emboldened to

give the lie direct to the public faith, and have laboured to prove that war ought to be classed among our chief blessings. These writers consider it as a sanative distemper, the periodical returns of which are necessary to the general health of the patient. Whatever plausibility the arguments of such men possess, is derived from their total silence concerning two great truths — namely, that the malignant nature of war is evidenced not so much in the evils it inflicts, as in the blessings which it prevents; and, secondly, that the great mass of the evils which it does inflict, is made up of small and dispersed particulars, and not of those more palpable horrors which never exist but in aggregates. War is a poisoned weapon: it inflicts indeed a deep and ghastly wound, but the deep and ghastly wound which it inflicts is a slight evil, compared with the venom which it infuses. To pursue these two great truths through the requisite detail, would be an employment well worthy of a man, who, to philosophical views and healthful affections, added science and habits of minute inquiry. At present we must confine ourselves to the increase in the consumption, and the diminution in the production of food, in consequence of war. These evils are effected in a variety of ways. 1. Our soldiers and sailors consume much more as sailors and soldiers, than the same men would as ploughmen and manufacturers. The proportion of animal food to that of vegetable is much larger in the one case, than in

the other. Thus they not only consume a much larger quantity than they would have done in their original occupations, but the food they consume requires a larger quantity of land for its original production.

2. A great waste is incurred by feeding men on such a system as is necessarily pursued in the navy, from the positive destruction of so large a quantity of nutritious food by salt; from the losses in carriage, in magazines, and accidents of weather on board ship; and from the wasteful habits of the consumers, and (as many were taken from the country, or the small towns,) we may add to this all the animals that would have been reared from the unavoidable refuse of the men thus taken.

3. The ministerial loans and contracts divert a vast capital, and with it the talents of our most enterprising men, from the prosecution of canals, the improvements of neglected, and the inclosure of uncultivated, land. The same effect has been produced in a still greater degree among the country gentlemen by the income tax, the redemption of their land tax, the increase of the poor rates from so many wives and families falling in on the parish, &c. &c. It is a popular argument against a war, that soldiers and sailors not only increase the demand on the market by the additional quantity they consume, but decrease the supply of the market by the subtraction of that quantity, which they would produce were they employed in agriculture and

useful manufactures. But we suspect that this argument is more popular than sound, as far at least as respects the men themselves in the first place. For no one has ventured to assert, that our last year's harvest was unproductive for want of hands, or that our cultivated lands are in a less state of cultivation now than before the war, and as to manufactures, what have they to do with the supply of the provision market? Besides, we may venture to observe, that the epithet "useful" will be very differently construed and applied by a philosopher and a student of Lombard-street. The manufactures, which are most affected by a war, will of course furnish the largest number of soldiers and sailors; and these manufactures are seldom the most useful. But whatever the *manufactures* may be, whether highly valuable as cotton, linen, and cloth, or eminently worthless as metal buttons, or muslins, or British spirits, yet (as to the artisans themselves,) it must be confessed, that there are few *manufactories* which do not produce a far larger portion of vice, disease, waste, and misery, than a regiment of soldiers, or a ship of war. But though this argument be not tenable in the ordinary way in which it is adduced; yet the effect, for which it is adduced, remains true. In consequence of war not only more is consumed, but less is produced; because the expences of war, and the speculations of monied men in consequence, arrest the course of

our agricultural exertions, and prevent our waste lands from being *manufactured* into corn fields.

4. Whatever food, of the produce of this country, is consumed by foreign troops and seamen, whether at home or abroad, is so much increase of consumption. It is adding so many new mouths to the diminished granary of the kingdom. We have heard it asserted by well-informed men, that the Russians, while at Jersey, consumed, in animal food alone, 7,000 lb. of beef daily, besides the soap and candles which they *eat*.

5. The support of the horses employed in war, and in all the operations relating to it, diminishes the quantity of human food to an amount, which, if detailed, would astonish men unaccustomed to such reflections; for the lands which would, if those horses did not exist, be employed in the fattening of oxen, and in producing wheat and barley, are now applied to grazing of horses, supplying hay for them, and in raising beans and oats. How greatly the supply of the market is diminished by this cause, may be imagined, when we reflect on the number of horses thus employed, and that each horse consumes, annually, the produce of four acres of land.

6. The existence of war with any power from whom we may in scarce seasons obtain a supply of provisions, precludes us from that supply; and this circumstance arises not only from the wish of an enemy to distress his opponent as much as possible, but his real ability (if he were willing to assist) is

diminished inasmuch as the war causes the same waste of the necessaries of life in that country as is experienced in this; and the enemy himself is probably obliged to have a supply of provisions from neutral countries, which competition increases the price of them in those countries, and of course the difficulty of obtaining a supply from them. These circumstances, by diminishing the quantity brought to market, raise the price of that which is. Thus probably every Englishman has cause to lament when he hears of the destruction of a magazine of the enemy's provisions, for perhaps that very magazine must be replaced by provisions purchased from a neutral country, which provisions, without this circumstance, might have alleviated our own distress. The truth is, that there is that facility of intercourse among the states of Europe, that a great defect of crops, an unwise use, or destruction of them, in any particular part, is sensibly felt throughout the whole, so that we are compelled, notwithstanding the sharp hostility and bitter enmity which exist among us, mutually to feel the distresses which we mutually inflict. Would to God that every state would consider that its own happiness consisted not only in preserving its own peace, and promoting its own prosperity, but also in preserving the peace and promoting the prosperity of its neighbours. Add to this (as affecting the farmer, though not the quantity of provisions in this country) the manner in which provisions are purchased by government.

A few accredited agents purchase the whole; and the appearance of one of these agents in a fair or market, at once raises the price ten or twenty per cent. whereas, if the same additional demand were divided among ten indifferent people, who came to that fair or market, probably the advance would not be the tenth part as great. The above are some of the most obvious causes occasioned by the existence of war, which either increase the consumption of provisions, or diminish the supply of them, both of which equally tend to enhance their price; and they seem to be causes operating so actively, that we cannot be surprised that many have wholly attributed to them the scarcity under which we labour. But although these causes are abundantly sufficient to make every humane man deprecate war, yet when we consider that at the commencement of this war the price of the necessaries of life was moderate, that soon after they became dear, then moderate, and are now extravagantly dear, we must admit that this variation argues the existence of some cause greater than those occasioned by the war. This cause, as I have before stated, is no other than a deficient crop.

The addition, whatever that may be, to the price of provisions, occasioned by the war, is doubtless so much money put for a short time in the pocket of the agriculturist. It is very difficult to state precisely the influence the war has had in raising

provisions to the very enormous price they now bear; but supposing it has increased the price of wheat 2*s.* per bushel, and barley one, what would be the additional profits of the agriculturist? We will take the same individual farmer, whose case we estimated in calculating the influence of a deficient crop, and state his additional profits, and the additional demands made on him in consequence of the war.

	Bushels
The average produce of his farm in wheat (for in this case we must calculate on the average) was 20 acres, at 23 bushels per acre	460
From which deduct his permanent consumption, as before stated	206
Leave him to sell	254

Two hundred and fifty-four bushels, 2*s.* the additional price occasioned by the war, amount to £25 8*s.* which is in the article of wheat so much additional money put in our farmer's pocket.

	Bushels
The average quantity of barley, or other spring corn grown was 20 acres, at 30 bushels per acre which amount to	600
Deduct his permanent consumption	350
Remain to be sold	250

Two hundred and fifty bushels, 1*s.* the additional price per bushel, amount to £12 10*s.* addition to

the farmer's profit in the article of spring corn. Whatever increase the war has occasioned in the price of cattle is subject to the same reasoning which was used in No. II. — when the influence of a deficient crop was considered, where it was suggested, that in consequence of the additional price, the farmer was obliged to pay for the animal food consumed in his own family, he was probably but a very small gainer by the increase of the price of cattle!

No. III. Of Farmers.

(By Mr. Poole.)

(Concluded from our Paper of Monday.)

(Wednesday, October 8, 1800.)

THE addition to the agriculturist in question then of profit occasioned by the war arises from wheat and spring corn.

	£	s.	d.
From wheat	25	10	0
From spring corn	12	10	0
The whole additional profit per annum . .	38	0	0

Or, in other words, our farmer's income is increased £78 per annum during the continuance of the war: on peace being made, the causes which produced this additional income ceasing to act, the income will consequently cease to arise. These £38 per annum, are the whole of the additional profits ac-

cruing to the farmer in consequence of the high price of provisions; for I have proved, I trust, that as far as the high price is produced by a deficient crop, he is not a gainer, but a great sufferer. What then are the additional demands which the high price of provisions and the war have caused to be made on the farmer, and to answer which he has these £38 per annum additional income?

1st. The poor's rates (which are now so universally paid by the farmer, that in a calculation of this kind I consider them as belonging to him) are, since the commencement of the war, doubled, which has been occasioned by the calls made by government to raise men for the navy, by the support of the families of militia-men, and by the high price of provisions. If our farmer paid before 2*s.* in the pound, he now pays 4*s.* which increase alone amounts to £21 per annum.

2nd. He has been so emphatically addressed to subscribe voluntarily to the prosecution of the war, and every passion, and every interest have been so powerfully appealed to, to induce him to come forward in some corps of horse or of infantry, that he has been obliged to be a voluntary though severe sufferer. Indeed, if he has declined joining some corps of horse, he has been necessitated to contribute to the raising of the provisional cavalry. These circumstances may be estimated at £5 per annum since the commencement of the war. The above demands, we see, have absorbed a great part of the

profit occasioned by the war; but, besides these, which we trust will cease on peace being made, there are the following, which will be permanent, and which will continue to act when the farmer's income ceases to arise.

1st. The taxes which have been levied during the war, and continue to be levied on the various articles of food, clothing and conveniences, made by the habits of our society necessary to a family in this station of life.

2nd. The additional taxes on horses, particularly on those used in agriculture; on houses, on windows, &c. to all of which the agriculturist must contribute, and which, with the former, cannot be estimated at less than £10 per annum.

3rd. And, above all, the income tax, that heart-withering scrutiny, which, by its moral effects, destroys the very character of an Englishman, destroys that prudent reserve which made every man feel the consciousness of independence, because he felt that no one knew he had cause to be dependent; destroys that sincerity of heart for which we have been distinguished by holding out the greatest temptations to deceive. It deprives the unfortunate of hope, and these effects will infallibly take place, or that avowed and general depravity will exist, by which it will be understood that, however severe the scrutiny, or solemn the means, by which the state of a man's affairs will be ascertained, yet that state will be no criterion of his real ability. Better

had it been if the arm of government had arbitrarily seized what it thought proper of every man's property, than thus to sink us in the scale of human nature, and deprive us of that which was most estimable in us. This must be changed. While it continues, and the time is indefinite, our farmer contributes to it £20 and a few shillings per annum.

4th. The next demand which has been made on the farmer, in consequence of the high price of the produce of land, has been, and will be, to him the most fatal, though very naturally to have been expected, from the general opinion of the farmer's increased riches—I mean the call from his landlord. The rent of many estates has been doubled, many risen 50 per cent.—All, I believe, which have been lately let, 20 per cent. We cannot calculate that the agriculturist under consideration is exempted from this general demand: taking it at the lowest rate I have mentioned, the rise of his estate is £42 per annum.

What is the amount of all these additional demands, occasioned by the high price of provisions?

We will class these demands according to their probable duration.

	£	s.	d.
1st. The increase in the poor rate	21	0	0
2nd. Contribution and cavalry	5	0	0
	26	0	0

The above, it is hoped, will terminate at the end

of the war. The following demands are likely to be as permanent as by experience we have unfortunately found taxes to be:

	£	s.	d.
1st. Various taxes, horse, house, window tax &c. &c.	10	0	0
2nd. Income tax	20	0	0
Per annum	30	0	0

Which together make £56 per annum.

Of the above £56 per annum we may deduct, perhaps, £6 per annum of the addition of the poor rates, as arising from the increased price of provisions, occasioned by the deficient crop, &c. which ought to have been placed among the losses which the farmer in question sustains by a deficient crop. — Six pounds per annum, on this account, in agricultural districts, appear to be sufficient, as we have presumed throughout this inquiry that the farmer supplies his labourers with bread corn at a fixed price. After this deduction, there will remain of additional demands for our farmer to pay, on account of the war, £50 per annum. We calculated that he received £38 per annum more for the produce of his estate, in consequence of the addition which we supposed the war had occasioned to the price of provisions; so that, instead of being a gainer by this cause of the price of provisions, he is, even during the continuance of the war, a loser of £12 per annum. And as there are £30 per annum additional taxes occasioned by the war, which

will exist after the war; and as, on peace being made, the rise of the produce of land, occasioned by the war, will cease, and of course, our farmer's additional revenue, he will then be left, until those taxes cease, £30 per annum out of pocket. But to this heavy drawback on the farmer's profits, we must add, the additional rent paid the landlord, which will be, at any rate, as permanent as the lease on which every farmer holds his estate. This, in the present instance, is £42 per annum, which, added to the £30 per annum of permanent demand, stated above, make £72 per annum, or an addition of £36 per cent. on his rent. Happy had it been for him, if he had continued to sell his wheat at 6*s*. per bushel—if neither a deficient crop, nor war had existed—if the seasons had been propitious, and his country in peace.

I have thus, I trust, shewn, that neither from a deficient crop, nor from the existence of war, the avowed causes which have produced the present scarcity, and consequent high price of provisions, can the agriculturist be enriched; but that his interest goes hand in hand with the interest of every other branch of the community; that from a deficient crop he is, of all men, the greatest sufferer; that, in fact, no rise of provisions can compensate the losses he sustains; that a larger sum than the additional sum he receives by the rise of provisions, occasioned by the war, is taken from him by the additional demands of poor rates and of taxes, and

this during the continuance of the war; and that, on peace being made, he is left with a large part of those demands upon him, after the additional profits have ceased to arise; and I have stated, that, in consequence of the high price of the produce of land, the landlord has been induced to raise the rent of his estates; so that, on the whole, on the return of peace, of average crops, and probably of average prices, the agriculturist, whom we have selected as an instance, will be left with an addition of £72 per annum, to be paid from the fruits of his industry.—As the above individual is affected, so, on the average, and in proportion, will be every individual of the agricultural body; and if peace and plenty be sources of happiness and prosperity to the generality of the community, so they are, above all, to the agriculturist.

We trust we have said enough to rescue the farmer from every species of obloquy from the public; we would fain do more; we would save him from the oppression of his landlord. In the next number we shall offer some hints on the subject of the raising of rents.

No. IV. Of Farmers.

In what Manner they are affected by War.

(By Mr. Poole.)

(Thursday, October 9, 1800.)

GENTLEMEN, previously to raising their estates, in consequence of the rise of the produce of land, should well consider what the causes of that rise are. If the cause be a deficient crop, it is direct ruin then to raise the farmer, though wheat should be 15*s.* per bushel; it is the course of the winds and the waters to which all must submit, and in this case the duty of the gentleman, as well as the yeoman, is to diminish his consumption in proportion to the scarcity. This cause, thanks be to God, is commonly transitory, for though He chastens, He does not destroy. The causes of scarcity created by man are more permanent; they are less merciful to each other than their common Parent is to them. If war be the cause of the high price of the produce of land, and more money is for the moment put into the farmer's pocket, the additional demand by the poor's rate, and the taxes occasioned by the war, should be estimated. Whatever these demands are, less than the farmer's additional profits, that sum he can doubtless afford to pay his landlord in additional rent; but war must be carried on much more economically than it is at present, before the farmer, on this account,

will be enabled to advance his rent, and this advance, if it ever happened, ought to be limited to the duration of the war. The truth is, that the only legitimate causes for raising an estate, supposing a fair price was given at the time it was let, are, —

1st. The improvements made in agriculture since that estate was let.

And, 2nd., a depreciation in the value of money, or of the circulating medium, whatever it may be.

The first cause, improvements in agriculture, by which an additional produce is raised from the same land, is a real permanent addition to the happiness of human nature. If a sort of wheat, for instance, be introduced, which produces 20 bushels on the same land where any species hitherto cultivated would produce only 15, by this single circumstance alone, an addition of one-fourth would be made to the bread of the community. Every poor man would have one-fourth more of bread to eat than he has at present, or a proportional addition would be made to the population and power of the country. The individual who should be fortunate enough to introduce such an improvement, would, indeed, be a benefactor to his species; he would fill with plenty every dwelling, from the palace to the cottage, or he would add to the population of this country alone, a million, at least, of human beings. Every improvement in agriculture, of whatever nature, has a tendency to these noble ends, and gentlemen do well to make the introduction of these improve-

ments the prime object of their ambition. By those they are not only, as it becomes them to be, the fathers and benefactors of their country, but by those, as the just fruits of their exertions, they effectually increase their own revenue and power. If, by the aggregate of improvements in agriculture, in a given time, lands in general are made to produce a fourth more than they before produced, and the demand continue in proportion to the supply, every gentleman has a right to an addition of 25 per cent. to the rent of his estates.

3rd. A depreciation in the value of money, or of the circulating medium, whatever it be, consequently increases the quantity of it given for whatever is to be exchanged, or, in other words, sold for it. If by the introduction of more gold and silver into the country, or by creating a large quantity of paper money, the market is additionally supplied in proportion to the commodities to be purchased with circulating medium, the farmer will receive more for the produce of the estate than he would otherwise do; and can, without doubt, afford to pay his landlord an increased rent. What this increased rent should be, it is very difficult to ascertain. During the last fourteen years, the circulating medium has been, without doubt, increased by the introduction of paper-money, which has represented a larger value than the quantity of specie taken from the country. The increasing, to great excess, this addition of paper to the circulating medium,

should be cautiously avoided. If any shock should be given to the credit of paper, the most serious consequences would ensue; for a short time gold and silver would be, perhaps, five times the value it was before that shock, and of course every article would yield but the fifth part of its former price; and this state of affairs, perhaps, would continue long enough to ruin the farmer who was covenanted to pay a fixed rent in proportion to the circulating medium which was existing at the time he agreed with his landlord.* At length money would reappear by gold and silver being purchased with a part of the fixed capital of the country; but then as much of the agriculture and trade of the country would be lost, as was put in action by that part of the capital in this instance employed to purchase gold and silver. Thus the use of paper is easily understood. Paper, if good, represents the value of a capital to be found in the barns and fields of agriculturists, and in the warehouses of merchants.

In these observations, on the propriety of raising the rent of lands, I have taken no notice of the necessary variation in the rate of the wages of labourers, in proportion to the price of provisions,

* This terrible event would infallibly have happened at the time the Bank of England stopped payment, if the most unheard of, but at the same time, the most wise and honourable system of confidence had not immediately been put in action. As it was, a sensible diminution of the price of every article occurred for a short time.

because, throughout this little tract, I have calculated only on the quantity the farmer has to sell, after deducting his fixed consumption, in which I have included the supply of his labourers with bread-corn at a fixed price.* Thus, supplying them

* This method of supplying workmen with the necessaries of life at a fixed price, is the very best method of paying wages. A cheap shop for the poor is a good substitute, but it is rarely that the supporters of these institutions pay in just proportion to the number of labourers they employ, who purchase provisions at these shops. It is better for the master, whether in the business of agriculture or manufacture, to consider his labourers as part of his family; for him to be the shop-keeper for them all, as he is for his own children, at least to procure for them the principal articles of consumption, and give them a fixed quantity of those articles, for a certain quantity of labour; this would recall old times, when men gave an actual value for an actual value, without the intervention of a circulating medium. It would then have been thought monstrous to have given the same man half a peck of wheat, or half a pound of beef, for the same labour, for which, a short time before, he received a peck of wheat, or a pound of beef. He would naturally have said, Is my family to starve, or can you diminish our appetites one half? Yet this very thing is done by the agriculturist or manufacturer, who now gives a shilling for the same labour, for which he gave a shilling a few years since; for that shilling will not now purchase above half the necessaries of life which it would then purchase. If the price of provisions increase, the labourer need know little of it; that additional price should be placed by the masters, on the product of the labourer's industry, and paid by the consumers of it, who are living without labour, and can afford to pay it. It is absurd for the man, who enjoys only necessaries, to have

with this the prime necessary of life, precludes in a great measure the necessity of varying the money of their wages. But then, the quantity thus consumed, and all the fixed consumption of the farmer, must not be calculated on by the landlord in raising his estate. He is only to calculate on that part of the produce which the farmer has to sell. In proportion as that part is exchanged for more of the circulating medium, in the same proportion the landlord may advance his rent; and I need not add the converse of the proposition, that in the same proportion as that part is exchanged for less of the circulating medium, in the same proportion his rent ought to be abated.

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these diminished, before the superfluities of others are lessened, thus making the high price of provisions press immediately on the labourer, instead of pressing on those who can bear it. The introduction of the circulating medium has been highly useful in exchanging the superfluities of the world; but it has been most fatal to the labourer who produces them. It is a mist before his eyes, which prevents his seeing the justice of his claims.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF THE MORNING POST,

BY THE AUTHOR OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE TRUTH, ETC.

(Tuesday, October 14, 1800.)

SIR,

LIVING at a distance of three hundred miles from London, I did not receive your paper of Monday, October 6, till a late hour this evening. In this paper you announce a series of letters of a very different description from those which I have addressed to you on Monopolists and Farmers.* I shall of course wait for them, not without impatience. If they convince me, I shall be forward to acknowledge that conviction; if my old creed remains unshaken, I shall again claim a place in a

* The notice referred to in the letter is as follows:

"It must not be concluded, because this paper is open to impartial discussion on the subject, that we take a part in favour of Forestallers. The present series of Essays on the Scarcity of Provisions will be concluded on Wednesday, when we shall give place to Letters of a very different description." I have not been able to find the letters thus announced, but the Morning Post of Oct. 25, 1800, contains a long paper signed A. B., praising and coinciding with those on Monopolists and Farmers, given above, and ascribing the high price of provisions to "the increase of our riches and the increase of our national debts, or public poverty and private opulence." S. C.

paper so open to impartial discussion, for the support of that creed. In the mean time I beg to offer a few miscellaneous remarks and queries.

I have now before me an evening paper of Saturday, September 6. In one column of this paper we are told, "That the only mad dogs of this season are the monopolists. — The hue and cry against them is pretty general." In another column of the same paper I read, "The present riots in different parts of the country prove what erroneous notions the mob entertain of the means of rendering provisions cheap. In order to lower the price of bread, we find them, in more than one instance, destroying the flour and burning the mills."

Now, Sir, I am one of those who greatly reverence the *feelings* of a multitude, though I have not the same respect for the *opinions* that excite them. A multitude may, and too often do, take up false opinions; but, these admitted for truths, they rarely, indeed, act *inconsequentially*. If monopolists, farmers, and millers, are in reality the guilty causes of the present scarcity, it would be a difficult task to detect any error in the *deductions* of our mobs, who wished to counterpoise the passion of avarice by the passion of terror. Avarice can do great things — we know, though, perhaps, our posterity will scarcely believe it, that avarice can make a man an African slave-merchant; but then where does he reside? Among those whom he has made miserable? No! among his accomplices, or at least among

those who are enjoying the luxuries which he procures, without having their bodily sympathies disturbed by the miseries which he creates. But avarice, in its most diseased excess, would never impel him to live among the fathers, brothers, husbands, and wives, of the men, women, and children, whom he was in the habit of carrying into slavery, among those who had detected his guilt, and possessed all the *physical* power of the country to punish it. Now, say our rioters, such and such are the fellows that starve us, in order to make money out of our hunger. We will prove to them that they are *found out*. Is it credible, that a man would long continue in an occupation which exposed him night and day to the operation of opinions like these?—opinions, which if just, cannot be transient. I deduce, therefore, that if monopoly be the real cause of our scarcity, our mobs have acted imprudently and wickedly, but not absurdly nor *inconsequentially*. What is the real operation of these too successful attempts to raise the popular indignation against particular classes?—Are the ministers wholly unfavourable to these attempts? Is it impossible that they themselves are well aware that the causes of national scarcity lie deep, deep in the very heart of what is called our national prosperity; that years of dearth are likely to have almost regular recurrences; and that popular rage against corn-traders would greatly facilitate the attempt to place the corn-trade, and even the agriculture of the

country, under ministerial controul? This, at least, is, I believe, certain, that the present withholding of corn does, in great part, depend on his Majesty's Ministers. When, by the assertion of Ministers in Parliament, the existence of scarcity to an alarming degree was a fact no longer to be doubted; promises were undoubtedly made to corn-merchants to encourage them to the most fearless speculations, as to any quantity which they could import. Vast quantities of corn are at this moment withheld, because the corn-merchants are left in a state of uncertainty, whether ministers mean to keep their promises. But on this subject I shall obtain your permission to speak a few words, when I have seen the letters in which the popular cry against the corn-traders is to be substantiated. In the first letter of your correspondent W. in your paper of Tuesday, Sept. 30, it is *assumed* as a fact, that the farmers *grew*, and the traders *bought up* the corn (which they now sell at an advance of 40*s.* a quarter) at its usual price. That the traders *could not* buy up the corn at its usual price, and that the farmers *would not* be such idiots as to sell it, I trust I have amply proved in the first number of my inquiry. But it is *assumed* as a *fact* in this letter, that there was no real scarcity. This, Sir, should not have been *assumed*; it should have been *proved*. It is the corner-stone of the whole question. Deduction, Sir, is an easy business. The ground-work of *facts* is the important, useful, and difficult part of a rea-

soner's trade. What if I were to assume as a fact, that your correspondent writes on a subject of which he is ignorant. The *deduction*, that his letter is not worth the reading, would be legitimate and inevitable; but the whole of my argument would be as contemptible in reason, as it would be deficient in common politeness. The march of the question is this: 1. Has there been a scarcity, and to what degree? 2. To what degree beyond the natural exertions of the corn-trader have the traders been extra-regularly stimulated by the promises and exhortation of the government and legislature of their country? And were the government right or wrong in their interference? 3. Suppose the whole quantity of the grain in the kingdom to be measured and known, what would be the residue, if a whole month's national consumption were subtracted? This in common justice ought to be done, for the harvest has been a month earlier than it might have been: and where the food of ten millions is in question, it would be madness not to provide for the worst. 4. What is the strict definition of forestaller in the article of corn? Wherein is he distinguishable from the fair trader? and what have forestallers in the strict and legal sense of the word, been able to accomplish?

These questions demand an answer — an answer of facts, not assumptions. I have often heard unthinking people exclaim, in observing differences of price in different parts of the country, "What has

become of Adam Smith's *level?*" I, God knows, am no friend to those hard-hearted comparisons of human actions with the laws of inanimate nature. Water will come to a level without pain or pleasure, and provisions and money will come to a level likewise; but, O God! what scenes of anguish must take place while they are *coming to a level?* But still the sneer against Adam Smith, as to the simple fact, is absurd. The tide in the rivers Trent and Parrot flows in in a *head.* Now if a spectator should exclaim to a writer on fluids, What has become of your *level* now? Would he not answer, *Stay*, and see?

I remain, Sir, yours, &c.

Wednesday Night, October 8, 1800.

(Friday, November 27, 1801.) (a)

AS we expected, Sir Francis Burdett's motion was postponed last night till after the Christmas holidays, and perhaps it will never now be made. This is obviously produced by the negotiations on foot between the parties, between ministers and the members of the old opposition. It was yesterday reported that Mr. Addington has waited on Mr. Fox; that the former is to be created a Peer, and to hold a high station in the Cabinet; that the latter is to be one of the Secretaries of State, Mr. Grey another, Lord Hawkesbury the

third, and Mr. Tierney, Chancellor of the Exchequer. We only mention this to shew what are the rumours. We believe no direct overtures or engagements have been made; but it is certain that negotiations are on foot, and that under all circumstances the present ministers must either renew the war, or fly to the members of the old opposition for support. Should they adopt the last course, as report asserts they will, the country will be highly benefited by their conduct, as we are persuaded, the opposition will only give their support, on condition that ministers shall act upon the genuine principles of the constitution.

So important an event, as the termination of a war, has we believe, never taken place in this country since the Revolution, without effecting a derangement in the existing state of parties. One of the many reasons of this may be found in our insular situation, and the preponderance of our naval power, which exempt us from those sudden impulses, both of ambition and terror, that have at times electrified our great continental rival, uniting all parties, as it were, by fusion. Inaccessible to all direct hostility, England has in every war, had a party of more or less strength, who have been able to adduce plausible grounds for doubting or disbelieving the justice and necessity of it. These by their continued and eloquent opposition in both Houses of Parliament, have driven or surprised the servants of the crown into declarations so decisive, and language so irri-

tating and intemperate, as have made it oftentimes difficult for them to terminate the war at all; and impossible to do it, or to justify it when done, without inconsistence with their former language, and a tacit retraction at least of their former principles. Hence a peace has been always concluded in one or other of these two ways: either the opposition have displaced the ministry and made the peace; or else the more violent part of the ministry have resigned, and left both the glory and the ignominy of the pacification to those of their party, who had been somewhat less dogmatic in their principles, or at least less intemperate in the language, in which they had publicly avowed them. Now unfortunately it so happens that the most moderate men are seldom the men of splendid talent in either party. They are permitted to form a ministry, in order that a peace may be made; and then the very peace which they have concluded, (or at least some scheme of measures necessarily resulting from that change,) is made the pretext for the attempt to displace them. At all events it never fails to raise up a new and powerful opposition, transfiguring friends into enemies, and enemies into friends. This is the natural course of things; and it is well for our constitution that it is so.—All wars must increase the patronage and influence of the Executive Power; and most of our wars since the Revolution having been wars of *Principles*, and connected with domestic disturbances, they have facilitated the passing of laws

abhorrent from the spirit of our constitution, and unfavourable to the liberty of the subject. This evil scarcely admits of a complete cure; but the natural palliative and check is the breaking up of parties, in consequence of which the obnoxious laws are repealed, or suffered to expire, and many of the most lucrative and desirable places in the gift of the crown are possessed by the leaders of the new opposition, as the *spoils* of their ministers, or the prices of their resignation.

The application of these general remarks to the existing state of politics is abundantly obvious. — But indeed an action much less powerful than that of peace with the French Republic, would have been sufficient to have dissolved our parties into the present chaos. The opposition, wearied out by the repetition of ineffectual efforts, and almost disorganised by the measure of the secession, would scarcely be called a party. It was at least two parties, when its whole number, as one, was perhaps too small to effect those common purposes, which render an opposition a part of our constitution. At the same time the party of government was composed of materials still more heterogeneous, and whether taken, as the cabinet exclusively, or as including the whole of the adherents of ministry, contained in itself all the principles of approaching dissolution, personal jealousies, difference of dispositions, difference of prior connections, difference as to the final object of their measures, difference as

to the means of effecting it; to all which we must of necessity add the different relations, in which different members of the administration stood, to the feelings and opinions of the Sovereign and his family. It required little quickness to hear the creakings of a machine so disordered, and little sagacity to draw the proper conclusion from them. The question of The Catholic Emancipation was in part a cause, and in part an honourable pretext, of the resignation of Mr. Pitt, who had the address, or the good luck, or both, of taking out of the ministry with him precisely those very men whose weight in the cabinet he had found the most oppressive, and whom he would either stand in union with or in opposition to, as after circumstances might render convenient; and, on the other hand, to leave in power those men whom he might, in some future time, once more head as their leader, with less fears of indocility, and whom, if this project should fall to the ground, he could oppose with more assured hopes of rapidly displacing them. — Alas! that circumstances should so often, so unexpectedly, unravel the fineliest-spun threads of state policy, and that the men, who do not find in honesty the best policy, should so seldom possess the genius that can command circumstances! Selfish views are ever the progeny of minds low and incomprehensive. And the cunning of selfishness, therefore, is but a sort of ingenious ignorance, a poison that contains within itself its own antidote. If these last

observations can be justly deemed inapplicable to Mr. Pitt, we are confident that they are inapplicable only as *premature*, and not as *false*. But of Mr. Pitt hereafter; we return to the general state of parties in the kingdom. We ventured to call it a chaos; and if our ears have not been

——— peal'd
With noises loud and ruinous,

we must attribute this in part to the decencies of recent friendship, and in part to the anxiousness of uncertainty that naturally impresses silence, and the slowness and gradual approaches with which public characters venture to announce any glaring charge of party or inconsistence of principle. Into what forms this chaos is destined finally to be organised it would be rash to assert positively; but those assuredly are likely to form the best conjectures on this subject who have the most accurately enumerated the *elements* of the parties, and most attentively watched their affinities with each other, either directly, or by means of an intermedium.

These *elements* we may perhaps name in the following order: First, all those who belong to every minister, as minister. Secondly, a small number of inoffensive, and, in many points of view, respectable men, who dislike any thing that sounds or looks violent; who have no other criterion of truth, than the appearance of moderation; who listen to an argument from one side, and say, "*that is very*

true!" and to the answer on the other side, and say, "*that is very true likewise!*" and who, sometimes voting on one side and sometimes on the other, give more frequent proofs of their independence than of their wisdom. Third, all those who are attached to the war by motives of private and personal interest, and who do not foresee for themselves any adequate compensation in the peace establishment of the country. Fourth, the enthusiastic Anti-Gallicans, men who fear the power and ambition of France more than its principles (which they could not but see would die a natural death,) and who joined the outcry against the principles of the Revolution only as a means of exciting resistance to its power. Fifth, the enthusiastic Anti-Jacobins, who may be subdivided into three classes, accordingly as they have been ague-stricken either by the panic of *property*, the panic of *feudal subordination*, or the panic of religion and morals. The fourth and fifth classes are of course so intimately blended, that it is difficult to know in many men whether they most fear the ambition or the principles of the Great Nation; yet we are inclined to believe that we are not deceived in stating Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Windham, and Mr. Wilberforce as the leaders of the three subdivisions of the Anti-Jacobins, though, no doubt, they are almost equally zealous as Anti-Gallicans. — Sixth, those of the former opposition, who, seeing nothing to blame in the recent actions of the present ministry, are wil-

ling to waive any nice inquiry into the *principles*, on which they act, and who, by their conciliatory speeches, and other good offices, are seeking a cordial for that "sickness of the heart, which cometh from hope long delayed." In blunter language, those of the late opposition who were not of such rank or importance in their party, as to make it beneath their characters or their expectations, to accept of subordinate honours and emoluments under the new ministry. Seventh, the great bodies and powerful individuals concerned with our colonies, in the East and West Indies, who, it is to be apprehended, will regret the peace in exact proportion to the rapidity with which France extends her commercial prosperity and colonial power, and who will, of course, be more or less friendly to the pacification, according to the degree of their alarm. Lastly, we must place, each in a class by himself, Lord Grenville, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Fox, and the present Chancellor of the Exchequer; the probable views of each of whom we may endeavour to develope on an early day, at the same time that we shall then hazard a conjecture as to the *compounds* into which these elements must soon combine. We shall only observe, that the new ministry wish to connect themselves with the *High Party* by their *principles*, and with the *Opposition* by their *actions;* and we cannot therefore but regret, that Sir Francis Burdett's motion has been so mysteriously postponed; for it was certainly well adapted to produce an effect

which all honest men must desire, namely, to perplex the movements of *certain men* on both sides, and either to convict them of inconsistency, or force them to *retractation*. *Ne videlicet sub nomine Pacis publicæ servitutis sit nutrimentum et causa; et quæ fuerunt vitia, moves tacite fiant.*

THE REPORTED CHANGES.

(Thursday, December 3, 1801.)

MEN who possess (or who imagine that they possess) a few secret anecdotes of men in power, as a part of their own private collection, are generally disposed to consider all causes deduced from the state of society at large, as idle dreams or unmeaning generalities. But such men mistake accidents for principles. Even when the stories to which they give credit, are facts, and have had an actual influence, still these facts must have derived their power of being powerful from the tone of public opinion, and the aggregate of national circumstances. They are sometimes occasions, but scarcely ever *causes*; they may sometimes determine the particular moment, on which an event shall take place, but they rarely, indeed, give birth to the event itself. When these private intrigues are most powerful, they are no more than the minor springs of the machine, and most often they are merely the indexes and minute hands. We hear

abundance of these secret anecdotes, and when there exists no moral or prudential reason for the contrary, it is our duty and business to amuse the public with them; but we never wish to affix to them an importance which they do not possess, or pass them off for anything more than they really are. In short we look at the weather-cock to be informed *which* way the wind blows—not to discover *how* it happened to blow that way.

We have been induced to hazard these general remarks in consequence of sundry rumours relative to a coalition between the new ministry and certain members of the old opposition. Whether any *formal negotiations* are on foot, or any *direct overtures* have been made, we do not know. We remember too many cases in point, not to be convinced that such rumours *may* have their foundation in truth, notwithstanding the most positive assertions to the contrary in the subservient prints of the two parties. Indeed, the *form* only has been denied in the present instance; the substance has been admitted. It has been admitted, that Mr. Addington has given conciliatory explanations respecting his plans of administration. And this is itself the opening of a treaty. For it is not to be supposed, that any direct overture will be made till, by means of these friendly intermediators, who have been employed by the one party to sound the dispositions of the other, so much is *understood* on both sides, as renders the direct overture a matter

of form — the mere seal and subscription of the bond, which had been previously drawn up by mutual agreement. From what we know, and from what we have heard, we are inclined to fear, that it is probable, that a *virtual* coalition is taking place between the present ministry, and a part, at least, of the old opposition. It may, perhaps commence (as the Duke of Portland's, &c. with Mr. Pitt) by a mere support of certain given measures; but neither human nature, nor the particular constitution of our Parliament, permits the continuance of this half friendship; and we have little doubt, therefore, that it will end in a complete partnership. Some circumstances have come to our knowledge which gave an *appearance of plausibility* to the rumour, that direct proposals had been made to one highly respectable member of the opposition. But this is no more than a rumour; and, even if this, and reports like this, should be connected with the real state of the case, we attribute but a subordinate importance to them. However the whispering advertisers of state secrets may smile at our ignorance, we shall continue to believe, that personal intrigues can, in the present state of mankind, be only the proximate causes of the formation of any party; the ultimate and true cause must be sought for in public opinion and national circumstances. We believe, that the temper of the public mind at present is favourable to the formation of such a party; but, we likewise believe, that this present

temper cannot be permanent, and that the party, if it be formed, will be both transitory and inglorious. Any change gives a temporary pleasure to the mass of the people; moderate and quiet men are glad to see even the appearance of union and moderation; and, of the men of more active minds, almost all have something to be ashamed of;—they have either *hoped* like enthusiasts, or *feared* like fanatics; and, conscious of more or less inconsistency in their own political opinions, they are less eager or precise in their demands of consistency in others. Such, we believe to be the tone of the *public* feelings at present; and such, no doubt, must, in a certain degree, be the feelings of many of the members of the opposition, connected, perhaps, with the prospect of a nearer approach to the objects of an ambition, which is, in itself, the reverse of immoral or dishonourable.

The national circumstances, which have in part created this tone of feeling and opinion, are equally favourable to the formation of the party. If on the one hand, Jacobinism is everywhere discredited; on the other hand, the better and wiser part, even of the friends of government, begin to acknowledge, that it never existed in this kingdom, in such strength, as at all to justify the alarm which it excited, or the measures of alarm to which it gave birth. And though, on the other hand, the dread of the power of France has greatly increased, and with great reason; yet none of the opponents of the

peace have been able distinctly to point out, in what way the prolongation of the war would tend to lessen that power. That the dominion of the Chief Consul would have been more insecure in war, than it is likely to be in peace, has been asserted; but no shadow of proof advanced for the opinion. To have prolonged hostilities, in the hope that by the excitement of internal disturbances, we might *cut off* the Chief Consul, would assuredly not have damped the zeal or boldness of his enterprises against this country during the war, or inclined him to moderation in the terms of a future peace. And again, to prolong a war, in the hope of a counter-revolution, and to avow, that we desire a counter-revolution, because we dread the might and prosperity of the Great Nation, if Bonaparte remain the Chief Magistrate, is a strange scheme of inducing the Great Nation to desire a counter-revolution, and to prefer a Bourbon, because he is to cut down the prosperity of his country to the Procrastes bed of its rival's wishes, to a Bonaparte, who has made that country the object of our terror and jealousy. The peace which has been concluded may be a bitter pill to our pride; but though we may exclaim, bad is the best, yet still, the best must be taken. Ashamed, therefore, of its late alarms at Jacobinism, and with a half-ludicrous conviction, that, deceived by the animal's noise, it had mistaken a bull-frog for a bull; compelled too by common sense, to prefer a peace of anxiety to a war without

hope or object; the nation is just in that temper of mind, which will dispose it to acquiesce in, and languidly support for a while, the ministry which is now forming: a ministry, made up of the *middle-sized* talents of all parties; and, like the peace, which it will definitively conclude, the best that can at present be had; *and bad is the best!*

On the side of the ministry, all circumstances favour the desire of such a coalition. To have concluded a peace, after so dreadful a war, a peace with the French Republic, must of necessity have been the ruling and marked event of *any* administration, however vigorous and splendid it were; much more then of an administration so naked of *first-rate* talent (at least, of the *reputation* of first-rate talent,) as the present. The peace, and the conditions of the peace, Mr. Addington, and his compeers, must defend and abide by. This is the great measure, which makes their ministry important to their contemporaries, and which consigns their names to history. They, who support the administration in this measure, are, for a time, at least, its natural friends, however different the principles, on which they justify their support of the measure, may be from the motives which impelled the ministry to adopt it. Still, however, this diversity of motive and principle, if it were often and loudly avowed, would necessarily introduce a dissension among the supporters of the peace; which would weaken the measure, both in the public mind,

and in the minds of those *independent* members of Parliament, who combine but loosely with *any* party, and can scarcely be expected therefore, to remain firm to a party divided in itself. Now, whatever weakens the party, which supports the peace, will give strength to the opponents of it. The avowal, therefore of this dissentience, must, if possible, be prevented; and this can be done in no other way, but, by uniting all the great efficient members of the old opposition *in* the ministry, conciliating their silence by gratifying their ambition. They, meantime, find in the moderation, with which ministers are disposed to *act*, a motive for a general amnesty as to principles, and prior conduct.

It is rumoured (and we believe the rumour,) that Mr. Pitt has receded from the new ministry, and that he is daily receding further. This, it is said, gives both the *motive* to Mr. Addington to negotiate with the opposition, and a prospect of success to the negotiation. For never can we deem so meanly of the honour or prudence of *any* part of the old opposition, as to suspect for a moment that they would go over to the Addington party, without insisting on a complete separation from Mr. Pitt as a *sine qua non* of their union. It would indeed crush them for ever in the opinions of Englishmen, if they gave their influence for the purpose of raising the Ex-Minister once more into that power from which their great leader, who, more than any other individual, possesses the affection and confidence of

the great *mass* of the people, is excluded by those prejudices *in a certain quarter* (we purposely use a word tame and palliative, when we say only *prejudices,*) which the Ex-Minister had both fostered and deepened. If, then, this separation from Mr. Pitt's interests should take place, and if Mr. Fox consent to remain in secession, the road seems smooth and easy, it *seems* smooth, but it is treacherous and insecure, and, as it appears to us, leads by labyrinthine windings to the very den of the monster, from which we all wish to escape.

We are told indeed that Mr. Addington promises to suffer the obnoxious laws to expire, and to conduct the government in the spirit of the constitution; and we are told that, if he is faithful to his promise, there is no room for opposition. No room for opposition!—As well might you whisper in the ear of a man whose nose had been pulled—"Why do you remain angry?—your adversary is ready to shake hands with you *under the table.*" A public insult demands a public explanation. Many of the most obnoxious measures of the present ministry, both as ministers and as supporters of the late administration, were execrable, not so much for the immediate evil which they occasioned, as for the precedent which they tended to create. Such in particular were the repeated suspensions of the Habeas Corpus Act. Like the tooth of the viper, it inflicted but a trifling wound, but it dropped in a deadly poison. The *proper* antidote of the venom

would be a direct vote of the next Parliament stamping the obnoxious measures as unnecessary and unconstitutional. — It was in this way that the liberty of election was secured (in the affair of Mr. Wilkes,) and the personal safety of Englishmen bulwarked against the tyranny of general warrants. The friends of freedom at that period did not think it sufficient that the ministers suffered the persecution to intermit, and Mr. Wilkes to resume his seat in the House of Commons—and then asked "What room is there now for opposition?" The resignation of Sylla did not remove the *precedent* of his dictatorship, and Cæsar knew how to avail himself of it. Let it be remembered, that they who permit a precedent help to make it: and every place they afterwards accept will be rightly regarded as the purchase money of the desertion of the liberties of their country.

We are told that it is idle to discuss what men are likely to do when great leading differences among them have ceased; in other words, idle to anticipate the places which the members of the old opposition may accept, when they and the present ministry have honourably become friends. But can they coalesce with honour, unless Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury publicly disavow the principles of the war, and by branding them with an open retractation, prevent them from becoming *precedents?* Is there any probability that they would do it, if they could; or that they could do it,

even if they wished it, and retain their situations as servants of the crown? It is now, perhaps, believed by them that the government of France, an iron and military despotism, holds out no inducements to the desire of change; and this being the case, they are willing to intermit those laws which they had passed, when the politics of France wore, or were doomed to wear, a more seducing form. Now that the raving madness of Jacobinism hath sunk into the melancholy madness of despotism, they consent to unlace the strait-waistcoat, in which they themselves had confined the nation, *lest* it should go mad. But are we quite sure that the volcanic force of the revolution has wholly spent itself? And what? If the Chief Consul should disclose certain traits of character, which Mr. Windham would be more disposed to believe than Mr. Addington, what pledge have the opposition received, that we shall not once again be plunged into a war *of principles?* The precedent is recorded, unerased, unrepented of. It is well known that the seditious dramatic libel, which was used as a pretext for subjecting the London stage to the controul of a licenser, was written for that very purpose by a creature of the then administration. There have been common tricks of state policy in all governments. Now, what if the faction of the alarmists should send some of their spies to *enact* sedition in a garret, or to tempt some half-witted, half-starved journeyman to commit the crime in good earnest;

what pledge is the new ministry disposed to give, that they will not once again constitute a committee of ——, with a careful exclusion of every man who has ever dissented from them; and, on the report of *such* a committee, once again suspend the Habeas Corpus Act? They have a PRECEDENT in their favour, and they may, any month in the year, safely aver that they do it now on still stronger ground than they had in the last suspension. If then, the creatures of *any* faction ask us, what is the object of the hostility which we wish to see waged by the friends of freedom against the new ministry, we, too, can compress our answer into one word—SECURITY.

Admitting that there existed any shadow of reasons to induce us to waive all consideration of the conduct of Mr. Addington and his compeers, as the adherents of the late ministry, and arraying them on their entrance into official situations in all the spotlessness of a new creation, there have been two acts of their own administration which have *outheralded* all the measures even of their immediate predecessors. The first is the re-suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act on the report of a committee, from which they had excluded every member of the opposition, and assigning, as a reason, that the members of the opposition could not with safety be entrusted with any knowledge, which it was necessary for the safety and welfare of the country to keep secret. Surely, if ever the wrongs of indivi-

duals could become sacred, and exempted from all duties of forgiveness, by being intimately blended with the wrongs of the country, it was in this instance. Ambition has a strange power, if it can cause this "*leading* difference" to die by voluntary oblivion — if it can cause this insult to the country in the person of the individuals to be done away, without having been retracted as formally as it was offered. The second act is the Bill of indemnity, which established *espionage* by law, purchasing calumnies by impunity, interposing the ominous shadow of a particular act between the injured man and the law of the land, and eclipsing its blessed light, that assassins might escape in the unnatural darkness. When the authors of acts, like these, seem inclined to shake hands with freedom, we dread the poisoned gloves of Italy. With these men, we are assured, it is scarcely possible, that the great patriots, who have almost identified their names with those of peace and liberty, can ever yield even a semblance of union. We trust, therefore, that the rumours, which have excited our alarm, will *end* in nothing; though we dare not affirm, that they *originated* in nothing. We respect the persons and the rank, we revere the talent, and, above all, the services of opposition. We remember with grateful admiration the patient endurance, and the intrepid courage, with which they defended the laws and constitution of their country, and the rights of all mankind, in "evil

days;" and among "evil tongues." In the trying hour, when liberty was, as it were, fixed on the cross of shame and public abhorrence, amid the earthquake, that rent, and the darkness that covered, the whole earth; they persisted to acknowledge, and proclaim, the divinity of its mission; and we cannot, we will not believe, that such men will, on the very eve of that resurrection, which they themselves had foretold, associate their fair names with those of that priestly and pharisaic faction, whose fanatical outcries occasioned the *Barabbas* war to be let loose upon us. In the depth of alarms we seek for reasons to evince the groundlessness of it; and we hope, and struggle to believe, that it *is* groundless. But we have felt it our duty to state these alarms, ignorant how far the members of the opposition may sympathise with that tone of public feeling and opinion, which we have described as existing, but which, we are confident, will be transitory; ignorant too, how far they might be seduced by the best feelings to transfer that facility of forgiveness and reconciliation, which is so natural to generous minds, from the events of private life, where it is most amiable, to public men and public events, where it would be error and apostacy. We know, that between the support of the measures, and the support of the men, the interspace is sloping and slippery—and as every good and wise man, in the ensnaring business of public life, must needs have the humility to fear for himself, so no good and wise man can be offended with others that fear

for him. Besides, we have the strongest reasons for declaring our opinion on events which it would be dotage not to look forward to as *possible*, however great the improbability may be. For if the alarm should pass away, like a vapour, the principles, which we have declared, will ably plead our forgiveness with the great advocates of those principles; and if, alas! the alarm should be substantiated, we shall perhaps have done prudently in thus declaring our opinions of the event previously to its accomplishment. For after *such* an event it may be problematical how far we should dare to do so — at least the *subservient* paper (that tail of the weathercock of the French revolution) has informed the public, that it is an axiom in politics, that no new government can tolerate the Liberty of the Press.*

*** *To-morrow, if possible, the subject will be continued, and the argument concluded, in an article † on the Report that Mr. Grey is to succeed Lord Hobart, as Secretary of State. In this article will be disclosed important facts.*

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* *The Morning Chronicle* of Saturday last contained an article more hostile to free government than any which the anti-jacobin writers have produced. It was an apology for all the acts of the despotism of Bonaparte — among other things, justifying his suppression of the Liberty of the Press! This from a newspaper pretending to defend the cause of freedom! — No *new* government, it was said, can allow the Freedom of the Press. Did the writer never hear of the United States of America?

† This article did not appear. S. C.

COMPARISON

OF THE PRESENT STATE OF FRANCE WITH THAT OF ROME UNDER JULIUS AND AUGUSTUS CÆSAR.

I.

(Tuesday, September 21, 1802.)

AS human nature is the same in all ages, similar events will of course take place under similar circumstances; but sometimes names will run parallel, and produce the appearance of a similarity, which does not really exist. Indeed, it is generally observable that the instances in which the names run the most parallel, are not those that will best stand the tests of inspection and analysis. An examination, however, should always be instituted. We discover something well worth the trouble employed, if we do no more than detect a common source of fallacy, more especially when there is reason to suspect that this coincidence of names has been adopted by design, and for political purposes. The least attentive observer of the political world cannot but have noticed the solicitude of the French government to represent their country as a new Roman Republic. France has its Consuls, its Tribunes, its Senate, its Proconsular Provinces, its dependent Free States and Allies, its obedient Kings. In a recent instance it has attempted to force its language upon Europe, as a

general language of state, as the successor and substitute of the language of the former masters of mankind. In the same spirit the first Consul, in his late address to Mr. Fox, divides the whole world into two nations, the European and the Oriental, even as under Augustus the world was considered as consisting of two parts, the Roman Empire and the Barbarians. In the same spirit, too, the finest parts of Europe have been pillaged in order to convert Paris into a new Rome, a metropolis of the civilized world, of this one great European nation: and the books, statues, and pictures of Italy have undergone the same fate from the French conquerors, which those of Greece formerly experienced under the Italians.* As far as

* Even in the circumstance of *imitation*, the parallel holds good. For if the French are imitating the Romans, it is equally as certain that the Romans imitated the Greeks; and that Cæsar, Pompey, and their predecessors, acted on the plans of Philip and Alexander. To make one great nation of the civilised part of mankind, with one common language, and to use them as the engine of subjugating and civilising the barbarous nations, were the sanctifying pretexts of the Greek and Roman conquests. The very language of Bonaparte and Anacharsis Cloots is borrowed from Pliny. *Sparsa congregare Imperia, ritusque mollire, et tot populorum discordes ferasque linguas sermonis commercio contrahere ad colloquia, et humanitatem homini dare, breviterque una cunctarum gentium in toto orbe patria fieri.* Plin. Nat. Hist. *lib.* 3. *cap.* 5. If the Romans placed their deceased Emperors among the Gods, the flatterers of Bonaparte have not hesitated, even in his life time, to style him

the ambition and ambitious designs of the two empires are concerned, we must confess the resemblance is strict and real, the analogy in all its parts exact.

If we inquire, to what period of the Roman history the present history of France assimilates itself, the answer may prove unpleasant to the new Roman Republic; but it is not the less true. If it resemble any period at all, it must be that when Rome ceased to be a Republic, and the government was organized into a masked and military despotism (a despotism with a frightful half-mask on its face); when the sovereign power was repeatedly and ostentatiously affirmed to reside in the people, but the right of exercising it suspended for ever; when the popular elections were transferred to a trembling senate, and all the powers of consul, tribune, and generalissimo, centered in one person. Here indeed the points of apparent resemblance are sufficiently obvious. And surely it cannot be indifferent either to Europe or to France itself, whether there be *any* real resemblance; and if that cannot be denied nor softened down, whether it be a total

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the Providence of Europe; if it was said of the Roman Perpetual General First Consuls, that they were elected, not by the people, but by the active influence of the Gods (*numine deorum electi*), for the establishment of unity and civilisation among jarring nations, Bonaparte speaks of himself as a divine envoy for the same great purposes, as *called* by Him from whom all things emanate.

or only a partial resemblance, whether they are to produce the same effects, to possess the same duration. No! It cannot be indifferent either to Englishmen or Frenchmen, whether the new Cæsar* be likely to transmit his power to other Tiberiuses, Caligulas, Claudiuses, Neros, Vitelliuses, and Domitians, till such time as Providence shall have

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* It would be too great a digression to inquire, at present, which of the three first Cæsars we mean, when, in imitation of his late addresses, we style Bonaparte the new Cæsar. His character comprises in it many of the good, and some of the bad, traits of all the three. If in courage, splendour of military fame, in military success and conduct, and the love of science, he recall Julius to our memory; if he remind us of Augustus in his close application to public business, and his encouragement of the liberal arts and great public works, we must at the same time admit, that he has likewise the imperious, irritable, and ostentatious mind of the former, with the constitutional coldness and politic craft of the latter. But if reserve, if darkness, if the employment of spies and informers, if dread and hatred of all political discussions, if vindictive hatred of all bold political writings, if an indifference to all religions, except as instruments of state policy, with a certain strange and dark superstition respecting fate, a blind confidence in his destinies —if these be any parts of the Chief Consul's character, they would force upon us, even against our own will, the name and history of Tiberius—Vide Suetonius, lib. 3. Tib. Cæsar, *passim*. Non modo morosus, sed prætrepidus quoque, si qua famosa de se ac suis carmina, imo, versiculi facti, animadversum est statim in auctores, scriptaque abolita.—Nemini delatorum fides abrogata.—Circa Deos ac Religiones negligentior, *persuasionisque plenus cuncta Fato agi*.

peopled and disciplined the limited deserts of Russia and Asiatic Tartary, and a new deluge from the north sweep away slaves and dwarfs, and put men and freemen in their places.

First, then, it cannot be denied that some resemblance does really exist. The prodigious influx of new wealth from the Asiatic conquests unsettled the balance of property in Rome, and of course the very foundations of the Roman constitution. The same revolution was produced in France by the commercial spirit, and the consequent prosperity, political importance, and increased size and population of cities. In both empires the spread of arts, sciences, eloquence, and free thinking, had been accompanied by luxury, of the most criminal kinds, corruption of domestic morals, venality, an inordinate overgrowth of social vanity, and a general contempt of the religious creeds and establishments of their ancestors. Both in France and Rome the metaphysics and ethics of Epicurus had become the fashionable philosophy among the wealthy and powerful; a philosophy which regards man as a mere machine, a sort of living automaton; which teaches that pleasure is the sole good, and a prudent calculation of enjoyment the only virtue. In both states the people had been agitated by the wildest and most unprincipled demagogues, and projects of Agrarian laws set afloat, to raise the people against the natural aristocracy of the state, and consequently to throw them into the arms of a military despot.

In both countries proscriptions, and tumults, and the most shameless venality had made the very name of liberty odious, and the vices of the leaders of all parties had introduced into the minds even of good men a despair of the Republic, and a disposition to submit to the sober despotism of any individual, rather than the mad tyranny of a multitude. The distant conquests in Gaul and the Asiatic provinces had effected that in Rome, which the long and desperate war with all Europe had more rapidly brought about in France; the affections and duties of the soldiery were gradually weaned from the laws and free legislatures of their country, and transferred to their generals. This is the common and natural course of political contests: they begin in *principles*, and end in *men*.

In France all these events followed each other more rapidly than in Rome; but the events themselves are the same. The admission of all the Italian States to the citizenship of Rome, and to the right of voting in the Campus Martius, was the same both in its own nature and in its consequences with that right of universal suffrage, which was passed into a fundamental law of the French constitution by the Brissotines. For thus all the elements of a military despotism were thrown together. —The soldiery in the course of so wild a war would necessarily grow into the knowledge and feeling of their own power; and a promiscuous mob in the mean time were called forth to overawe, oppress,

and render contemptible the legislature, and by all possible follies and excesses to afford the soldiery a pretext for the exercise of that power. Happily for France, Dumourier antedated his plans, and happily both for France and for himself, Moreau appears to possess neither the impulses nor the talents requisite for political intrigue; or the armies of the Rhine, with those of the interior, and those of Italy and Egypt, might play over again the parts of the Gallic and Asiatic Legions under Pompey and Julius, and France boast a new Pharsalia as an accompaniment of her new Cæsar. The pressure of foreign enemies, from which Rome was altogether exempt, has been, in this respect at least, as fortunate for France, as it has proved luckless to England and Austria: its Republic has been changed into an empire without a civil war among its own generals. It has, however, been changed by the same steps as the Roman Republic was, and under the same titles and phrases: only, as before, differing in the degrees of rapidity with which the same processes have been accomplished. The reigns of the three first Cæsars have been crowded into the three first years of the reign of Bonaparte. He began by imitating the decency and decorous ambition of Augustus, who caused himself to be elected the first magistrate of the Republic for ten years only, and at the expiration of that period was re-elected. A show of free-voting was at the same time allowed to the people. But Bonaparte soon found the bold and contemp-

tuous impetuosity of Julius Cæsar more accordant with his natural inclinations, and probably more flattering to his vanity, as well as more agreeable to his pride. In exact imitation of Julius Cæsar he assumed the perpetual consulship with the imperatorial power, and the prefix of General, and appointed two Consuls in subordination to him. *Binos Consules substituit sibi* (*Suet.* lib. i. *Jul. Cæsar*), and he assumed it in nearly the same forms. The votes of the soldiers were taken, as of the army, and Bonaparte is fully entitled to proclaim his election in the very words of the old Roman Emperors, "*delectu militum, et authoritate patrum,*"—by the choice of the soldiery and the assent of the senate. Nor would it be difficult to discover in the biographies of Julius Cæsar, striking parallels to the fierce and intemperate speeches with which his imitator has threatened all who attempted to make a shadow of opposition to his measures.

The result of the whole is plainly this: that at present the French constitution is precisely the same with that of the Roman empire under the Cæsars; and that this revolution has been brought about by similar causes. In both, all effective power and patronage are in the hands of the General of the State, who has the privilege of recommending and finally appointing his own successor. In both the soldiers are to be kept, if possible, in decent awe, by the image of a civil government, while all the powers of that government, not included in

those of the *Imperator et Consul Perpetuus*, are palsied by the dread of the soldiery.

If then there be no counterpoise of dissimilar circumstances, the prospect is gloomy indeed. The commencement of the public slavery in Rome was in the most splendid æra of human genius. Any unusually flourishing period of the arts and sciences in any country, is, even to this day, called the Augustan age of that country. The Roman poets, the Roman historians, the Roman orators, rivalled those of Greece; in military tactics, in machinery, in all the conveniences of private life, the Romans greatly surpassed the Greeks. With few exceptions, all the Emperors, even the worst of them, were like Bonaparte,* the liberal encouragers of all great public works, and of every species of public merit

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* Imitators succeed better in copying the vices than the excellences of their archetypes. Where shall we find in the First Consul of France a counterpart to the generous and dreadless clemency of the first Cæsar? *Acerbe loquentibus satis habuit pro concione denunciare, ne perseverarent. Aulique Cæcinæ criminosissimo libro, et Pitholai carminibus maledicentissimis laceratam existimationem suam civili animo tulit.*

It deserves translation, for our English readers. "If any spoke bitterly against him, he held it sufficient to complain of it publicly, to prevent them from persevering in the use of such language. His character had been mangled in a most libellous work of Aulus Cæcina, and he had been grossly lampooned in some verses by Pitholaus; but he bore both with the temper of a good citizen."

For this part of the First Consul's character, if common

not connected with the assertion of political freedom.

> —— O Juvenes, circumspicit et agitat vos,
> Materiamque sibi ducis indulgentia quærit.

It is even so, at this present moment, in France. Yet, both in France and in Rome, we have learned, that the most abject disposition to slavery rapidly trod on the heels of the most outrageous fanaticism for an almost anarchical liberty. *Ruêre in servitium patres et populum.* Peace and the coadunation of all the civilised provinces of the earth, were the grand and plausible pretexts of Roman despotism; the degeneracy of the human species itself, in all the nations so blended, was the melancholy effect. To-morrow, therefore, we shall endeavour to detect all those points and circumstances of dissimilarity, which, though they cannot impeach the rectitude of the parallel, for the present, may yet render it probable, that as the same constitution of government has been built up in France with incomparably greater rapidity, so it may have an incomparably shorter duration. We are not conscious of any

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report speaks the truth, we must seek a parallel in the dispositions of the third Cæsar, who dreaded the pen of a paragraph writer, hinting aught against his morals and measures, with as great anxiety, and with as vindictive feelings, as if it had been the dagger of an assassin lifted up against his life. From the third Cæsar, too, he adopted the abrogation of all popular elections.

feelings of bitterness towards the First Consul; or, if any, only that venial prejudice, which naturally results from the having hoped proudly of any individual, and the having been miserably disappointed. But we will not voluntarily cease to think freely and speak openly. We owe grateful hearts, and uplifted hands of thanksgiving to the Divine Providence, that there is yet one European country (and that country our own) in which the actions of public men may be boldly analysed, and the result publicly stated. And let the Chief Consul, who professes in all things to follow his fate, learn to submit to it, if he finds that it is still his fate to struggle with the spirit of English freedom, and the virtues which are the offspring of that spirit! If he finds, that the Genius of Great Britain, which blew up his Egyptian navy into the air, and blighted his Syrian laurels, still follows him with a calm and dreadful eye; and in peace, equally as in war, still watches for that liberty, in which alone the Genius of our Isle lives, and moves, and has his being; and which being lost, all our commercial and naval greatness would instantly languish, like a flower, the root of which had been silently eat away by a worm; and without which, in any country, the public festivals, and pompous merriments of a nation, present no other spectacle to the eye of reason, than a mob of maniacs dancing in their fetters.

COMPARISON—No. II.

(Continued from our Paper of Tuesday last.)

(Saturday, September 25, 1802.)

DOES there exist any real resemblance between the present empire and government of France, under Bonaparte, and the empire and government of Rome, under the three first Cæsars? This is the question, which we proposed to the attention of our readers, in our Tuesday's paper; and (if we do not grossly deceive ourselves) we fully proved, that it must be answered in the affirmative. We are confident, that no Englishman will be weak enough to ask us, whether we have not forgotten the Cantonal Assemblies, the Electoral Colleges, the Tribunate, and the Legislature, of France.* It is capable of demonstration, that the first consul might as well nominate the legislature and tribunate in the first instance. We know

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* All these will do no more than recal, perhaps, to the minds of some of our readers, the old trick, which exercises the ingenuity, and excites the surprise, of *very young* children, when they first learn the rudiments of arithmetic. Take any number you like! *(there is the freedom of election)* add 12 to it! *(That* must *be done)* then double the whole. Thus doubled, halve it: then double it again: then halve it again: *then subtract your original number*, and there remains 12!! In all the movements of the present French Constitution, the trick is equally palpable, and vastly more tedious.

of no end, that can be answered by the labyrinthine and improgressive steps of his tiresome figure-dance, but simply this: Frenchmen may be *idle*, but will never be *indolent*—wherein, heaven be praised! they are the very antithesis of Englishmen, who think it wiser to do *nothing*, than *nothings*, and might possibly endure, for a little while, to be *slaves*, but never, never to be *puppets!* Notwithstanding, therefore, the whole Senatus Consultum of August the 4th, with all its ten titles, we persevere * in affirming, that in no essential point does

* We have made no mere *assertions:* we have adduced the instances and the proofs. If we be accurate, it would be worthy the magnanimity of the imitator of Alexander and Julius Cæsar to suppress the anger, which an inconvenient truth is apt to excite. If we be deceived, let his official Journalists detect and expose our errors or blunders, in the spirit of freemen. It is easy to forgive accusations that are altogether unfounded. Many Englishmen were made merry, but none angry, by the article in the *Moniteur* of the 9th of August; because none of us have been led by it ever to suspect that Mr. Pitt and his colleagues "excited the massacres of September," or "encouraged the fabricator of the infernal machine:" and because a vast majority of us are obstinate enough not to believe, though the First Consul himself assures us of it, "that the French government is now more *stable* than the English." The First Consul himself believes it, of course, for he asserts it. But yet, if we may judge by the irritation and alarm which a few squibs in a foreign newspaper have awakened in our new Cæsar, his faith resembles that of the ambitious beings mentioned in Scripture—he "*believes and trembles;*" or perhaps it is a sort of ague faith, in which the hot fit is regularly followed

the present government and constitution of France differ from that of Rome, under Julius, Augustus, and Tiberius. The effective offices of the state are in the same manner concentered to one person: his power is built up upon the same foundations, his ambition directed to the same objects, and *attempted* to be justified by the same pretexts.

We proceed, therefore, to examine the second question. If, then, the resemblance between the *government* of France at present, and that of Rome under the Cæsars, be both real and strict, is there *any* resemblance between the *circumstances* of the two empires? (the circumstances, we mean, both external and internal.) And if this cannot be denied, are there not likewise some important circumstances of dissimilarity, that must act as a counterpoise to the partial resemblance? And which forebode to the military despotism of France a duration as brief, as its rise has been rapid?

That *some* circumstances of resemblance exist in the manners, morals, and revolutionary events of the Roman and French people, we conceive ourselves to have proved satisfactorily, at the same time that we substantiated the *entire* resemblance of

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by a cold one. One thing seriously astonishes us; how, after the infamous article in the *Moniteur* of the 9th of August, and the abusive libels that followed it in all the other French papers, the complaint against the English papers could have been received by our ministry with common patience.

the two governments. Yes, *some* circumstances of likeness assuredly there are, and these not minute, not unalarming, but of a nature that calls upon all Europe, and, above all, on Great Britain, to be always watchful, always on the guard. We must be jealous of the progress of their truly slavish language among us; we must be detectors and detesters of their mock philosophy, of their false and boastful pretensions in science and literature, equally as in politics. In war, whenever it becomes inevitable, we will be, as ever, their controlling and thwarting genius; in peace their monitor, and outward conscience. All this our national fear, equally with our national pride, demands of us. Having stated this, we turn to the more pleasant task of pointing out those circumstances of dissimilarity between the French and Roman empires, which, though they cannot and must not take aught from that degree of alarm, which is necessary to watchfulness, yet present sufficient of hope to preserve us from dejection.

First, then, it is some little at least in favour of mankind, that there has pre-existed a state of things similar to the present state of France. We have the example, and warning experience of Rome, familiar to us from our school-days; and we would fain hope, that facts do not accumulate altogether to no purpose—that experience will not be always like the lights in the stern of the vessel, illumining the tract only which we have already passed over; that

the human race will not always, like poor moths, fly headlong into a flame, that is already choked and bedimmed with the wings and half-burnt limbs of their predecessors. However, as we may always calculate with more safety on the folly than on the wisdom of nations, we lay no stress on this; but we consider the second point of unlikeness as really important. France has not the same justification which Rome had, either for her ambition, with regard to surrounding nations, or for the despotism of her internal government. And as all national justification must rest mainly on the existing state of mankind, what cannot be justified cannot be permanent. Rome was really an enlightener and civiliser of the world. The free Greeks had done something, and not much, by their colonies—(unless, indeed, we consider Rome itself as a Grecian colony). Alexander and the enslaved Greeks, like Bonaparte and his enslaved Savans, boasted much, and planned much, and did almost nothing.—— But Rome did really spread civilisation, sciences, and the humanising comforts of social life, over amazing tracts of country, and was the cause of the facility with which that religion was propagated over Europe, Africa, and Asia, to which we ourselves owe all we enjoy, in the purity of our domestic manners, and all we dare hope for in the ultimate improvement of the species. France has no claim of this nature. In the neighbouring nations of Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Germany,

Switzerland, and Great Britain, it finds a race of men more moral, and better informed, than its own people (we speak of the mass of each nation); and, in proportion to the population of the different countries, at least an equal number of eminently enlightened individuals. To the South, Italy is somewhat, perhaps, but not greatly, inferior to France. Spain and Portugal are, indeed, wofully inferior; but it is a well-known fact, that it has been the constant policy and effort of Republican France, to prevent civilisation and liberty from spreading among those two unhappy kingdoms. Were they free, and well informed, they would soon present that bulwark against the ambition of France on the south, which Germany would *now* offer on the north, if only she were as united, as she is brave and enlightened. To all the grand purposes of civilisation and science, Europe, and European America, are already one people, beyond the most boastful dream of Roman pride. What would mankind gain, by turning this brotherhood in science and manners, into a political amalgamation? We should exchange national wars for civil wars. We should sink into barbarism from slavery, into discord from barbarism; and thus sacrifice our close union, as men, to an appearance of alliance, as citizens. Neither has France the same excuse with Rome for the despotism of her government. In those feudal institutions, which her shallow mock statesmen have now made the objects of an hostile oath, she had links of social subordination, a happy

intertexture of the interests and property of the state, which was in vain to be sought for in the original constitution of Rome, in which every rich proprietor was regarded as an illegal oppressor; and that Agrarian Law was necessary for Rome, as a Republic, which would have destroyed it, as a society. And though, before the usurpation of the Cæsars, the city of Rome, and the free inhabitants of the Italian states, enjoyed a sort of tumultuary liberty, yet the empire at large was miserably oppressed; every blood-stained and rapacious pro-consul could be brought to trial only before his accomplices; and, it is an undoubted fact, that the Emperors, while they enslaved the city, alleviated the slavery of the provinces. But these circumstances are wholly foreign to France, considered as a mighty nation composed of Frenchmen. Her *true* empire exists in herself; it is, indeed, one and indivisible, because it is composed of men, who have the same manners, the same language; and is not, like the Roman Empire, a gorgeous robe of patchwork. The provinces were the very body and limbs of the Roman Empire, but they are only the *wens* and diseases of the French. Rome *could* not continue free, because she *consisted* of incongruous parts; the liberty of the people was sacrificed to the life of the empire. France *is* not free, because she has wilfully *incrusted* herself with an heterogeneous compound; in all the petty states, which she has bound *to* herself, she has bound chains and fetters *around* herself. The soldiers, that enslaved Rome,

were the natural and necessary parents of the Roman Empire; in France their power was originally *created* by the mad fear and rage of Great Britain, and her allies, at the commencement of the French Republic, and they are *continued* by the mad ambition of France itself, and at this moment rendered necessary only by reluctant and useless dependencies, by justly alarmed neighbours, and by the deep domestic discontents, of which the military despotism is itself the chief cause. Rome, in short, was *precipitated* by vices and corruptions into the slavery, which, suited the nature of her empire; France, by the same vices and corruptions, into a slavery, which (as we shall shew hereafter) will undermine her false power, and thereby bring her within the possibility of freedom.

To these considerations we must add the modern improvement in the science of politics, by the discovery of *government by popular representation;* the great rule and law of which is, that it shall recede from universal suffrage, as the state of property in the nation to be represented recedes from the subdivisions of Agrarian equality. It must appear strange to us, that so simple and natural an idea did not suggest itself to the antients; that it was never conceived, for instance, by the Antonini, who assuredly were not deficient in fervent desires for the liberty of Rome. But, perhaps, it is less strange than that neither Greece nor Rome discovered the art of printing, the general idea of

which is so simple, that Cicero stumbled upon it in a mere metaphorical illustration. The difficulty is, indeed, much more readily solved in the one instance than in the other. For all the republics of Greece were *cities*, and at first not very large cities. Of course there was an apparent necessity for representation: they would be as little likely to fall upon, or to approve, the idea, as the inhabitants of Westminster to approve the plan of choosing electoral colleges, instead of themselves choosing their own members by their own votes. What the cities of Greece always were, Rome was for a long time. Happy it would have been for her, if the plan of representation had been suggested and adopted, at the time of the admission of the Italian states to the right of suffrage; but who could have persuaded the citizens of Rome to have abandoned their own old custom and right of exercising the supreme power in their own persons? and for the Italian States to have sent representatives, while every Roman citizen voted in person, would have been infinitely more ridiculous and disproportionate than the number of Scotch peers in our British House of Lords. Under the empire, when the popular assemblies ceased altogether, this objection of course no longer existed; but now the other provinces of the empire were more nearly on an equality, both in rights and pretensions with the Italian States. They of course would have claimed the privilege of sending members to their Imperial

Parliament; and it is highly probable, that a parliament elected fairly from all the Provinces of the Roman Empire would have exhibited too jarring an assemblage of manners and interests, for the dignity or safety of the empire. It is said, that this is felt in a slight degree, even in the American Congress at present, where all the difference is effected by the different climate and consequent modification of manners and opinions. None of these difficulties exist in France. The system has been tried in her presence, and its excellence proved before her own eyes. Imperfect as our representation is, we still have become a great and flourishing people under its auspicious influence. In America, where the nature of the property permits, and, indeed, commands a much more extensive right of suffrage, than any wise man would wish in England or France, the result is equally in favour of a Representative Legislature. The Americans are neither very amiable nor very enlightened, as a people; yet what government on earth has presented such continued proofs of wisdom, moderation, and love of peace? Nothing can be conceived more violent than the contentions of the candidates, nothing more calm and dignified than the conduct of the same men, as legislators and magistrates. France therefore cannot justify her despotism by the same necessity as Rome could; and if this be true, Frenchmen will, and do, feel it to be truth; and the despotism, which cannot be justified—can-

not be permanent. It is true, that some *shew* of justification is, and will be, derived from the miseries and vices of the revolution. But the sophistry is too palpable not to be detected by every man, as soon as his feelings, passions, and individual sufferings, permit his reason to have fair play. The principle of disregarding property, both in the candidates and the electors, and the wild attempt to erect a government on the hypothetical *rights* of man, as a creature of nature, instead of his real and existing privileges, as a creature of society, were errors so egregious, that men will as little suspect or relinquish the system of a representative government, in consequence of these French experiments, as they would reject the present efforts in chemistry, in consequence of the mad schemes of the old alchemists. Besides, what wise man will make any deductions to the discredit of liberty, from the first extravagances of unfettered slaves? Even a common stage-coachman will not object to the amendment of a bad road, although he well knows, that *no* road can be so bad, as a road *a mending?* It is the fate and nature of revolutions, that the people at first are more than *angels* in their notions of rights and liberties; and less than men in the enjoyment and practice of them. It is equally natural, that the consequent failures should induce disgust; and that arguments should be deduced from the first outrages of a transient hope, to *justify* the despotism, which has its best foundation in an

equally transient despondency. A sick stomach, and a throbbing head, are as little favourable to just conceptions, as the gay madness of the midnight carousal. This is the morning after a debauch.—As we would not rely on the promises of France, in her drunken mood, so neither shall we calculate on her passiveness and languor, now that she is *getting* sober. We must wait till she *is* sober. We shall then see, that as the despotism and ambition of the French Government have no plea of necessity or advantage, derived from the circumstances of Europe at large, and consequently cannot be *justified;* even so, and for even the same reasons, it cannot be permanent.

For, in truth, the same reasons, that make the constitution and ambitious schemes of France less just and necessary than those of imperial Rome, make it likewise insecure. The very newspaper, which our reader has now in his hand, and which, in a few hours hence, he may probably rumple up for "vile uses," is so powerful an agent, as to constitute an essential difference between the probable duration of a despot's reign in the present age, and that which it often was in the time of imperial Rome. If Bonaparte were told, that Julius Cæsar magnanimously contemned the libels written against his person and measures, we should not be surprised, if Bonaparte should answer—"He did well! But a manuscript libel was not a printed newspaper." When God sent Christianity into the

world, he made men capable of freedom; when he permitted the discovery of printing, he gave men the means of acquiring and perpetuating it. The press is the only "*infernal machine*," which is truly formidable to a modern despot. And only the enemies to the freedom of their country, either fear or have cause to fear. At this moment, the illumination of all Europe, and the European world, is acting upon each part of it. The rapid intercommunication of thoughts and discoveries, the amiable social vanity, that is the result of this free intellectual commerce; and the awe, in which each government stands, of the opinions of its nation, and in which each nation stands, of the opinions of its neighbours; these are the most effectual guards and warrants of mutual freedom: these will make all actual despotism short-lived; and will convert (and, in some measure, have already converted) formal despotisms into virtual free states. Prussia and Denmark are existing instances. It cannot therefore be, that France will long endure to be the pity and scorn of Great Britain! At present, she is dazzled, perhaps, almost to blindness, by her conquests and military achievements; but her rulers are taking infinite pains to restore her eye-sight. A spy or two, in every restaurateur and coffee-house, with soldiers parading in every street, lane, and alley, who advance, and listen, if any three friends stand talking together; and "*the best, greatest, and wisest nation of Europe*" compelled to be

silent, while the army, and the creatures of the generals, declare, in the name, and as the act, of this "*best, greatest, and wisest nation,*" that they are not fit to be trusted with the choice of a bailiff, or the perusal of a newspaper; and that they totter upon the very summit of their integrity and political discernment, when they have humbly *recommended* a constable to the choice of the great I by itself, I, the Autocrator of France, and of all her six or seven "*free and independent*" Republics!—These are wrongs and insults which, it cannot be hoped, that even Frenchmen will endure —unless by compulsion. For it is not with *them*, as with the old Romans, who feared no Censors, and no proud Pitiers in Gaul, then semi-barbarous, and Asia always a slave. The finger of enlightened Europe points at *their* fetters; and their old rivals, the English, utter the words—"The French Republic," as a spell, as a love-philtre, that enamours them of their own constitution, of their own dear island; that is at once a majestic kingdom, and a free commonwealth. Formerly, when we spoke of Frenchmen, we used the words, slavery and wooden shoes; now we say, LIBERTY and EQUALITY—and we mean the same things, and mingle no whit less pity with our thoughts, and infinitely more contempt.

Let us add to all this, as a fact least of all to be omitted in this statement of difference, that on the death of Augustus, all the power, and all the exer-

cises of power, were wholly taken from the popular assemblies. The *people* of Rome, as distinguished from the individuals, existed only as an audience in a play-house, or as a *spectatorate* in an amphitheatre. But France is not a city like Rome: it is a vast populous territory, and all its cities, and all its towns, feel an equal interest in the movements of government, and have been accustomed to exert almost an equal political activity, with Paris. Even Portalis, who has supplanted Sieyes in his own manufactory, and whom the Dey himself could have no objection to as constitution-maker for the free Republic of Algiers, even Portalis has not ventured to sentence the whole population of France to absolute inactivity. So far are Frenchmen from being condemned to do nothing, that they are called forth to do a great deal—though, it must be confessed, nothing to any purpose. But to call forth large numbers of men to make fools of themselves, is a dangerous experiment; and it will require all the watchfulness of a *faithful* soldiery, and a large importation of fresh Mamelukes,* to persuade the

* It is well known, that Negroes are beyond measure fascinated with splendid vestments and ornaments of dress. It is worthy, therefore, of being hinted to the First Consul and his Counsellors of State, whether the late soldiers of Toussaint might not be drafted to France, presented with rich regimentals, &c.; and whether in due time they might not be so far won over, as that a Consular Guard might be formed from them, more to be relied on than native French-

whole people of France thus to keep their own fingers dancing to and fro before their own eyes, in order that they may not *see*; though they must *know*, that their pockets are in the act of being picked of those charters and privileges, for which many of them had bled, and all of them suffered—charters bequeathed to them in the field of battle, as the testament and dying legacy of more than a million of their best fellow-countrymen. The Cantonal Assemblies, the Electoral Colleges, the Tribunate, the Legislature, do not affect the *existence* of a pure Cæsarean despotism in France; this we asserted, and this we re-assert; but we did not affirm, nor did we mean to imply, that they may not affect the *duration* of that despotism. Consequently, these are to be counted among the important *circumstances* of difference between the Roman Empire under the Cæsars, and the French under Bonaparte. Other, and equally important ones are to be found in the personal character of the First Consul, and in the character of the dif-

men. The Mamelukes no doubt were an excellent thought; but how are they to be recruited? The Mamelukes too, it is well known, are addicted to certain detestable vices, which are by no means frequent among the Negroes; but whether, in the present state of the morals of France, this would plead for or against the Negroes, is a difficult question, which we do not pretend to decide. We offer the above hint with great humility, and fully conscious that the whole merit of the original idea belongs to the First Consul in his formation of the Egyptian guard.

ferent factions. But we have already transgressed the limits of a newspaper disquisition; and though they are of a nature to be more generally interesting, as being more personal, than the points hitherto adduced, yet we must turn them over to a third and last Essay, which will appear in to-morrow's paper.

No. III. Conclusion of the Comparison.

(Saturday, October 2, 1802.)

WE have heard, with equal sorrow and surprise, that an eminent public character, and one hitherto an assertor of English liberty, has expressed a disapprobation of the late boldness of the London newspapers. Nay, he has intimated "*his fears*," that it may be necessary "*for peace*" to conciliate the good will of Bonaparte, by imposing some additional restrictions on the freedom of political disquisition. We venture to have *our* fears too; our fears, that from the day, on which these fears of *his* were realised, another prophecy would date the *dawn* of its fulfilment: we mean that prophecy of the First Consul, in the *Moniteur* of the 9th of August, that the French Government will last longer than the English. Or rather, it will be idle to ask, which of the two Governments will last the longer, when they have both become one.—A zealous Bishop has taught us, that the

subjects of Great Britain have nothing to do with the laws of their own country but to obey them. This gentleman, it seems, has his fears, that it may be necessary to refine on this truly episcopal maxim, and to inform us by act of parliament, that we have nothing to do with the *edicts* of the First Consul, but to *obey them.* Has not the Chief Consul, by his minister Talleyrand, presented the constitution of France to the Diet, stating it as his reason for so doing, that the tranquillity of all Europe is interested in the establishment of the Consular power? He, himself, informs us officially, that the present constitution of France greatly and nearly concerns us; and shall we not then have leave to examine it? or does he mean, some time or other, to *give* it "to the Department of the Thames;" and therefore expects that, according to the vulgar proverb, we shall not *look the gift in the mouth!* We, for our part, have no fears but such as arise from dispositions much nearer home than those of Bonaparte; nor should we be *surprised* at the event, though we by no means *expect* it, if this parricidal child and champion of Jacobinism should be disarmed of his terrors, even before it can be proposed in an English Legislature, that we should throw ourselves prostrate before them.

We believe, that this new Roman Empire will be of short duration: and we have made this highly probable, by shewing at large, that while its govern-

ment, and its ambitious pretensions, are almost an exact copy of Imperial Rome, it is on the other hand, in a great majority of its *circumstances*, external and internal, wholly unlike those of Rome, and the Roman world. This dissimilarity we are now to carry on by the induction of new facts. The insolence of Julius Cæsar cost him his life; but this insolence and contemptuous tyranny was exerted wholly towards the Senate, whom the people regarded as their worst enemies, and since the murder of the Gracchi, and the suppression of the question of the Licinian law, as cruel and illegal tyrants. To the people of Rome Julius Cæsar was respectful, liberal, almost adulatory. He was assassinated in the senate; but he had been, and he remained, the darling of the people. The cruelties of Tiberius were endured in gratitude to Augustus, and in the hope of better days, of a second Augustus; and the mad tyranny of Caligula and Nero were directed almost wholly against the senate, and were regarded by the people not without complacency. These maniacs, in their worse excesses, provided for the real wants of Rome, as well as for the most splendid pleasures of its inhabitants; and though the materials for the history of those times are both scanty, and from very suspicious sources, yet enough remains to make it highly probable that the executions of the patricians were often regarded by the Romans, as an expiation for the atrocious murder of the Gracchi; and the confiscations of

their prodigious and illegal property (which was in the main squandered by Caligula and Nero, on public shews, edifices, and largesses) appeared as so many extra-regular acts of the old Licinian law. If there stood no order of men, and no possibility of any order, between Bonaparte and the people of France, except the old nobility and farmers general; and if the old nobility were the nominal magistracy of the state, there would be then some resemblance between the present state of France, and that of Imperial Rome; and Bonaparte, like the Cæsars, might remain a despot, and transmit the despotism to posterity, as the protector of the people, as "*the child and champion of Jacobinism.*" We have so long connected the names of Brutus and Cassius with the word, Liberty, that we have forgotten that, by the Roman populace, they were considered as the leaders of the senatorian aristocracy — Cæsar was the child and champion of Jacobinism. But Bonaparte is to the Jacobins what the senate was to the popular faction at Rome, and to the aristocracy of France, what Cæsar was to the senate.

If from Julius Cæsar we turn to Augustus, we shall find the commencement of his power, and that of Bonaparte, so far similar, as that in both instances, all men, and especially all peaceable men, were wearied out by the horrors of civil discord, and prepared to acquiesce in any government, that put a period to them. But, dreadful as the revolutionary scenes in France may have been, they are

trifling compared with those under Marius and Sylla, and afterwards under the triumvirate.—Yet Augustus saw no reason to place such confidence in this terror and despondency of men's minds, as to exempt himself from the necessity of the utmost caution, slowness, and decency. The total extinction of popular liberty was not, as at present in France, effected at a blow. The popular elections were continued; and Augustus repeatedly, for himself and for his friends, acted the part of the most humble and unwearied candidate. He affected no pomp in his person, or palace, beyond that of other wealthy patricians. He received and returned visits, as a common senator. Spies were rigorously discouraged; and the utmost freedom, both in writing and speaking, was practised without danger. He was regarded with veneration, both by the people and the senate, not as the man who governed them by the soldiery—which is the light in which Bonaparte must be considered—but as the only man in the state, who had both the power and the inclination to retain the soldiery within the controul of the laws. Augustus reigned fifty-seven years, during at least forty-seven of which, his character was truly that of the father of his country. All this time there was no apparent change in the nominal constitution of the state; and there can be no doubt, but that a vast majority of the Roman people thought their country a free Republic, and believed that it could only remain

free under the protection and divinity of a Cæsar. Thus more than a generation of men were born and died under the wise and well concealed despotism; and, at the accession of Tiberius, there were probably few Romans alive, who could have remembered any other times than those of Augustus. It is tedious to be always drawing out formal parallels, or opposites; and, in this instance, it is wholly unnecessary. Soldiers in every street, spies under every window, political questions answered only by a look of terror and distrust, and a blank silence in every public company on all subjects of public interest—this is a picture of Rome under Tiberius. Does it bear any resemblance to the present state of Paris? If so, is there any man so unread in the human mind as not to know, that if the Roman Imperial Government had commenced with a Tiberius, it would have been strangled in its birth (though no doubt in some after time it would again have arisen, from the absolute necessity of circumstances). In France the necessity does not exist; and yet in the very commencement of their despotism they are permitted to see what the Romans saw only after a lapse of forty-seven Augustan years. The memory of Augustus threw a glory over Tiberius, as that of Louis the XIVth over his weak and wicked successor: and if this had not been the case, yet the evils must have been endured, for who could suggest a remedy? There was no feasible novelty to look forward to: and as

both Augustus and Tiberius left everything nominally what it had always been, there was no mass of old names to return to — nothing, that had been violently suppressed, and to which the people could revert by a direct counter-revolution. But what Augustus was to all the Roman Empire, in the first years of the reign of Tiberius, that Louis the XVIth is at this moment to a large part of France; and that the fondly cherished hope of a republic is to a majority of the remaining part. — Fear, hope, and memory, are the three great agents, both in the binding of a people to a government, and in the rousing of them to a revolution. All three worked together in favour of Tiberius; but it should appear, that the First Consul must rely chiefly upon the first. His power is an isthmus of Darien, beat upon by the two oceans of Royalism and Republicanism: of Royalism, aided by a powerful superstition; of Republicanism, aided by the detestation of that superstition.

But while the army remain attached to the First Consul, all else, it may be thought, is of little importance. We have had a recent proof, that when an army vote under arms, the people have no other response left, than an Amen. This is undoubtedly true; the present existence of Bonaparte's power evinces its truth. But, on the other hand, it must be remembered, that the affections of the soldiery must be in great measure moulded by those of the offices; and how long will Bonaparte retain these,

he, who daily affects more and more a retiredness of manner, with a kingly demeanour, and who is daily giving proofs of his partiality to the soldiers of the Italian and Egyptian armies, to the real or imagined neglect of the army of the Rhine, the real saviours of the Republic? Add to this, that an immense standing army, which cannot now be fed on the spoils of the countries which it had overrun, implies an immense expenditure; and financial difficulties are serious difficulties, indeed, in a country at peace, and no longer revolutionary, though they were most idly and perniciously calculated upon by our clerk-like minister during the war. But in the military affairs of France, there lies a great and important difference between the circumstances of its Perpetual Consulate, and the same authority under the Imperial title in Rome—a difference which we might with propriety have stated in a former part of this disquisition, but purposely deferred it from its immediate bearing on the personal concerns of the present First Consul. Rome had conquered her whole empire under the Republic: the Emperors, with the single exception of Trajan, contented themselves with maintaining what had been won, and this they accomplished with so little difficulty, that their few and distant wars can scarcely be deemed an interruption of the tranquillity of the Roman empire. Except in peace, the despotism and the empire could not coexist: as soon as the Northern nations became

sufficiently disciplined, and had learnt the policy of combination to carry on regular wars, the Roman empire fell asunder. Now, surely, while there exist four such powers in Europe as Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain, even the grossest flatterers of the great Pacificator will not predict to France a perpetual peace. But if any long and serious war should take place, either the despotism must depress military merit, or fall a sacrifice to military rivalship. Valour and warlike genius are qualities safe only in an Emperor, under a military despotism. If military merit were depressed, want of success would be the inevitable result, and the contempt of the soldiery, and the national alarm deriving courage from the same contempt, would soon dash down both the despotism and the despot. If military merit were encouraged, civil wars would arise; army against army; till the common feelings of human nature would resort either to an hereditary monarch, or to a quick rotation of the supreme magistracy. Even if France were to continue at peace with all her neighbours, yet, the longer the continuance of the peace, the less would the influence and authority of the military become. Men of talents, men of spirit, men of virtue, would all relinquish a profession, in which there was no other employment than that of spies and executioners to their fellow-countrymen.

Summing together all these points of difference we have no hesitation in predicting, that it is im-

possible that France can ever realise her ambitious dream of universal sovereignty. Her present power, her present form of government, so closely resemble those of Rome, that all the Powers of Europe, that remain unsubjugated, are called upon to suspicion, watchfulness, and prompt and firm courage: but the *circumstances* of the two Empires are so widely different, that there results the strongest hope that, with the exertion of these qualities we are safe. There is much to alarm us, nothing to terrify. Happy will it be for Europe, if her governors shall at last perceive, that the more free a nation is, the less she will be disposed to conquest; that the absurd principles of demagogues are mere effects, and not causes, and will, at all times, die a natural death; but that, if opposed by violence, they may become indeed pernicious; not by their own proper action, but by the facility which they afford to the levying of armies, whose political fanaticism is soon transmuted into a passion for military glory. A noisy republic is interred; and an iron-handed empire rises out of the grave, its ghost, and its avenger.

AFFAIRS OF FRANCE.

(Tuesday, October 5, 1802.)

IN our comparison of the military despotisms of Rome and France, which, we have reason to hope, excited some degree of interest, we spoke of the two powerful factions in France, equally hostile to the existing Consular government, the Royalists, and the Republicans. We could find nothing correspondent or equivalent to them in the history of imperial Rome, and we placed them, therefore, among the other *circumstances* of dissimilarity in the two despotisms, which combined to render it probable that the French will be as transient as that of Rome was durable. Our subject neither required, nor even permitted us, to do more. At the same time, we were fully sensible that the existence of these two parties (for perhaps we were not justified in styling them *factions*) involved more than one question of no easy solution. It was presumed, at the commencement of the Consulate, that Bonaparte would cautiously and solicitously adopt such measures as might win over both parties to an acquiescence in his government — the Jacobins, by the hope that it was to be for a time only, a dictatorship that would yearly relax and soften, and at length die away into a free Republic—the Royalists, by the apparent restoration of their old institutions under new names. To satisfy the Jacobin, there was but

one alteration necessary in the constitution, as it first appeared; namely, that the candidates, chosen by the process of a three-fold decimation of the electors, should be again presented to the primary assemblies, and the final selection made by them, instead of the Senate or Consulate. This would certainly be the most unobjectionable form which a system of universal suffrage can assume, and would very greatly lessen the danger of an unwise or factious choice, while it left entire to the nation the full exercise of its inherent sovereignty. To satisfy the Royalists was not, indeed, so easy; but still, by the remission of the persecution against them, by the recall of the priests, and of the majority of their emigrant relations, and by the re-establishment of the Catholic religion, it was presumed that they might at least be *pacified;* and that time would gradually undermine their prejudices, and national vanity overpower their personal attachment to a family, which had been long the pensioners of the natural enemy of their country.

At the commencement of the Consulate, these were the speculations of many friends of freedom, both here and in France; but they formed no part of *our* hopes or expectations; we stated them, indeed, as speculations, but at the same time expressly warned our readers not to anticipate any system favourable to rational liberty from a young man, who had formed his habits, feelings, and political creed, at the head of an army, and amid the career

of dazzling victories. The result has fully verified our predictions. Every succeeding month, from the first promulgation of the new constitution, has afforded some new outrage against the Republicans; and though immense sacrifices have been in reality made to the Royalists, yet every sacrifice has been so palpably a gratification of the Consul's own ambition and lust of power, that it *served*, but not *conciliated*, the party; nay, by bringing them so much nearer the object of their wishes, it rekindled a hope that was dying away, and with that hope gave them new courage and new activity. Nor was this all. These sacrifices have supplied them with new arguments in favour of Royalism; of no value, indeed, with the Jacobins, but of irresistible weight with those who, without being the creatures and hirelings of the present government, seemed willing to be its favourers. "You wish," say the Royalists, "for peace and domestic security; and to these you have offered up all your splendid visions of political liberty, all your civic rights, all your popular privileges. For these you have offered them all up; yet these you have not gained. You have paid down the purchase money, but you have not received the purchase. — How can *you* feel a security, which the government itself does not feel? How can *you* hope for peace, and a settled order of things, which the government itself proclaims not to exist, by a garrison in every street, and an Egyptian plague of spies and informers in every theatre, in

every coffee house? Are not the seats billeted out, monthly, to your very legislators, lest any half dozen of them should frame a conspiracy in whispers? Would not even an English newspaper, if found in your house, sentence you to a Bastile more certainly now, than a paper of high treason would have done under Louis the XVIth? You have sacrificed everything to a mere promise of peace and security; with what shadow of reason can you refuse to sacrifice a few names for the real possession? Put only King for Consul, and the rightful Heir of the throne for a Corsican; and, in the place of six thousand new military nobles, one twelfth of the number from the most ancient families of France; and then we may indeed have not only peace and security, but a calm conscience and a reconciled God! Have you given your consent to the total abolition of real Republicanism? Then why disgrace the nation with the vile *nickname* of it? Have we killed the chimæra; and must we still wear it in our national arms? Surely, the three lilies were a handsome emblazonment." Such, we may easily conceive, will be the language of many an artful Royalist: and we sincerely wish, that Portalis or Rœderer would furnish us with the answer. We could indeed frame a very sufficient answer to many parts of the plea; but we do not see, with what consistency it could be uttered by an adherent of the Consulate. We are greatly deceived, if Bonaparte have not played an unwise game, and

alienated his old friends, without winning over a single enemy.

This accession to the strength and proselyting spirit of royalism in France, we should have stated in our former disquisition, as fully as we have now done, but that it would have proved rather the insecurity of the present despot, than the probable transiency of the despotism itself, and its accompanying scheme of Empire. For, as we before observed, the existence of the two parties involves more than one question. First, it is commonly believed, that the First Consul calculates on the mutual counter-action of the Jacobins and the Royalists. They are, indeed, it has been said, both equally hostile to him; but possessing the same strength, and being in direct opposition, they must necessarily destroy each other's forces. Now is it true that the two parties are thus evenly balanced? and if they be, is not this notion of exact counteraction, a mere phantom in politics? a childish application of mechanics to a subject, in which even as metaphors, the phrases have scarcely any intelligible sense? Secondly, presuming to know nothing accurately of the comparative numbers of the two parties, may we not be able to offer some rational conjectures concerning the ultimate result of their contest, from our knowledge of the present circumstances of France and Europe, from the influence of property, commerce, and the desire of civil security? Thirdly, supposing the Royalists to be finally

successful, and to introduce the Bourbons without terms, what change would this restoration effect or not effect, in the despotism and spirit of empire in France?—In other words, what are the advantages to Europe, and especially to this country, on which Mr. Windham, and other eager Bourbonists, calculate so confidently, as certain results of the re-introduction of the old monarchy in France? Lastly, is there any point of junction possible between the Royalists and Republicans?

We were led into these questions by the private letter from Paris, which we published in our paper some days ago. We then said, and we repeat it, that we never place much confidence on private letters from Paris; and assuredly from its own merit we should be little inclined to deviate from our habitual scepticism in favour of this letter. Such familiarity with the discussions in the Consular Privy Council, savours strongly of that bold spirit of conjecture, natural to Frenchmen, and which among every people is a necessary consequence of strangling the liberty of the Press. We hear much of *groundless paragraphs;* and much idle abuse lavished upon them. But a paragraph may be easily traced to the paper in which it first appeared; and the paper that deals largely in such ware, will soon receive a broad hint from the public to be more careful, by the diminished sale; to which add the facility of legal inquiry. But who is to hunt down a groundless whisper? or prosecute a coffee-

house politician's lie? The letter states the existence of a many-headed party, each pursuing purely and nakedly its own old principles; — and yet as having a common point of union? Is this possible? Is it not very like nonsense? The letter concludes, with stating the nomination of a committee, of La Place, Perregaux, Kellerman, and Le Febvre, to digest a plan of colonising Louisiana, by a violent deportation of all the malcontents out of France. It is difficult to mention so extravagant a report with a serious countenance. Yet the very extravagance and incongruity of the contents of this letter, give it a sober interest, if it be taken in its proper point of view. Assuming that this letter conveys the substance of real conversations at Paris, it will mark to an attentive mind the troubled and gloomy expectation of men's minds in political circles; and it is probable, that there is some ground for the various reports, strangely as it may have been modified by the different reporters. No thinking man believes, that France will remain long in precisely its present presageful calmness: and we seem to be authorised in believing, that even an attempt made to solve the important questions, stated above, will not wholly fail of interesting our readers. We propose to do this to-morrow. *Interea, tenuitatis nostræ memores nihil pertinaciter affirmemus; sed in re futurâ, et suo modo prodigiosâ, qui optime conjicit, optimus et vates et philosophus esto.*

(Saturday, October 9, 1802.)

ONE of our correspondents in England, has received a letter from Paris, which we regret that we are not permitted to publish. It was incomparably more interesting, than private French letters commonly are, not for the novelty of its information, but from its having been written by a gentleman, who has had an opportunity of forming intimacies at Paris in the highest circles, and whose uncredulous, watchful, and profound understanding, stamps a kind of authenticity on the reports, which he considers as worthy of particular notice. His letter authorises us to repeat a conjecture, which we lately hazarded, as now something more than a mere conjecture; namely, that Bonaparte both is, and has good reason to be, more alarmed by the rapid spread of Royalism in France, at this present time, than in any preceding period of the revolution. The present is an age, in which a man may be as easily politic over much, as righteous over much. We more than suspect, that this has been the case with the First Consul. The republicans and philosophers were his natural friends; but they would not endure a despot; and, besides, they are decidedly the minority in France. He applied himself, therefore, to trick the Royalists, and the priests; and we think it not at all improbable that they will have tricked him. It was not without reason, that so many of the republican generals were disgusted

and alarmed by the late consecration of banners, &c. They saw clearly, that in the minds of the soldiery, the attachment to liberty was grounded on a contempt for their old superstitions. The common people are no nice discriminators: opinions and attachments enter their minds *in companies*, and make their *exit* in the same way. The army had fought both against the altar and the throne: and, if it behoves them to repent of the one, they will not be slow in making atonement for the other. Or, if they remain faithful, they must be kept steady by such privileges and largesses, as will rouse the people of France by the sense of direct personal insecurity, and by the intolerable weight of taxes. Our only apprehension is, that the government may have recourse to the old preventive against domestic disturbances, and plunge the country once again into a foreign war. We believe (and we now refer to the questions which we have stated in our paper,) that there are five Royalists to one Jacobin in France at present; and that there are nearly an equal number of *active* and *zealous* Royalists, as of *active* and *zealous* Jacobins. We can conceive no way, in which they can counteract each other's forces unless it be by the fears, which the Jacobins entertain from a knowledge of the spread of Royalism. While the *name* of the republic continues, and the sovereignty of the people is taught by the government itself, as the basis of all rightful government, there remains a *hope* to the republicans. A more

favourable moment may arrive; and the liberty of the press, and a genuine representative system, may be established by a single act of the legislature. — But if the Bourbons be once restored, they can never be re-ejected without a civil war. These considerations *may*, perhaps, preserve the Republicans in a gloomy passiveness. Indignation may clutch the dagger of Brutus with convulsive grasp; but the fear of more lasting evils keeps it still sheathed. A famous ex-bishop, now in England, whom we may with justice class among the purest patriots of the revolution; a man, who dared avow his zeal for Christianity under Robespierre, and his love of popular freedom under Bonaparte, said lately, as we have been informed — "the Republicans in France endure the despotism, not as men, but as fathers. They hope, that their children will be free." As far as this can be deemed a counterpoise, so far the two parties may be said to counteract each other. We are fully conscious that this is a very inadequate answer to the important questions concerning the strength of the two parties, and their mutual relations. But we wait for further information from France. We wish to present facts to our readers, not vague reasonings founded on sandy conjectures. To the three latter questions, we trust, we shall do somewhat more justice. 1st. What are the advantages to France, and to Great Britain, which may be expected from the re-establishment of the old monarchy? 2ndly, What are

the circumstances, which do at this time especially favour the restoration of the Bourbons? 3rdly, Is there any possible point of union between the Republicans and the Royalists?

In the first question we suppose an extreme case, namely, the re-establishment of the old Monarchy, without modification, or limitations. We must, therefore, in fair reasoning, suppose another extreme case, to compare it with: namely, the permanence of the present despotism. On this supposition, the advantages to France would be great indeed!—The First Consuls of France swear to prevent, as far as in them lies, the return of all feudal institutions. Lucien Bonaparte, in the Tribunate, debating on the establishment of a legion of Honour, treated hereditary honours as too absurd to be even disputed against in a Republic: and the First Consul is said to have expressed his surprise, that any man should be weak or wicked enough to propose, that the Supreme Magistracy should be hereditary in his family. These may be very orthodox politics in France; but it has been the habit of our mind to think with great respect of feudal institutions in general, and with an especial admiration of this particular part of it, hereditary succession. We regard it, as forming of itself a limitation of monarchical power; and if we dared wish an abridgment of the power of the Crown in our own country in any instance (and the vote of the House of Commons on Mr. Burke's motion, surely authorises us to

wish it,) it would be in this — that the creation of new Peers should be controuled by certain definite limitations. The influence which the late Minister derived from increasing the Peerage nearly one-third, is notorious, and has been often the subject of constitutional complaint. What would it be, if every Peerage returned to the Crown at the death of its possessor? — and not only this, but likewise the revenues attached to the Peerage? What if the Crown itself were at the disposal of the King? — Where should we look for any bulwark of our freedom? All those great and illustrious names, who, whether they oppose, or support, the ministry, do in both cases equally influence and check its measures, would then perhaps be the servile, and daring creatures, because the ambitious candidates, of the Crown. If the provision which the Crown can at present make for the younger branches of noble families, have gained the ministry too many adherents in both Houses, what would be the result, if even the very existence of the whole family, as noble, depended on the will of the executive government? If, in short, instead of our Percies, Russels, and Howards, we had a legion of Mandarins, without any of those ancient internal regulations which controul the election of the Mandarins in China? The patronage of the Crown in Great Britain is enormous; but it is only nominally concentered to one person. No ministry can exist without possessing the absolute disposal of the

largest portion of it, unchecked by the Sovereign: and every great parliamentary landholder considers himself as entitled to make a certain number of claims upon the ministry, in proportion to his consequence in the Legislature and in the country. That there are great inequalities in the power, in consequence of the very disproportionate number of boroughs in the different counties, we know and regret. Yet the rule holds good, notwithstanding the exceptions.

Now, though this check on the power of the Crown arises in a great measure in this country from the power of our Parliaments, yet, we must not forget, that the power of the Parliaments did, itself, originally spring from the power of the great feudal families: and the same check, though not in the same degree, did exist in France before the revolution; and to a certain degree exists at this time in Spain, dependent as it is on France; and in Austria, it is nearly as great as in England. In France, at present, the military are the sole claimants on the patronage of the government; men, who have no stake in their country, no honourable family pride, no natural influence. The only men, who dare ask, as those, that have a *right* to be gratified, are the men, to whom the Despot may venture to propose any baseness, any conspiracy against the rights and properties of the people, as the condition of the bargain. An hereditary monarchy, with an hereditary nobility, is, *ipso facto*,

a limited monarchy; and, whatever advantages a limited monarchy possesses over a military despotism, those advantages France would gain, by substituting the Bourbons for the Corsican.

Add to this, that the majority of Frenchmen are decidedly, though passively, Royalists. Now it is scarcely possible to conceive a greater or more important difference than that of a majority, with the government in its favour, and a majority, with a government in direct hostility to it. For, in the first place, the Consular government knows the strength of the Royalists better than the Royalists themselves know it; and becomes fierce, suspicious, and prone to violent measures, from the perpetual goading of its own terrors. But, let the government become that of the majority, and every man then avows his opinion loudly; those, who were timid, or indifferent, become bold and zealous; their numbers are counted and known; the fact is ascertained, that they *are* the majority; and the Jacobins are not only disheartened, but even baffled by their own creed, of which it is a fundamental article, that the will of the majority is binding on the *actions* of the minority. The majority, thus conscious of their own superior strength and numbers, would communicate a sense of security to the government; and such a government can show itself magnanimous with very little self-denial, and still less danger. Nay, this shew of magnanimity would be a necessary measure of policy in one instance, and that

the most important. The restored Monarch would necessarily place his greatest confidence in the avowed affections of the people, while the object of his greatest fears would be the soldiery and their officers. To disband the army was the first step of the reign of Charles the Second; and, tyrant as he was, he tyrannised by lawyers and priests, and not by soldiers. In consequence, he entered into no wars, but those into which the Parliament absolutely compelled him.

And here, we presume, we are to find the advantages of the re-establishment of the old monarchy in France in relation to Austria and Great Britain. Peace would be of necessity the first and fundamental policy of the monarch, for many years. First, because a victorious General under Louis XVIII. would be no longer necessarily in the same devotion to his Sovereign as the same person must have been under Louis XIV.; but both himself and his army would justly become objects of suspicion. Secondly, because it would be idle to anticipate, under a regular and monarchical government, the same career of splendid victories which had accompanied the enthusiasm, gigantic efforts, and extra-natural resources of a revolutionary republic; and it would be therefore a most pernicious policy to hazard the comparison among a people, whose very life and being are involved in national vanity. The same ambition and vain gloriousness, which drove Louis XIV. to perpetual wars, would impel his

restored successor to perpetual peace; at least, it would have this tendency. And lastly, the complication of financial difficulties, and the difficulties attendant on the re-induction of the exiles into their properties and titles, would of themselves form enough of employment, and more than enough of anxiety. Other causes might be stated, arising out of the depression of the Catholic interest in Germany; and the influence, which the fashionable zeal for religion—(for no doubt this would become *fashionable*, in the most emphatic sense of the word, after the restoration in France, and from the same causes that made debauchery and open contempt of religion fashionable, after the restoration in England;) the influence which this new religious zeal would have in moderating the national ambition, and in prompting the pious son of the church to give back to Austria what the Republicans and Protestants had robbed from her. We would willingly add to all these the influence of gratitude to this country, for her unexampled hospitality; but this would be a compliment to priests, Romish priests, French priests, which we could not pay with sincerity. For of all men, priests are the least grateful, of all priests the Catholic, and of all Catholic priests the French. If it be asked, why? we answer briefly, 1. That to be and to appear an ordinary man among ordinary men is the firmest security for our best virtues, and that priests are less grateful than other men in consequence of that early removal, which

is, more or less, common to all priests, into a permanent corps, with its appropriate and peculiar dresses, manners, and interests. 2. In consequence of the total banishment from the conjugal and parental affections which is peculiar to the Romish superstition. 3. In consequence of the excessive vanity which belongs to them, as Frenchmen, and which is more incompatible with gratitude, than any other vice or weakness whatsoever. Any gratitude to this country for her efforts in the war, we do not even speak of. Mr. Pitt, in the first campaign, took care that we should have no claim of this kind. For our own purposes we waged war; and, for our own purposes, made peace. We have thus stated the advantages which would accrue both to France and to her neighbours from the restoration of the old monarchy, without terms or limitations. We should strangely forget our best principles, if we overlooked, or omitted to mention, that great disadvantages would accompany them, both to France and Great Britain. But we shall introduce them more naturally in the solution of the two very interesting questions, which still remain. And in this solution, which we shall attempt to-morrow, we flatter ourselves, that we shall place the present state of France in a light, in which it has not been generally seen in this country.

ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES

THAT APPEAR ESPECIALLY TO FAVOUR THE RETURN OF THE BOURBONS AT THIS PRESENT TIME.

IT was scarcely more than a month before his restoration, when Charles the Second appeared to all Europe as much an exile from the hope, as from the possession, of his throne. He had neither army, nor treasure, no organized faction in England, no influence in the Continental Courts: he was countenanced by no foreign Power, and Cardinal Mazarine, the then master-spirit of Europe, was intriguing against him. His fortunes were at their lowest ebb; and they returned, as the tide does in our rivers Trent and Parrot, not by any gradual increase, but *in a head*, and like a wall of waters. Had England then sunk in the rank of nations during her commonwealth? And were the inhabitants recalled to loyalty by national pride? Or had her commerce failed? Or was her naval strength giving way? Least of all things. Never had England stood crowned with equal glory; never had she spoken in so commanding a voice to the surrounding Powers! Lord Clarendon, and other contemporary writers, can find no other terms for this sudden restoration, than that it was *miraculous*, and effected by an immediate influence of the Deity. This was the natural language of

gratitude and exultation at the time; but now it would be childish. The inference, which thinking men have since drawn from this event, are these: —That to conduct with splendour the foreign concerns of a revolutionary nation is an easy task, but to settle its domestic troubles, exceeds the strength of the most gigantic genius; and that though a nation may be intoxicated for awhile by their glory abroad, yet they will inevitably, sooner or later, be sobered by the sense of insecurity and oppression at home. The Republic of England was splendid and powerful; and the Pretender to the Throne a weak and friendless exile. But the people of England were sick at heart with hope long delayed; it was natural for those, who had been disappointed of liberty, to compound for quiet. "For *liberty* they had fought, but they still found themselves *slaves;* and weary of their military yoke, were easily induced to submit once more to that of the old monarchy, as the lesser evil." (*Vide Ralph's Review of the Reigns of Charles II. and James II. p.* 2). These inferences we receive, as the fair solution of the apparent miracle, yet not without some addition and some correction. It ought not to be overlooked, that the revolution itself, its rapid change of constitution, and its quick succession of political contrivances, had distempered the people with a craving for novelty, while new constitutions, and new ordinances, became themselves stale and unattractive; and that the only novelty,

which remained, of sufficient excitement to ease this craving, was the restoration of their banished sovereign; and the more extraordinary the circumstances of this restoration, the more likely therefore was it to be effected. This addition is not only important in itself, but it is likewise eminently pertinent to our present purpose, for who among our leaders has not already detected the application? And the correction, which we propose, is on the same ground still more interesting. All the reasoners on this great event have spoken of the weakness and desertion of Charles the Second as circumstances which of themselves were unfriendly to the restoration, though they were more than counterpoised by the national discontents, contempt of transitory constitutions, and dread and hatred of the military despotism. Now we, on the contrary, feel a deep conviction, that this very weakness, this very desertion of the monarch, was a *cause* of his restoration equally powerful with any of those last enumerated; that it was a great *co-cause*, and necessary condition of his return. For, in the first place, it flattered both the national pride and the national morality; it was an act of its own free choice, a true election, a measure not of compulsion or foreign influence, but of conscience and genuine conviction; secondly, it did from the same reasons present nothing opposite to good policy and the welfare of the nation.— If Charles came back wholly unassisted by the power of the

Continental Courts, he came back of course unintangled in their interests, with no obligations incurred that were likely to set the *gratitude* of the throne at variance with the honour and prosperity of the nation; and, lastly, infatuated as the parliament appeared by its loyalty, yet the whole proceedings of all the parliaments of his whole reign make it amount almost to demonstration, that if Charles the Second had been powerfully backed by the armies and resources of France, Spain, or the Empire, he never would have been received without *terms;* that the discussion of *terms* would have rekindled the disposition to political controversy; that a spirit of Republican enthusiasm, which only slumbered, would have been re-awakened in the army; and that, instead of Charles the Second on the throne, England would have seen General Monk on the scaffold. These are no mere speculations; they are facts of history. Hale, afterwards chief justice, moved in the new parliament, that a committee should be appointed to digest such propositions of terms, as might be sent over to the king. This motion was seconded; but immediately and successfully opposed by Monk, who swore solemnly, that though all was now quiet beyond expectation, he nevertheless could not answer for the army, if any delay whatsoever was put to the sending for the king: and as a sufficient answer to the general expediency of sending over terms, he uttered the following memorable sentences, which appeared

so full of unanswerable good sense, that they were followed by a *shout* of assent over the whole house. "I cannot answer for the peace of the army, if there be any delay; and the blood and mischief, that will follow, will be on the heads of those who cause that delay, however plausible the pretext.—But in this instance, there is not even a plausible pretext. What *need* is there of *sending* over propositions to the king? May you not as well prepare them, and offer them to him when he shall have come over? He has neither army nor treasure to bring with him, wherewith either to frighten or corrupt you."

If it were unsafe or imprudent to compare these facts in open and direct terms with the present circumstances of the Bourbons, the resemblance is so close and striking, that we might confidently leave the inference to be drawn by our readers themselves. But it will be more pleasant to our readers to find their own thoughts in our words; and we have, besides, other facts and circumstances, *peculiar* to France, which it belongs to our present purpose to place in their proper light; and lastly, although we are no adherents or partisans of the present ministry, yet we do believe that both ministers themselves, and the great offices in the service of government, possess too much of the principles and temper of our constitution to regard, with an evil eye, any truly dispassionate, respectful, and unfactious reasoning, that has been conceived in

the spirit, and expressed with the decency, of an Englishman and a gentleman. Whether the restoration of the Royal Family of France be the object of our hopes, or of our fears, whether it be an event which we implore or deprecate, we shall, in the present disquisition, give our readers no opportunity of concluding or even conjecturing; for we shall confine ourselves to *facts*, and to the deductions that flow immediately from those facts. *Sedulo curavimus humanas res et actiones humanas non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari; sed* intelligere! (Spino. Tract. Pol.)

When the Duke of Brunswick sent abroad his notorious proclamation, we can assuredly not condemn the French, for acting on the belief of the old adage—

Regnabit sanguine multo,
Ad regnum quisquis venit ab exilio.

When Austria and England, the natural enemies of France, made the restoration of the Bourbons so far a necessary condition of peace, as that Lord Grenville (though he did not in direct terms state it as the necessary condition, yet) stated it as the only means the English Court were able to suggest, we can assuredly not wonder, if the French had serious doubts respecting the good policy of an event, which appeared to be so ardently wished for by those, who could not be suspected of very ardently wishing for the glory or prosperity of France. We ventured at the time to state the

impolicy of Lord Grenville's letter, and that the French would interpret it into these words:— "The Bourbons are to receive their throne at the expense of their country." Indeed, it was generally understood, that a peace, which should take place on the restoration of the Royal Family, was to be accompanied by a complete return of all Europe to its *status quo*. Now, though neither Belgium, nor the Italian conquests, may prove ultimately of any true advantage to France, yet it was irrational to imagine, that it would be other than a mighty motive with that ambitious and military nation against the recall of the Bourbons, if it were accompanied by the loss of these acquisitions. Neither, indeed, was it altogether *fair* to propose a nominal *status quo* for France, when Great Britain had utterly ruined both the navy and commerce of France, had doubled her own trade and naval force, and almost doubled her empire in India. It was foreseen from the beginning of the contest, that it was contrary to every principle of human nature that a great, warlike, and vain nation should receive a family which was to be forced upon them by the arms of their enemies and rivals. A king might be a necessary medicine for France; but a full-grown nation will not endure to be *drenched*. We have ever been of opinion that the alliance of James with the Court of France, and the notorious, and in plain truth, *treasonable* attachment of the House of Stuart to that Court, were among the

principal causes of the final victory of the Revolutionists over the Jacobites. And, it is no small confirmation of this opinion, and a fact, strikingly to our present purpose, that the time in which the Pretender was the nearest to his object, and the Jacobites the most powerful and numerous, was in the latter end of the reign of Queen Anne, when the victories and conquests of the Duke of Marlborough and the allies had reduced France almost to an object of pity: when the state of France resembled the present state of Austria. In short, the Bourbons now are free from all obligations, from all entanglement of English and Austrian interest; we will not add, that the illustrious persons themselves consider themselves as injured and abandoned, and that their feelings are much more those of resentment, than partiality, or a sense of obligation; but we may surely say, without offence, or danger of contradiction, that the French and the Royalists of France consider them in this light. No doubt, the argument is not lost among them. All former objections to the recall of the Monarch have ceased; we may have our king, and a government of laws and religion, and yet not give up a hair's breadth of our present territory, and yet not lose a grain of sand from the weight of our present influence.

So far the affairs of France and the Bourbons are as nearly alike, as two distant events well can be, to the affairs of England and Charles II. But the

state of property in Great Britain had undergone, during the civil wars, and subsequent commonwealth and usurpation, a change perfectly trifling, compared with that, which it has undergone in France during the revolution. And this, it must be admitted, is a difficulty of almost gigantic size; and the attempt which Mr. Pitt, in answer to Mr. Erskine, made to obviate or weaken it, was utterly unsuccessful; and the futility of the attempt was unanswerably evinced by Mr. Fox, in his reply to that speech. The difficulty still exists, but not in its former magnitude. First, it has been the policy of the Chief Consul to prevent the sub-division of landed property, for he has learnt that small independent properties are a nursery of freemen, and his policy has been aided, and carried into full effect, by the enormous fortunes, which a swarm of generals, and commissaries, and diplomatists, have acquired, and which they have been encouraged to realise in land; and indeed, called on to do so, as a test of their attachment to their country. What the First Consul does from policy, the weak and abandoned Directory permitted from necessity or corruption. The result of the whole is briefly this, that the property, which must, and ought to be, restored on the re-establishment of the Bourbons, lies, for the greater part, in large masses, and in comparatively few hands; and that the proprietors likewise are for the greater part men stained with such crimes as would make it unsafe for them to

remain in France on the restoration of royalty, independently of the government, and belong to that faction, which is equally unpopular with the Jacobins as with the Royalists. In those instances, in which the alienated property has been greatly subdivided, the small land-holders have been, and still are, so heavily taxed, and so constantly alarmed concerning the intentions of the Consulate towards them, that there is reason to believe, that they would many of them rather be the farmers than the proprietors, if the government guaranteed to them a long lease, at a moderate rent, as the price of a voluntary surrender of their precarious rights, as freeholders. Add to this, as mainly diminishing the difficulty, the number of emigrants, who have lately forfeited all claim on the exertions of the royal family of France by the court, which they have paid to Bonaparte. Those, who have consulted their own interests, neglecting those of the emigrant sovereign, must have expected, that the sovereign and his family would consult their own interest in the same manner. In short, no emigrant has any positive claim on the Bourbons, but those who have neither attempted to gain the forgiveness of the Consular government, nor accepted it when offered. The difficulty, therefore, exists still; but it has diminished, and it is daily diminishing. The property of the church, and the whole of ecclesiastical affairs, have been so far settled by Bonaparte, that (unless the Bourbons are more bigoted in re-

ligion, and far less attached to the monarchy, than we can believe them to be) the very authority of the Pope, and the necessity of preserving the consistency of the Papal proceedings in the eyes of the people, may be well pleaded by them, for a general adherence to the Concordat, as far as it regards the Catholics. The Concordat is indeed, one of the countless proceedings of the First Consul, which has smoothed the way for the triumphal entry of the Bourbons. The same measure has, indeed, called forth the Protestants into open day, and given them the knowledge of their own numbers and importance; but it has proportionally alarmed the Catholics, and effectually aided the general cause of royalism. It is now time that we should state the difficulties on the supposition of the complete re-establishment of the ancient regime; and, whether, or no, the knots can be untied; and, if not, whether they may not be cut, by a plan that should embrace the grand principles of all honest men of all parties.

ONCE A JACOBIN ALWAYS A JACOBIN. (N)

THIS charitable adage was at one time fashionable in the ministerial circles; and Mr. Pitt himself, in one of his most powerful speeches, gave it every advantage that is derivable from stately

diction. What he thus condescended to decorate, it were well, if he had attempted to prove. But no! he found it a blank assertion, and a blank assertion he suffered it to remain. What *is* a Jacobin? Perhaps the best answer to this question would be, that it is a term of abuse, the convenient watch-word of a faction. Of course, it has either no meaning, or a very vague one: for definite terms are unmanageable things, and the passions of men do not readily gather round them. Party rage, and fanatical aversion, have their birth place and natural abode in floating and obscure generalities, and seldom or never burst forth, except from clouds and vapours. Thunder and lightning from a clear blue sky has been deemed a miracle in all ages. But though we should find it difficult to determine, what a Jacobin *is*, we may however easily conjecture, what the different sects of Anti-Jacobins have meant by the word. The base and venal creatures, and the blind and furious bigots, of the late ministry, comprehended under that word all, who from whatever cause opposed the late war, and the late ministry, and whom they hate for this opposition with such mortal hatred, as is usual with bigots alarmed, and detected culprits. "*Once a Jacobin always a Jacobin*," signifies no more in the minds of these men, than "*such a one is a man, whom I shall never cease to hate.*" With other men, honest and less violent Anti-Jacobins, the word implies a man, whose affections have been warmly and deeply interested in the cause of general free-

dom, who has hoped all good and honourable things both *of*, and *for*, mankind. In this sense of the word Jacobin, the adage would affirm, that no man can ever become altogether an apostate to liberty, who has at any time been sincerely and fervently attached to it. His hopes will burn like the Greek fire, hard to be extinguished, and easily rekindling. Even when he despairs of the cause, he will yet *wish*, that it had been successful. And even when private interests have warped his public character, his convictions will remain, and his wishes often rise up in rebellion against his outward actions and public avowals. Thus interpreted, the assertion, "*Once a Jacobin, always a Jacobin*," is so favourable a representation of human nature, that we are willing, too willing perhaps, to admit it even without proof. There is yet a third class of Anti-Jacobins, and of this class we profess ourselves to be, who use the word *Jacobin*, as they use the word, *Whig*, and both words only for want of better; who confess, that Jacobin is too often a word of vague abuse, but believe, that there are certain definite ideas, hitherto not expressed in any single word, which may be attached to this word; and who in consequence uniformly use the word, Jacobin, with certain definite ideas attached to it, those ideas, and no other. A Jacobin, in *our* sense of the term, is one who believes, and is disposed to act on the belief, that all, or the greater part of, the happiness or misery, virtue or vice, of mankind,

depends on forms of government; who admits no form of government as either good or rightful, which does not flow directly and formally from the persons governed; who,—considering life, health, moral and intellectual improvement, and liberty both of person and conscience, as blessings which governments are bound as far as possible to increase and secure to every inhabitant, whether he has or has not any fixed property, and moreover as blessings of infinitely greater value to each individual, than the preservation of property can be to any individual,—does consequently and consistently hold, that every inhabitant, who has attained the age of reason, has a natural and inalienable right to an *equal* share of power in the choice of the governors. In other words, the Jacobins affirm that no legislature can be rightful or good, which did not proceed from universal suffrage. In the power, and under the controul, of a legislature so chosen, he places all and every thing, with the exception of the natural rights of man, and the means appointed for the preservation and exercise of these rights, by a direct vote of the nation itself—that is to say, by a constitution. Finally, the Jacobin deems it both justifiable and expedient to effect these requisite changes in faulty governments, by absolute revolutions, and considers no violences as properly rebellious or criminal, which are the *means* of giving to a nation the power of declaring and enforcing its sovereign will. In brief, therefore, a Jacobin's creed is this:

1. A government is the organ, by which form and publicity are given to the sovereign will of the people; and by which that will is enforced and exercised. 2. A government is likewise the instrument and means of purifying and regulating the national will by its public discussions, and by direct institutions for the comforts and instruction of the people. 3. Every native of a country has an equal right to that quantity of property, which is necessary for the sustenance of his life and health. 4. All property beyond this, not being itself a right, can confer no right. Superior wisdom, with superior virtue, would indeed confer a right of superior power; but who is to decide on the possession? Not the person himself, who makes the claim: and if the people, then the right is given, and not inherent. Votes, therefore, *cannot* be *weighed* in this way, and they *must not* be weighed in any other way. Nothing therefore remains possible, but that they must be *numbered*. No form of electing representatives is rightful, but that of universal suffrage. Every individual has a *right* to elect, and a capability of being elected. 5. The legislature has an absolute power over all other property, but that of article 3: unless the people shall have declared otherwise in the constitution. 6. All governments not constituted on these principles are unjust governments. 7. The people have a right to overturn them, in whatever way it is possible; and any means necessary to this end become, *ipso*

facto, right means. 8. It is the right and duty of each individual, living under that government, as far as in him lies, to impel and enable the people to exercise these rights.—The man who subscribes to *all* these articles is a complete Jacobin; to many, but not to all of them, a Semi-Jacobin, and the man who subscribes to any one article (excepting the second, which the Jacobin professes only in common with every other political sect not directly an advocate of despotism), may be fairly said to have a *shade* of Jacobinism in his character. If we are not greatly deceived we could point out more than one or two celebrated Anti-Jacobins, who are not slightly infected with some of the worst symptoms of the madness, against which they are raving; and one or two acts of parliament which are justifiable only upon Jacobin principles. These are the ideas which we attach to the word Jacobin; and no other single word expresses them. Not republican; Milton was a pure republican, and yet his notions of government were highly aristocratic; Brutus was a republican, but he perished in consequence of having killed the Jacobin, Cæsar. Neither does Demagogue express that which we have detailed; nor yet Democrat. The former word implies simply a mode of conduct, and has no reference to principles; and the latter does of *necessity* convey no more than that a man prefers in any country a form of government, without monarchy or aristocracy, which in any country he *may* do, and yet be

no Jacobin, and which in some countries he can do without any impeachment of good sense or honesty; for instance, in the purely pastoral and agricultural districts of Switzerland, where there is no other property but that of land and cattle, and that property very nearly equalized. Whoever builds a government on personal and natural rights, is so far a Jacobin. Whoever builds on social rights, that is, hereditary rank, property, and long prescription, is an Anti-Jacobin, even though he should nevertheless be a republican, or even a democrat.

If we have been prolix, let the importance of the subject induce our readers to consider it as a venial fault. Concerning a term, which nine-tenths of the nation have been in the habit of using, either as a name of glory, or a name of reproach and abhorrence, it is not only our advantage but even our duty to have clear, correct, and definite conceptions. In the sense of the word, Jacobin, which we have here detailed (and, we dare be confident, that no other sense can be given which belongs exclusively to this word,) the truth of the adage, "ONCE A JACOBIN, AND ALWAYS A JACOBIN," ought to be proved, before it can be used otherwise than wickedly and uncharitably. To prove its falsehood is rendered difficult by this circumstance alone, that there is no pretence, no shadow of an argument in support of its truth—no pretended facts, which we might invalidate — no train of reasoning, of which we might detect the sophistry. It is a blank asser-

tion, the truth of which would be strange, inexplicable, monstrous; a fact standing by itself, without companion or analogy. An *assertion* therefore of its utter falsehood would be a complete overthrow of the *assertion* of its truth; and the only confutation, which it merits. It is an assertion that is consistent and pardonable only in the mouth of a thorough Jacobin, who held his principles to be of such undeniable, obvious, and eternal truth, that a man who had once understood could abandon them no more than he could abandon the elements of geometry; and indeed we must admit, that the whole faction of re-alarmists, from whose manufactory this precious adage proceeded, have both talked and acted precisely as if they believed in their hearts that Jacobinism presented arguments which were not answerable except by the sword, and charms, and an appearance of happiness, which were not to be withstood except by turning away our eyes from them.—Whence, but from these convictions, (acting *unconsciously*, perhaps) did certain speeches proceed; speeches containing such sentiments concerning the press and the public journals, as beseemed only the private conclave of an Inquisition, where every inquisitor was an Atheist, and yet bent to suppress Atheism? Whence that notable sentiment from the same orator, that those, who could be made *dumb*, ought to be so; and where this could not be, that the others were to be made *deaf*? —From what other source that alarm concerning

peace, because we should flock to Paris, and all come back *Jacobins?* In the name of all that is sacred, of all that is great and honourable, in the name of Briton, unless this alarmist and his faction believe the truth of Jacobinism, although from self-interest they oppose it, what, do they imagine we have done with our common sense and common feelings? Is Jacobinism an absurdity — and have we no reason to detect it with? Is it productive of all misery, and all horrors? and have we no natural humanity to make us turn away with indignation and loathing from it? Uproar and confusion, personal insecurity, insecurity of property, the tyranny of mobs, or the domination of a soldiery; private houses changed to brothels, the very ceremony of marriage only an initiation to harlotry, while marriage itself is degraded to mere concubinage—these, Mr. W. and his friends, have said, and truly said, are the effects of Jacobinism! An insufferable licentiousness in their houses, and abroad an insufferable despotism. These are the effects of Jacobinism; and these, the whole English nation was to be clapped under hatches, lest they should see and fall in love with! "Once a Jacobin, always a Jacobin!" And why? Is it because the creed which we have stated, is dazzling at first sight to the young, the innocent, the disinterested, and to those who, judging of men in general, from their own uncorrupted hearts, judge erroneously, and expect unwisely? Is it because it deceives the mind in its

purest and most flexible period? Is it because it is an error that every day's experience aids to detect? an error against which all history is full of warning examples? Or, is it because the experiment has been tried before our eyes, and the error made palpable? From what source are we to derive this strange phænomenon, that the young, and the inexperienced, who, we know by regular experience, are deceived in their religious antipathies, and grow wiser; in their friendships, and grow wiser; in their modes of pleasure, and grow wiser; should, if once deceived in a question of abstract politics, cling to the error for ever and ever! though, in addition to the natural growth of judgment and information with increase of years, they live in the age, in which the tenets had been unfortunately acted upon, and the consequences, deformities, at which every good man's heart sickens, and head turns giddy? We were never at any period of our life converts to the system of French politics. As far back as our memory reaches, it was an axiom in politics with us, that in every country in which property prevailed, property must be the grand basis of the government; and that that *government was the best, in which the power was the most exactly proportioned to the property.* Yet we do not feel the less shocked by those who would turn an error in speculative politics into a sort of sin against the Holy Ghost, which in some miraculous and inexplicable manner shuts out not only mercy

but even repentance!—and who now, that religious bigotry is dying away, would substitute in its place dogmas of *election* and *reprobation* in politics.

We were led to these considerations by the questions which we stated, and attempted in part to answer, in our last — and to which we shall again return, on the first open day — namely, what are the circumstances that more especially favour the restoration of the Bourbons at this present time? What are the difficulties? And is there any possible point of junction between the Royalists and Jacobins?—The last of the three questions recalled to our memory the sentence, which we have been examining; and which we therefore examined, because we were unwilling that any of our readers should stumble at the threshold.

TO MR. FOX.

(Thursday, November 4, 1802.)

SIR,

A LETTER to Mr. Fox, "when not a personal lampoon, has usually been little more than a convenient form and title, for some political effusion, which has been thus dedicated to you *ex officio* as the nominal Leader of the Opposition. I hope, Sir, to have at least this one advantage over your former public correspondents, that while I address you exclusively on subjects of national in-

terest, I shall yet scrupulously confine myself to actions and speeches which are yours and yours only. In common with the majority of our countrymen, and I would fain believe, with all whose minds have not been distorted by political alarms, or sicklied by religious cant, I have felt you, Sir, to be a genuine Englishman. We know that the original web of your character is English, notwithstanding some foreign fancy patterns, which you may have incautiously suffered to be worked upon it. I have attributed to you, in an eminent degree, a healthy understanding, with *healthy* affections — if I may dare address so bold a Latinism to you, Sir! from the influence of whose future writings I hope and expect, that a pure and native English will once again become the taste and fashion of English writers. Your honours and your occupations, as the statesman, and as the leader of a party, have never overstepped and stifled your plain sense, and plain feelings, as a human being. Nature appears to me to have distinguished you from other men, not so much by rare and splendid faculties, as by an unusual portion of the good, which, in a lesser quantity, belongs to all men. For these reasons my admiration of your character has been without wonder, and, in consequence, accompanied with a proportionably greater confidence. My attachment too has been fervent and sincere, but not blind, not that of a partisan. By the clearness with which I have seemed to myself to detect your errors,

and by the pain and sense of reluctance, with which this detection has been uniformly attended, I have given evidence to my own mind, that my zeal has been in the light of knowledge. The most important, as well as the most recent, of these supposed errors will form the subject of the present letter. As an Englishman I have a right to notice it, for in your public conduct all your countrymen have more than a life-interest. As a lover of unsophisticated English liberty, I have a motive to exercise the right, yet with how much greater, with how much purer, a pleasure could I turn to your enemies, if the occasion permitted it, and recount the instances of your wisdom and integrity!

The French Revolution makes it difficult to call up any impassioned attention to the political disputes which preceded it. It has, to a wonderful degree, diminished the impression even of those which have been contemporary with it. What a tumultuous interest would not the Irish Union have excited in this country, if it had been attempted fourteen years earlier! The languid interest which it did excite (languid compared with the importance and magnitude of the event,) is a fact not unworthy the notice of the philosophical historian. I shall confine my letter to that part of your political conduct, Sir, which has an immediate bearing on the French Revolution.

You welcomed this stupendous event, Sir, with the spirit of an Englishman; with a spirit, which,

even in its excess, was truly English. If you shall ultimately appear to have erred, posterity will add more to your heart on this account, than it will detract from your sagacity. To have hoped too boldly of our common nature, is a fault, which all good men have an interest in forgiving. As far as the final verdict on this part of your character lies with the good, you will be tried, Sir, by a jury of accomplices. I still flatter myself that the main source of your common error will have been this, —you suffered yourself to forget, that the Revolutionists were Frenchmen. You were, however, Sir, assuredly on the further side of an allowable enthusiasm, when you pronounced the first constitution of France, "a stupendous monument of human wisdom and human happiness." The wish must have been indeed, "the father to the thought," when you imagined, Sir, that a constitution could receive its final and faultless shape at one cast; that the passions of a newly emancipated people, and that people the French, should run at once into the mould, like melted ores, and harden in a few hours into perfection.

The first gust of Jacobinism was sufficient to overthrow this stupendous monument. It was overthrown, the sovereign murdered, and all Europe seemed moving under arms. For your counsels and exertions at the commencement of this ominous war, and during the whole of its continuance, you have a just claim on the gratitude and admiration

of your country. Your efforts were proportioned to the awfulness of the occasion, and the melancholy event has demonstrated, that a portion of the gift of prophecy still rests upon the wise and good. We must be compelled to add, that you yourself appear to have been in part the cause of the frustration of your own counsels. History, nay, even the daily experience of our common law-courts teaches us, that in contests of all kinds, it is by no means necessary, that one party should be in the right. More frequently, both are in the wrong. It had been well for your fame, and well perhaps for your country, if you, Sir, had acted on this principle. But no! The English ministry were to be attacked at every movement, and criminated in every measure; and so far it must be admitted, their own blunders their own lust of innovation, did but too amply justify you. But this did not appear sufficient or perhaps practicable to you unless the French were as regularly defended. Where their conduct was too palpably, too outrageously bad to admit of direct defence, a palliation was attempted, and you manifested at least a wish to defend. I do not mean to assert that there were no parts in your numerous orations which if extracted would not appear to contradict this statement, but I do assert, Sir! that such was the general spirit of your speeches, and the fact is notorious that this was the general impression which they left on the minds of your countrymen. Your language, your sentiments, were

felt as Gallican. If your harangues in the House of Commons, and at the Whig Club, were to be published under any one title, *Vindiciæ Gallicæ*, is that which to the feelings of a large majority of Englishmen would best designate their general contents. Your defences, your palliations, your phraseology, would have been plainly impolitic and offensive had they been just and precise; and being too often incorrect or overstrained they were injurious to yourself and to the glorious cause which you were pleading, to the cause of peace, of freedom and of the independence of nations in their domestic concerns. Others both in Parliament and out of it took their tone from you. The paper which is devoted to your party, and which acts in the strictest conformity to its wishes, became, to all intents and purposes, the standing counsel for the French government. The prejudices and the good sense of the country were alike disgusted, and pious and sober men everywhere alarmed.

Similar praise is due to you, Sir, for your long and manly resistance to the violences which were offered by the late ministers to our laws and constitution — similar praise, and, I fear, with similar deductions. I am not disposed to charge you with countenancing the Corresponding Society. But did you or your friends discountenance them? Did you or your friends speak publicly and uniformly with due abhorrence of their principles or proceedings? Did no kind of political courtship pass be-

tween these English revolutionists and the friends of reform? It was the policy, let me say rather, it was a trick of the associated Jacobins or patrons of revolution and universal suffrage, in this country, to represent themselves, from the very infancy of their society, as already numerous and formidable. To be thought numerous, they knew, was one way of becoming so. I speak advisedly, and from personal knowledge of the fact. At a time when their fifties would not have puzzled a New Zealander's arithmetic, when a savage might have counted them on his fingers, without any occasion for repeating the process, it was only in their more modest moods, when their travelling agents represented themselves as below a hundred thousand. I believe that this advice was early given them by a man, whose talents and attainments ought to have inspired a nobler ambition, than that of becoming the leader and tool-master of a London corresponding society. But these men were outwitted, by means of their own contrivances. The ministers, and the agents of the ministry, echoed and re-echoed the lie; what secret committees were eager to hear and predetermined to believe, spies and informers gained a foundation for relating. *Confitentem habemus* reum. The conspirators themselves admit their numbers and the extent of the conspiracy. The ministers wanted a pretext for striking a universal panic of property. This vulgar artifice furnished them both with the pretext and the means.

The alarm spread: and the nation, then infatuated with loyalty, consented to be clapped under hatches in compliment to the audacious lie of a faction, which was in truth as contemptible in numbers and in weight, as it was abominable in morals and in principle. Of these facts, Sir! you might have easily gained both the information and the proof. Had your eloquence been directed to the enforcement of them, I dare not affirm that you would have been more successful; but I am sure that you would have better deserved success. But alas; the general tendency of your speeches was to invalidate the charges of ministry against the tenets and designs of the English Jacobins, when you should have joined hand and heart with the majority in the admission and the abhorrence both of one and the other. You should have pledged yourself, Sir! to public activity in all legal constitutional modes of suppressing both the men and their measures, if the ordinary constables of the night should indeed be found inadequate to the task. You should have declared, and even to satiety repeated the declaration, that you and your friends were both Anti-gallicans and Anti-jacobins. You should have made your country feel that you were indeed so. If there were any honest men in this country infected with Jacobinical opinions (and some there were, and chiefly from this cause, that they heard the notorious enemies of all freedom the loudest in the yell against Jacobinism,) your

speeches, Sir, would have been their natural and certain cure. It would have been policy and humanity to have made them the antidotes to this delusion. With what irresistible strength of argument might you not then have contended, that the Jacobins in this country possessed neither number nor influence; that in England they had never been truly formidable, or if at any time, only during the Jacobinical career of Mr. Pitt's partisans at the close of the American war; and then for these two plain reasons, because the country was unsuccessful and degraded, and because Jacobinism was as yet a mere theory. Let a free country be, or be supposed to be in danger: and Jacobinism is the necessary consequence. All men promiscuously, not according to rank, or property, but by the superiority of popular talents, and the impulse of superior restlessness, will take an active part in politics. And this is itself Jacobinism, a political disease, which in certain periods of national danger and by a transient operation, may, like other diseases, be even salutary and sanative. You might have shown that even in France the operation of Jacobinism would necessarily be transient. Incompatible with property, and even with personal security, its own absurdities ensured it a speedy and natural death, if only we would abandon it to its own destiny. By attempting violently, and by a war, to precipitate its dissolution, we should unnaturally lengthen out its existence, if our arms were victorious; and

if we were defeated we should transmute this transient fanaticism for visionary liberty into a military enthusiasm, and, alarmed by an ephemeral frenzy, play into the hands of a never-dying ambition. My language may appear presumptuous, the language of a man ridiculously forgetful of his measureless inferiority to the person, to whom he presumes to dictate. But no Sir! they are the dictates of mere common sense. That your own prudence did not dictate them to your own mind, is matter of regret indeed, but not altogether of surprise. The plainest rules of the game are those which are the most frequently forgotten by the most skilful adepts, when heated with the play. The great statesman and Roman orator bewailing his own blunders, adds — a child, who had quietly overlooked the game, might have set me right. The utmost extent of my presumption is to be that child in relation to Mr. Fox.

Not contented with mere omissions, not contented with not being the confuter and antagonist of Jacobinism, you publicly adopted its most offensive phraseology, and declared yourself at the Whig club an adherent to the doctrine of the *Rights of Man*. It is possible, Sir! that a very innocent meaning may be attached to these words laxly used. If we allow a little laxity in terms, to what form of words may not an innocent meaning be attached? But when you avowed your conviction, that all men had political rights, as by an act of

courage, and with the avowed consciousness that you were acknowledging an offensive doctrine, you must be understood, of course, to imply that doctrine which had given the offence. Else why avow, with so much form and emphasis, a tenet which the most infuriate bigots of monarchy had never controverted? I venture, Sir, to affirm, and if it shall hereafter appear necessary, am prepared to prove, that between the acknowledged truth, that, in all countries, both governments and subjects have duties—duties both to themselves and each other;—that between this truism and the Jacobinical doctrine of the universal inalienable right of all the inhabitants of every country to the exercise of their inherent sovereignty, there is no intermediate step, no middle meaning. But you, Sir, had publicly, and in parliament opposed the doctrine of universal suffrage. It is true — you did so, Sir! What will this prove? No more, I fear, than that you have acted inconsistently; or that you uttered words without any previous analysis of their import; or that you juggled with the understandings of the populace, and gratified their feelings by the use of popular words, while in your own mind you had annihilated their obvious sense and reduced them to a mere truism. Whichever were the case you spoke unwisely, Sir, and imprudently. Those whom alone a great statesman would wish to conciliate are proud of their rights, indeed, but of rights created by the laws, and modified by property.

These men, Sir, would regard the orator who would persuade them to substitute the rights of man for their rights, as Englishmen, in the same light as they would regard a mad metaphysician, who should counsel them to burn the writings of their estates and rest their claims on the demonstrations of Puffendorf or Wolfius.

But the time arrived, Sir, when all your errors might have been retrieved in one hour, and the memory of them have dissolved away in one general sentiment of regard and admiration. Peace was concluded with the *French Republic*, and both the spirit and the letter of your predictions received the seal of a complete and final fulfilment. It is natural, Sir, to anticipate the language and conduct of a favourite statesman on the eve of some great occasion — some occasion fitted and prepared by his guardian genius to call forth the best energies of his understanding and his affections. I looked forward to the debate on the Peace with an anxious pleasure. I described you to my imagination as enforcing with all your own dignified impetuosity and with a tenfold weight of argument, the grand principles of your former counsels: yet cautiously abstaining from all allusion to the counsels themselves, and by a generous silence provoking the whole nation to make them the objects of their deepest regret, the topic of their hourly talk, the conversation at the table, and the buzz in the market place! I described you as evincing that a

peace had been concluded at the very first period, at which a war had become indisputably just and necessary. I seemed almost to hear you congratulating the alarmists and the crusading Christians on the restoration of religion, and an intense monarchy in France, and then, with an indignation too restless to endure the clothing of irony, pourtraying the dreadful ambition, and undisguised lust of dominion, before which we had thrown ourselves prostrate. I imagined you with all your fervid and searching logic, exposing the hollowness of our boasted acquisitions, and bringing into the close view of the terrified peace-makers, the enormous and compacted empire of the enemy. Yet nevertheless, you would give your vote for the Peace. Even if it continue for a year only, if only for six months, there will be a time in which the true and just motives of war may be extricated from that cant of hypocrisy, and those ravings of delusion, which in the year 1793 had impelled the ministry to rush into hostilities like madmen, and afterwards conduct them, like men besotted. There will be a time at least for a general forgiveness to pass between all parties. Our mutual errors must needs bring on a mutual amnesty. And if we are compelled to wage war anew, as alas! who can doubt but sooner or later we shall be compelled, we shall wage it with one advantage, of almost incalculable importance, with definite, intelligible, unvarying, and universally admitted motives, and objects.

In the same spirit, Sir, did I venture to anticipate your consolations to the friends of liberty, that if France had now for the first time united all sects and all parties in one sentiment of abhorrence and terror, she had now for the first time also lost all the semblances of a Republic, and had yielded herself up to an unbridled despotism, without condition, or prospect. In the same spirit too, giving you credit, Sir, for language, illustration, and arrangement, far, far beyond the scope of my imagination to shadow out, I still seemed assured, that I had anticipated the meaning and general purport of your peroration. I conceived that it could be no other than a generous exhortation to the ministers and the parliament, to shew, both by public declarations and by measures answerable to these declarations, that the government was no longer jealous of the country, that they abjured all further insult of a loyal people by suspensions of the habeas-corpus act, or inquisitorial treason and sedition bills, that they looked for vigorous and enthusiastic support against the common enemy, chiefly from the spirit of freedom, and of free inquiry, confident that the few wretches who dared utter or publish the loose principles and mock-philosophy of these vile mock republicans, would find their fittest and adequate punishment in the contempt and abhorrence of their readers.

I believed, Sir! and still do believe, that selfish ambition can no longer retain a place in your hopes

or wishes, that you have long felt how possible it is to be a great man without place or office. I imagined, therefore, that you would have concluded with freely offering to ministers your vote and your counsels to preserve the peace, while it was possible, and when war was rendered inevitable, a still higher energy in support of that war, and a concentration of your intellect and experience to spread your own patriotic enthusiasm among the people, and to direct that enthusiasm to the wisest purposes. All this, and more than all this, I expected from you, Sir! Your country expected it. And how, Sir! did you meet these expectations? Did you utter one word of alarm at the atrocious ambition of the First Consul? One sentiment of pity or indignation at the iron despotism, under which this upstart Corsican had reduced forty millions of your fellow creatures? Not a syllable! Not a breathing! You *exulted*, Sir, that the war had ended, as it *ought* to end, gloriously for France, ignominiously for Great Britain!! For the spirit of a man and a patriot you abandoned yourself to the low and womanish temper, which finds in a triumphant, "*Did I not tell you so, now?*" a pleasure that overpowered, and sunk into oblivion, all the dangers and all the disgrace of a whole nation, and that nation your country! I am at a loss to determine, Sir, which was the greater, the inconsistency or the folly of this speech, the impolicy or the unfeelingness. It was inconsistent,

because you had hitherto uniformly contended, that you and your party had spoken the sense of the nation; that the guilt and misconduct rested upon the ministers, their adherents, and their creatures; that every artifice had been used to inflame and delude the public mind, yet that the success had been only transient and partial — that the ministry, well aware of this, had in every sense, shunned examination — that they alone were guilty, and, in the better days of the House of Commons, would assuredly have met with the punishment due to such misdemeanours joined with such incapacity. With what shadow of consistency, Sir, could you then exult in the calamity and prostration of a people, on whose guiltlessness you had grounded, and on which alone you could ground the guilt and punishableness of the ministers? Nor was it less foolish than inconsistent. You must have known, Sir, that a peace which had exchanged liberty for empire, that conquests and successes which had transformed the victors into crouching slaves, with no freedom but to be vicious; no voice but to utter brothelry and blasphemy, could not in the eye of reason be glorious, or matter of a wise man's congratulation. Frenchmen hold it glorious it is true; and you, Sir, when you pronounced it glorious for France, only proved to your mourning and indignant country, that you thought and felt as a Frenchman! It was unfeeling, Sir, for your country was dejected, and smarting with her wounds; you should

have poured oil into them, not corrosives. Lastly, it was impolitic. Such sentiments must tend to alienate from you the affections of your countrymen, of all who love their country. And though I have long held in suspicion those political saints, who deal in no other good deeds than those of supererogation, yet I must doubt whether your sentiments will win for you, the suffrages even of our new philosophers, our philanthropists, our citizens of the world; I conceive that even these turn away with disgust from the land of promise, from this glorified country, in which the government is all powerful by military violence, but weak and sluggish with the laws, even those of its own making; this regenerated country, in which the public advocates of civil freedom are the most obnoxious criminals, and the criminals not punished, but *kidnapped*.

Having thus, Sir, publicly expatriated yourself, nothing remained for you, but by some outward act and ceremony to naturalize yourself in your new country. You went to France. Your ostensible, and, I believe, true motive, was honourable, and at any less inauspicious time would have been adequate. A man must be little versed indeed in literary research, who does not understand, that no man can examine manuscripts for another, in reference to historical inquiries. The subject of your history (I speak from the general report) is worthy of your intellect, and appropriate to the efforts of

your political life. If you live to complete your plan, I hope and believe, Sir, that your work will instruct and animate your countrymen, when your errors will have an interest attached to them, chiefly in consequence of your literary fame. It has been said and, I think, without extravagance, that the History of Thucydides was cheaply purchased by the long Peloponnesian war, which was its subject. Painful as it will be to me to return from this digression, I cannot deny myself the pleasure of uttering this one heartfelt wish — may your name be dear in future ages, as the Thucydides of Great Britain! We are proud, perhaps boastful, of the names of Robertson, Hume, and Gibbon, yet I dare avow my conviction that the true honours of an English historian lie untouched before you. "For the annals of our own country this is now especially true; I know few books that have more deeply and extensively injured the principles of Englishmen, whether moral, religious, or political, than that History of England which alone stands in any high reputation. You best know it, Sir, to be a perfidious romance, not a history; the apologist for priestcraft, while it undermined the first principles even of natural religion; extravagantly sceptical concerning the laws, where they have been wantonly broken by tyrants, and then only decisive, and embittered by the breach, when the offence has become necessary and the offenders have been patriots; often false in the statement, and still more

frequently attaining the purposes of falsehood by the omission of facts; in reasoning a model of the mock-profound, and in style, Irish, Scottish, Gallican, — any thing but English. Yet in very truth, to write the history of that period, which you have chosen, without pain and weariness of spirit, it would be necessary to possess, like Mr. Hume, the head and heart of an atheist. For you will be compelled, Sir, to draw into light, in an almost uninterrupted series, actions disgraceful to our country and to human nature. — You must exhibit vices struggling with vices, the best ends frustrated by the worst means, dishonoured by the basest agents; lawless and godless tyrants, with the whole regiment of lawyers for their body guard, and the united priesthood of the kingdom for their advanced sentinels; and, more humiliating than this, you will be forced to shew the persecuted athirst for the power to persecute, and the partisans of freedom stained so indelibly with treachery, perjury, corruption, and hypocrisy, as to yield a semblance of justification, even to the oppressions against which they were struggling. In fine, Sir, you will crowd together, as into one vast picture, Dæmoniacs and Lepers, with no Pool of Bethesda in the foreground, and with no other Saviour than that great educer of good out of evil, whom with a master's license you might paint with a countenance of angry sorrow looking down on the group from the clouds of Heaven. This great history-piece you must teach us to hang up in the temple of

national humility. But you will yourself restore us to our self-estimation, as Englishmen, by the courage with which you will adhere to the cause of liberty, and of course to the natural worthiness of the human heart, and by the sagacity, with which you will detect, and the truly British eloquence with which you will heap shame on, those sophists, who have developed the vices of individuals, in order to enfeeble the virtues of the species, who have exhibited the depravity of a singularly corrupted age, as the means, not of deterring us from their vices, but of alienating our understanding from the best impulses of our own best affections.

Here, Sir, I would fain close my address to you, but so I should abandon the chief purpose which induced me to this act of apparent presumption. It is something, however, even to pause, from the painful task of cross examining the conduct of Mr. Fox. Many men, Sir, think you worthy to hear praise. I think the same, and I think still more: I believe you worthy of hearing the truth; and though this appear as rhetorical common place, and is suspicious from the antithetical form of its expression, yet it has a meaning for a good man; and if you should condescend to read this public remonstrance, you will feel, that, with a zeal, which your habitual encomiasts have neither head nor heart to apprehend,

I am, Sir, your friend and well-wisher,

ΕΣΤΗΣΕ.

LETTER II. TO MR. FOX.

(Tuesday, November 9, 1802.)

SIR,

UNPUBLISHED letters and memoirs in manuscript have hitherto furnished better materials for the sceptic than for the historian. The writers who have dealt the most largely and ostentatiously in these wares, and whose histories have boasted the thickest appendix of original papers, do not stand in the highest credit among us for good sense, or historical credibility. I admit, however, without reserve or scruple, that the examination of the MS. formed a sufficient reason for your journey to Paris; if for a thing so innocent any other reason were requisite than that of general curiosity. But what has the examination of the MS. to do with the levees of Bonaparte, or the dinners of Talleyrand? Dissatisfied with the apologies which your friends have made, I have sought for a better motive in the resemblance of the present state of Paris with that of England after the subversion of our Commonwealth. For with this æra, I have been led to believe that your history is to date its commencement. The pernicious influence of revolutions upon morals is a fact, which will have therefore become profoundly interesting to you. A general interest it will indeed have excited in every thoughtful mind; but it has become your business, Sir! to under-

stand it in detail. That certain fruits are poisonous it behoves us all to know. The medical writer must seek to know, what parts the poison specifically affects, whether the blood, the nerves or the stomach. He must particularise the various appearances which the diseased organs exhibit, and the symptomatic actions of the whole body, both those of sympathy with the part, and those of resistance to the venom. This, Sir! I admit you could but imperfectly learn from books or records. As we anticipate the future only by the analogies of the past, so can we truly and vividly apprehend the past, only by a close observation of whatever is apparently analogous to it in the present. With such changes and deductions, as with the severest impartiality you must needs make in favour of your native country, your residence in the metropolis of France will have enabled you to paint from the life the court, and the factions under our second Charles and James. Thus, Sir; your history, like the prophecies of Holy Writ, will have a double sense and a twofold value.

After the failure of mad projects in government, and the usual transformation of popular tyranny into a despotism, our ancestors saw in England, what you have been viewing in France, a truly frightful licentiousness in private life, and among public men the most profligate venality, the most abject prostration. For the fullest survey of domestic depravity any selected or commanding point

of view was altogether unnecessary. You might have seen as much as was useful for your purposes, and more than your moral feelings could well endure, and yet have remained at Paris, an unnoticed individual. In the time of a great plague we may examine patients in abundance without the trouble of procuring an admission to the public hospitals. But to understand the complexion and habit of servile and rapacious statesmen, to people and invigorate your imagination with pictures, from the life of an upstart despot, and his crouching creatures, required more than common opportunities. You thought the knowledge not too dearly purchased by becoming the temporary courtier of Bonaparte, and the visitor and intimate of Talleyrand. You look forward for absolution from the gratitude of posterity.

This, Sir, is the apology for your conduct, with which I attempted to satisfy my own mind. But, I fear, that neither you, nor your friends, nor the public, will admit it either as the truth or as fit to be the truth. You would condemn a man's religious morals as unwarrantably lax, who should be guilty of idolatry in order to make a drawing of the *idol*. It is utterly repugnant to the plainness and generous honesty of your nature to receive with every appearance of esteem and gratitude all possible favours and attentions from base men, merely that you might be able more livelily to display the colour and quality of their baseness. I must look else-

where for more justifiable motives. Was it the attestation of the American ambassadors in favour of Citizen Talleyrand's integrity, which induced you, Sir, to honour him with your acquaintance? The purity of his domestic morals was it? or his consistency in his religious and sacerdotal character? Was it the First Consul's exploit at Jaffa, which has entitled him to the respect of the friend of humanity? or was it the re-establishment of the slave-trade and his truly Corsican faith to the blacks in St. Domingo, which have recommended him by any bond of sympathy to the great Friend and Advocate of the unhappy Africans? Was it his message to the Legislature, his purgation of the Tribunate, his terror and hatred of free discussion by the press, his contempt of popular elections and representative governments, his jealousy of trials by juries, his system of espionage, the articles respecting the Police in his Milanese Code, his deportation (or what, in plain English, we should call the *kidnapping*) of untried patriots, or his incarceration of Toussaint less from political motives than from personal envy to a hero, in difficulty and splendour of exploit, and in true dignity of character, infinitely his superior?—Was it any, or all of these things which have recommended him to the Man of the People? Or was it his ambition, his interference in the governments of Holland and Switzerland, and his desperate attacks on the independence of Germany, which have pleaded his cause with the

English statesman? Was it the wish to consolidate his usurped power by giving him consequence in the eyes of a vain and light people? Or was it merely humanity — a desire to alleviate the pangs of the indignant French patriots, by giving them an example of voluntary homage in an English patriot. A free will offering of prostration from the leader of the English Opposition? I take shame to myself for addressing Mr. Fox in a strain of irony. It is indeed the natural language of indignation; and that indignation, Sir, is itself both the effect and a proof of the attachment and reverence with which I had hitherto contemplated you. But I recall myself to a calmer mood; I will attempt in plain and direct argument to convince you, Sir, that the reason which has been assigned for your conduct in this instance, and which, I fully believe, was the sole cause of that conduct, is not a sufficient reason; that it ought not to have influenced, that it does not justify you.

You had received the most distinguished honours and attentions in France: it was expected by the First Consul that you should solicit a personal interview with him; and you could not endure to inflict pain, or to act with rudeness. According to the customs of courtesy between man and man you could not help doing as you did. This is the sum of the apology; for that your conduct needed an apology, your warmest friends have admitted. Now Sir, the honours which you received on your arrival

in France, and during the various stages of your journey to Paris, were either by the command of the First Consul, or not. If not, you owed the return to the spirit of freedom that still lingers in that unhappy country; and the proper return would have been to have shown your contempt and abhorrence of the man who had gained his victories by the enthusiasm which the spirit of freedom alone inspired, and then abused the glory and power, which those victories conferred on his name, to extinguish that spirit, to subvert that freedom. But, if these honours were ordered by the First Consul, you were assuredly, Sir, blameable in making your purposes so notorious, and in thereby exposing yourself to the difficulty and the dilemma. If you would have felt it painful to have refused the attendance at Bonaparte's levee, you ought to have considered that pain as a fit expiation of the fault and imprudence which alone could have occasioned the refusal to be painful. You complied with the customs of courtesy between man and man, but this was not an affair between man and man. I trust that you would feel yourself humiliated if you believed that Bonaparte had any sincere esteem or attachment for you.—Such attachment for you could only have arisen from his belief, that you had been the enemy of your country, and the patron of his ambition. It was a mere trick of policy—a low attempt to persuade Frenchmen that their despot was attached to the cause of liberty by the honours ostentatiously paid by him to its most celebrated

advocate; and to win from your homage, an apparent proof, that the most undoubted zealots for the rights and freedom of mankind, regarded him with sentiments of confidence and attachment. We all know the artifices, which impostors use to procure themselves to be noticed in public by some man of rank and character, the importance, which they attach to such notice, and the uses, they afterwards make of it. Would you, Sir, think it any justification to an English nobleman, who should walk arm in arm with a swindler at Margate, or Brighton, knowing him to be so—would you think it a justification if the nobleman should say, that the man had behaved with laborious attention and civility, and that it would be uncourteous not to notice him; and, that it would wound and mortify the poor man, if he refused to do it? And, what, Sir! is that man, who has availed himself of his military fame, bought for him by the soldiers of liberty with rivers of blood — who has availed himself of his own professions of republican enthusiasm — to institute a military despotism? We will not call him a swindler, Sir! The vocabulary of crimes is too rich in appropriate terms, to lead us into the temptation. But, if you believe of Bonaparte, what ninety-nine in every hundred of your countrymen think themselves justified in believing of him, you must admit the analogy to be strict, whatever becomes of the term. And, if, Sir, you believe otherwise, and have solid reasons for your belief, you will bring home news indeed from the Continent; and you

owe it, Sir, to peace, truth, and charity, to publish the news as widely and as speedily as possible.

In examining the reason assigned as the justification of any action, the weight, we may attribute to it, must depend on the presence or absence, on the importance or insignificance, of the reasons in the opposite scale. The reason, or apology, which I am now examining, would scarcely produce a shew of inequality, were there nothing to weigh against it. How will it fly up, and strike against the beam, when we put in the counterweights! I have examined the reason why you paid and repeated your act of homage to the First Consul. I will now enumerate the reasons why you ought not to have done it.

Your absence from the Court of your own Sovereign is the misfortune of your country, but no dishonour to yourself. But to repay yourself for the privation by the honours with which you were received, the levee of the man, who, a few weeks before, had been the public enemy both of your Sovereign and the country, to appear in the first rank of favour at the Court of the mock Republic of France, when you could not, or would not appear at the Palace of the King of Great Britain. — O, Sir! I seem to feel, that this was not delicate, not worthy of Mr. Fox. To compare small things with great, it was in the spirit of Coriolanus, not Camillus; at all events you should have waited till the ambassador from France had appeared before your Sovereign, or some of the generals, or Frenchmen

of rank and importance had paid their homage to the representative of the Majesty of our country. Political contests, and personal injuries, may pardonably make a patriot sore and indignant, while he remains at home, may pardonably inspire a certain portion of personal dislike: but, in a foreign land, I have always felt, and always understood, that party animosities cease to have existence in the breast of an Englishman. He no longer knows the names of Whig or Tory. His King becomes an abstraction in his mind, around which his best feelings gather. It is the particular man no longer: it is the Majesty of his country. What Mr. Fox could not receive in England, he ought to have been too proud a patriot to have condescended to receive in France.

Secondly, Sir! let me revert to the offensive terms (be they right or wrong, that they were *offensive* to the country is a notorious fact,) permit me, Sir! to revert, however reluctantly, to the effusive words, in which you exulted in the conclusion of the peace, because it was glorious for France, and disgraceful to Great Britain. Had this speech met with nothing in your after conduct answerable to it, though it cannot be excused, it might have been pardoned. A man who speaks with warmth and rapidity, will often express ideas in the very moment of their conception, and will have conceived them in consequence of mere verbal associations. In the minds of wise and good men these *tirades* pass for that which they are—a precipitancy of the

organs of speech during a momentary lapse of the understanding. Even in this instance your friends might have had the courage, Sir! to interpret your words, as simply signifying, that Mr. Fox had forgotten himself. But you went to France, Sir! and submitted to receive such honours from the recent arch-enemy of your country, as perhaps it did not beseem any *subject* to receive in his individual capacity. In the eyes of the world, Sir! you appeared to receive your reward, your hire.—Whatever charitable faith I may keep alive in my own heart, I confess, Sir! that I have not the courage to maintain against your antagonists, that your intended journey to France was not present to your mind at the moment in which you uttered those words. In England they excited indignation; in France alone they made you popular.—You hastened to the scene of your popularity, even as an actor after a perilous rant turns round on his heel from the persons of the drama, and facing the galleries, receives the thunder of applause from that quarter, at whose hearts and understandings the speech had been exclusively levelled. Conscious, Sir! of the incompatibility of such a motive with your real character, you may despise these *appearances*. But, Sir! in a public man, a contempt of appearances is want of good sense, want of an appropriate virtue. To a certain extent even our inward feelings have less of *reality* than our appearances: for they belong less to the external world, and act less upon our fellow creatures. If

this be the case with all men, much more then with you. You have lost the right, Sir! to act as a common individual. It is, perhaps, one of the defects of your character, that in your habitual feelings you are not sufficiently aware of your own importance, and of the duties which it imposes upon you.

Sir, it is affirmed, and has remained uncontradicted, that your private intercourse with the First Consul has not been confined to a single interview; and, it is, I suppose, not to be doubted that you have *more than once* attended at his public levee.—This fact, if fact it be, annuls altogether the apology deduced from "the laws of courtesy between man and man." Your name and your authority have drawn over to Paris, and to the Consular levees, a cluster of your Parliamentary friends. At least it has embodied them: it has given the form and semblance of a bond to a number of gentlemen, who might otherwise have appeared as scattered individuals. This, too, is only an *appearance*, Sir! but it is an offensive, an unworthy appearance. It looks, Sir! as if you, and your friends, had felt the want of court-favour as a heavy deprivation: as if rather than not receive the caresses of a government, you would condescend to accept them from apostacy and usurpation, from the Ex-bishop of Autun, and the grateful *elève* of the Director Barras. The group of Englishmen who have appeared in their different *insignia* to do honour to Bonaparte, before any one Frenchman of rank had appeared at the Court of

St. James's, and who have contributed their best efforts to confirm the despot in his pernicious, yet plausible faith, that he has humbled the pride of Britain, and decided at length the point of precedence between the rival countries—this group of degenerate Englishmen (though indeed, to the honour of that name, the greater number have been Scotchmen and Irishmen), this group, Sir! will derive no authority or sanction from your example; but each component of it will shoot forth his portion of dark rays (the *tenebricosi radii* of Paracelsus) to cover you with a baseness not your own. Your country will, I trust, never forget their names. A monarch's favour ought to bring with it new places and new titles. By what better appellation can the whole party be known, than that of Bonaparte's courtiers? And you, Sir! you will no longer remain bald of place or title.— You will be his Lord Chamberlain for Foreign Affairs!! My mind involuntarily reverts to questions which have already been examined even to satiety. But at this moment the reasons assigned for your conduct appear idler to me than the talk of a dream. Good Heavens, Sir! what Circean cup transformed you into the leader of such a pack? and made *you* first in this vile chase? Was it [that] because he was master in the manufactory *you* were head-journeyman, or foreign [agent in] the manufactory of this gloomy, [this menacing] War-Peace? Or rather was it, [that one who aped] Cæsar in all things, but genius, nobleness and fearless clemency, had dared take the [command of the]

soldiery, as an army? Was it, Sir! on the—trail of old despotism that you opened [out? or was it because some of your fellow country-men] procured themselves to be presented at [St. James',] purposely and solely to enable them [to attend] at the levees of Bonaparte? And were you pleased, Sir! to see your sovereign degraded into a mere gentleman usher to this [upstart] Corsican? *

You have long been a seceder, though not, Sir! strictly or uniformly, from your duties as a member of the legislature. It has been a measure concerning the propriety and good policy of which your warmest friends have been divided. It required indeed all the warmth of friendship to entertain a doubt on so palpable a point. Very lately you re-affirmed your intention of persevering in this secession. If you shall hereafter attend your duty in parliament, your character will therefore not stand clear of the charges of lightness and inconsistency.—But attend, Sir! you must. Secession now will be infamy. You have long been styled our DEMOSTHENES. But hereafter, if you withdraw yourself from the public counsels of your country, you will be the Demosthenes of every caricature shop.—O! far worse than that—in the serious belief of all Englishmen, the Demosthenes *with the sore throat!* DEMOSTHENES, MUFFLED and MUTE! He could not take

* The latter part of this paragraph, from "Good Heavens" to "Corsican" was mutilated in the copy, and the words in brackets are supplied by conjecture. S. C.

any part in the debate concerning the GREAT KING; for the Great King, the enemy of Athens, had become the friend and patron of the Athenian orator and statesman.

With a true and fervent wish, that your return to England may clear away all these clouds that have gathered round your good name, even though your full and most honourable acquittal should bring an odium on myself for the present bold (but Heaven be my witness! most unfactious) address to you.

I remain, Sir! your well-wisher,

ΕΣΤΗΣΕ.

ROMANTIC MARRIAGE. (o)

(Monday, October 11, 1802.*)*

ON the 2nd instant, a gentleman calling himself Alexander Augustus Hope, member for Linlithgowshire, and brother to the earl of Hopetoun, was married at the church of Lorton, near Keswick, to a young woman, celebrated by the tourists, under the name of *The Beauty of Buttermere*. To beauty, however, in the strict sense of the word, she has small pretensions, for she is rather gap-toothed, and somewhat pock-fretten. But her face is very expressive, and the expression extremely interesting, and her figure and movements are graceful to a miracle. She ought indeed to have been called the Grace of Buttermere, rather than the Beauty. She is the daughter of an old couple, named Robinson,

who keep a poor little pot-house at the foot of the small lake of Buttermere, with the sign of the Char, and has been all her life the attendant and waiter; for they have no servant. She is now about thirty, and has long attracted the notice of every visitor by her exquisite elegance, and the becoming manner in which she is used to fillet her beautiful long hair; likewise by the uncommonly fine Italian hand-writing in which the little bill is drawn out. Added to this, she has ever maintained an irreproachable character, is a good daughter, and is a modest, sensible, and observant woman. That such a woman should find a husband in a man of rank and fortune, so very far above her sphere of life, is not very extraordinary; but there are other circumstances which add much to the interest of the story. Above two months ago, Mr. Hope went to Buttermere upon a fishing expedition, in his own carriage, but without any servants, and took up his abode at the home kept by the father of the Beauty of Buttermere, in the neighbourhood of which he was called the Honourable Charles Hope, member for Dumfries. Here he paid his addresses to a lady of youth, beauty, and good fortune, and obtained her consent. The wedding clothes were bought, and the day fixed for their marriage, when he feigned a pretence for absence, and married the Beauty of Buttermere. The mistake in the name, the want of an establishment suited to his rank, and the circumstance of his attaching himself to a young lady of fortune, had excited much suspicion, and many began to consider

him an impostor. His marriage, however, to a poor girl without money, family, or expectations, has weakened the suspicions entertained to his disadvantage; but the interest which the good people of Keswick take in the welfare of the Beauty of Buttermere, has not yet suffered them to entirely subside, and they await with anxiety the moment when they shall receive decisive proofs that the bridegroom is the real person whom he describes himself to be. The circumstances of his marriage are sufficient to satisfy us that he is no impostor; and, therefore, we may venture to congratulate the Beauty of Buttermere upon her good fortune. The Hon. Alexander Hope, the member for Linlithgowshire, is a colonel in the army, a lieutenant-colonel of the 14th regiment of foot, brother to the Earl of Hopetoun, and lieutenant-governour of Edinburgh Castle.*

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* *The following letter appeared in the Morning Post of Thursday, October* 14, 1802.

TO THE EDITOR.

Chatham, Oct. 12.

"Sir—Having seen in your paper of yesterday, an account of a romantic marriage, supposed to be celebrated by the Hon. Col. Alexander Hope, with a young woman of inferior rank in life, at the church of Lorton, near Keswick, on the 2nd instant; and at the conclusion of the account, you impress your readers with the idea of the authenticity of the marriage, I think it right to acquaint you that Col. Alex. Hope, the gentleman alluded to, has been abroad the whole summer, and by very late accounts, was at Vienna; I much desire, therefore, you will contradict the said marriage in your next paper, and assert, that the person who called him-

ROMANTIC MARRIAGE.

(Friday, October 22, 1802.)

Keswick, Oct. 15.

THE following are the particulars of the novel of real life, the scene of which has unfortunately been laid among our mountains. The pretended Alexander Augustus Hope had not only paid his addresses to the young lady mentioned in your first account, and actually fixed the wedding day, but had likewise made two others of Keswick (one the daughter of the fisherman, who used to be his companion in his fishing expeditions) believe him under an engagement of marriage to them. Including his unfortunate wife, he had paid serious addresses to four women at the same time, one of rank and fortune, and three of humble life. On the morning of his first departure from Keswick for Scotland, and of his marriage at Lorton church, he transmitted to the gentleman, under whose protection the young lady at present is, a draft for 30*l.* on Mr. Crump, of Liverpool, requesting him to pay

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self Col. Alexander Hope, must be an impostor. Yours, &c. CHARLES HOPE."

To the above letter we have given a place, as the readiest way of answering the object of the writer. That the person married was the person he represented himself to be, we cannot affirm; but that the marriage took place under the circumstances we have stated, is certain. *(Editor of the Morn. Post's notice.)*

some small debts in Keswick, and return him the balance. This the gentleman immediately did, and sent him besides ten guineas, lest the pretended *Honourable* should find himself short of cash. When the news came to Keswick (on the Saturday noon, Oct. 2) of his marriage, and suspicions were of course instantly awakened, the draft was sent to Liverpool for acceptance: and it *was* accepted. In a few days the gentleman received a letter (from Dumfries, we believe, and *franked* of course) informing him of the marriage. In this letter the pretended HONOURABLE stated his purpose of returning within the time, which he had promised on his departure. And accordingly, he did return to Buttermere, in a coach and four, at the beginning of this week. At this time, Mr. Judge Harding, who happened to be here, hearing that Colonel Hope was at Buttermere, and so romantically married (an old acquaintance of the Judge's, as it seems), sent over his servant, with a letter, requesting to see the Colonel. The servant was introduced, and on seeing the man, instantly said, "Here is some mistake—this is not Colonel Hope."—The impostor took the letter, and replied, "'Tis not for me; it is for my brother Charles;" but sent word, that he should come to Keswick. And on Wednesday morning he came in his coach, but without his wife. He was, of course, interrogated by the Judge, who told him that he was not the person whose name he had assumed. He confidently denied that he had assumed it; he had said that his name was Hope, but not

that he was the Hon. member for Linlithgow, or Dumfries. He was contradicted by the aforementioned gentleman, who not only gave evidence that he had always spoken of himself as Lord Hopetoun's brother, but that he had *franked* his letters as such. The respectable and intelligent postmaster of Keswick gave evidence to the same point. He was committed to our constable, while the examination was going forward. He made light of the business, drew for another 20*l.* on Liverpool, which was cashed for him by the landlord of the Queen's Head, and sent to the gentleman the ten guineas which he had borrowed. To amuse himself, he chose to make a little sailing expedition on the lake, which the constable did not think himself authorised to prevent. Accordingly, he went with his old friend, the fisherman, and all remained waiting for his return. Evening and the darkness came on: he did not return: but was guided by the fisherman through the Gorge of Borrodale, and probably escaped over the Stake, a fearful Alpine pass, over Glaramara, into Langdale. No intelligence has since been received of him. The landlord retains the coach in pledge for his 20*l.* and has discovered the very alarming circumstance, that all his plate and linen were in the coach. From which it is concluded, that he meant to desert his poor wife, and that he has deserted her. I cannot express the sincere concern, which every inhabitant of the country takes in the misfortune of poor Mary of Buttermere. I knew her well; and I can truly say, that she would have been an orna-

ment to any rank of life. She was intelligent, and well-informed, and uniformly maintained her dignity, as a woman, by never forgetting, or suffering others to forget, that she was the Maid of the Inn, the *attendant* of those who stopped at the ale-house, and not the *familiar*. I never knew any one think otherwise than well and highly of her, who had demeaned themselves consistently with their own rank and character. I am convinced, that when the whole of the courtship is made known, she will rise in the opinion of the good and the sensible, instead of sinking. It seems, that there are some circumstances attending her birth and true parentage, which would account for her striking superiority in mind, and manners, in a way extremely flattering to the prejudices of rank and birth. It is amusing to hear at Keswick the extravagant encomiums on the impostor's manners and address. Those who have been duped, find it pleasant to imagine all this; and the one or two whose suspicions were awakened from the first, as naturally imagine, that they saw the very contrary. Buttermere is nine miles from Keswick by the horse-road; fourteen by the carriage-road.

THE FRAUDULENT MARRIAGE.

(Friday, November 5, 1802.)

Keswick, Oct. 30.

THE pretended Colonel Hope, in his rapid flight, left behind him a costly dressing-box, which was opened last week by a warrant from a

magistrate. It was completely furnished with elegant silver toilet trinkets; and there were two letters found in it, one from Ballanahinck in Ireland, and directed to Colonel Hope, from which it appeared that he was concerned in some gang or other in that unhappy country. There was likewise a cash-book, in which a memorandum was made of 1200*l.* and odd, having been invested by him in the bank of Dimsdale and Co. in the month of March last. Nothing appeared leading to a discovery of his real name. But to-day poor Mary of Buttermere, examining the box more narrowly, found that it had a double bottom; and in the interspace were a number of letters addressed to him *from his wife and children*, under the name of Headfield. This atrocious villian is therefore a bigamist, as well as guilty of felony, for attaching the name of a member of parliament to a letter for the purpose of a fraud. Some of your correspondents will inform us, perhaps, whether a marriage under a false name be a legitimate marriage. The wretch had endeavoured to persuade the girl and her mother, and nominal father, to sell their estate, and to go all together with him into Scotland; which they refused to do, chiefly from the prudent fears of the old man. It is greatly to be hoped that the wretch will be apprehended—a more detestable action was surely never perpetrated. Poor Mary is the object of universal concern. (P)

LETTERS ON THE SPANIARDS.

To the Editor of the Courier.

Letter I.

(Thursday, December 7, 1809.)

Sir,

ACCEPT my thanks for the compliment you have paid me, by extracting from The Friend the parallel of Charlemagne and Bonaparte, or rather the *factitious* resemblance of the latter to the former. (Q) The great increase of circulation which it has thus obtained, is gratifying to my mind, without reference to myself or the character of my work, for I dare pronounce it a not less instructive than interesting historical document. The same motives impel me to request a place in the Courier for the accompanying Letters, which, but from the wish of procuring for them a better chance of general and immediate attention, I should have published as a Number of The Friend. Their subject will, of itself, entitle them to some degree of favour from all who sympathize with the Spaniards in their present struggle;

whatever may be their political attachments at home. For this is not a quarrel of governments, but a cause, which, involving the most sacred *social* claims of mankind, neither bewilders us on the one hand with visionary speculations of *natural* rights; nor, like the former continental wars saddens us on the other with the uncomfortable thought, that *bad is the best*, and that even the success of the *better* cause would merely preserve *the people at large* from a yet more deplorable state than they had endured under their former governors. Besides, the Spanish contest has a separate and additional interest for Englishmen of genuine English principles: for if the peace of Amiens made the nation unanimous in its dread of French *ambition*, it was the noble efforts of Spanish patriotism, that first restored us, without distinction of party, to our characteristic enthusiasm for *liberty*; and, presenting it in its genuine form, incapable of being confounded with its French counterfeit, enabled us once more to utter the names of our Hampdens, Sidneys, and Russels, without hazard of alarming the quiet subject, or of offending the zealous loyalist. The immediate and universal sympathy, which unmerited sufferings combined with a just cause never fail to excite in the minds of Britons, restored us to our natural good sense, and rescued us from the extravagances, into which the extremes of system and the re-action of contraries had hurried us. A humiliating fact will it be for ourselves and our posterity, if the future his-

torian should have to record, that so bright a fire of British enthusiasm, kindled by so noble a cause, proved at last to have been a mere straw-blaze of animal emotion, which either burnt out of itself, or was extinguished by the first shower of disappointment. There is but one way of preventing this: namely, to learn beforehand what we ought to expect, and thus to square our anticipation of events with the nature of the contest, and the circumstances of the combatants. We must hope wisely, if we would not despair dishonourably. To make my individual *mite* therefore go as far as possible to this good purpose, and because the state of public opinion on this point is in its nature temporary, and must receive an immediate impression or none at all (and not that the subject has not likewise a *permanent* interest grounded on *principles*, or is in the least incongruous with the plan of my own weekly Essay) I offer for insertion in your widely circulated paper, the following facts and observations — ON THE GROUNDS OF HOPE AND FEAR, WHICH THE HISTORY OF PAST AGES SUGGESTS TO US, RESPECTING THE WAR OF A PEOPLE AGAINST ARMIES— of an injured and insulted people struggling for religion, national independence, and *self-originating* improvements, against the numerous hosts and celebrated commanders of a remorseless invader, usurper, and tyrant.

To detract from accredited merit is sure to provoke a charge of presumption, if not a suspicion of

envy; and will have been painful to the detractor's own feelings in proportion as both are unfounded. An inquiry, therefore, into the fidelity and diligence of three celebrated historians, ornaments of the present and preceding reign, would be an ungracious office under any circumstances; but when two at least out of the three were North Britons, it becomes an attempt of no small hazard—at least for a man who has either a good name to be undermined, or literary reputation to be assaulted.

As national virtues (and I regard the spirit of nationality as such) often act in partnership with individual passions, when clannish resentment is called to arms by an assault on clannish vanity, the truth of the charge will avail as little to disarm the insurgents, as veracity is likely to influence them in the choice of their weapons. But the history of the past is the birth-right of every present generation, and to falsify its records either positively by interpolation or virtually by omission, is a species of public robbery, which it is the duty of every honest man to expose on detection. My own studies have but of late years led me to any exactness in historical research; yet might I choose as arbitrators, from both sides of the Tweed, those who have given and are giving undoubted proofs of zeal and industry in this province of literature—did my acquittal or condemnation depend on the verdict of Laing, Scott, Turner, Southey, Whitaker, and their compeers, I would hazard the assertion,

and hold myself prepared to support it by evidence, that—(observe I am not speaking of style or arrangement, or any other interest not excited by mere sufficiency and fidelity of statement—) a fuller, fairer, and more instructive work, *historically* considered, than either Hume's *England*, Robertson's *Charles the Fifth*, or Watson's *Philip the Second*, might be produced, by merely collecting what has been omitted by these historians, and rectifying what they have mis-stated or misrepresented.*—One glaring instance of historical neglect the reader will find in the accompanying article, namely, a splendid naval victory gained by the English over the Spanish fleet, of which not a hint exists in Hume, or his fellow compilers of English history.

Modern histories are not so much histories, as recapitulations of the most prominent facts, with philosophical comments on them. Instead of Hume and Watson, I must therefore refer your readers to the Latin chronicle *(Leo Belgicus)* of Michael Aitsinger, who was not only contemporary with the events which he records, but a diplomatist in the service of the Austrian and Spanish courts, and a confidential agent of Philip the Second. His

* I have here done little more than borrowed the words which were used, in a conversation concerning Robertson's Charles the Fifth, by a late dignitary of the church, who to uncommon general erudition added particular exactness of historical knowledge, and of its various sources.

work has a further advantage for my present purpose, that as a partizan both of the Spanish politics and the Roman superstition, we may be sure of his freedom from prepossessions in favour of the Belgic insurgents; and still more, because his Chronicle, ending with the 37th year of the troubles (1586), and while the contest was yet undecided, we have the sentiments and living impressions of an intelligent contemporary, unwarped and uncorrected by the knowledge of the final event.

Whatever may be deemed, Sir, of your domestic politics, no man, who is either patriot or philanthropist, will deny to the COURIER its due praise for a steady adherence to the Spanish cause, and a determined opposition to the cowardly clamour for a nominal peace, a peace with more than all the inconveniences of war, a peace with the expenses of war undiminished, and its dangers and anxieties increased tenfold; in short, a peace not only to confirm Bonaparte in his conquest of the European continent, but to enable him to use it for the destruction of Great Britain. A *Peace?*—No Sir! A *Truce* granted to a besieging enemy, in order that he may complete his mines, and lay his barrels of gun-powder underneath our very walls. Those who attach a proper importance to "the *wooden walls* of Old England," will have no difficulty in understanding or applying the metaphor.

When the King wants men, we are not overscrupulous in measuring the height of a recruit, if only his heart is in the right place. You may apply

this to the following article, which claims your favourable reception, less for its own merits, than as being the *contingent* of a humble, but zealous ally, as well as your constant reader,

S. T. COLERIDGE.

Grasmere.

P. S. If you should have no verses in your Poet's corner for the day, permit me to recommend the following quotations, the latter from an obscure poet of the reign of Charles the First; the former from a poet of Elizabeth's days, whose name indeed is better known, but whose works are almost as little read. The excellent good sense of the first, sufficiently atones for the languor of the metre, and the prosaic character of the diction: the application of both is too striking to need any comment.

Here Irish discontents and fears of France,
Urged with the present times' necessity,
Brought forth a subtly-shadow'd countenance
Of quiet PEACE, resembling amity;
Wrapt in a strong and curious ordinance
Of many articles bound solemnly,
As if those gordian knots could be so tied
That no ambitious sword could them divide!

Especially, whereas the self-same ends
Concur in no one point of like respect,
But that each party covertly intends
Thereby its own designment to effect.
Such Peace with more endangering wounds offends
Than War can do, which stands upon suspect;
And never can be tied with other chain
Than intermutual benefit and gain.

DANIEL'S *Civil Wars*, B. 7. Stan. 14. 15.

Fear never wanted arguments: you do
Reason yourself into a careful bondage,
Circumspect only to your misery.
I could urge Freedom, Charters, Country, Laws,
Gods, and Religion, and such precious names,
Nay, what you value higher, WEALTH; but that
You sue for bondage, yielding to demands
As treacherous as they are insolent, and have
Only this sluggish praise—to PERISH FULL!

Love's Convert, by CARTWRIGHT.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE COURIER.

LETTER II.

(Friday, December 8, 1809.)

"Hitherto indeed without skill or experience in war, but truly illustrious for their principles, and in obedience to the dictates of honour, preferring to die in their country while it was yet independent, rather than live prosperously and in the enjoyment of all other advantages on the conditions of vassalage."—PAUSANIAS *in Vitâ Aristom.*

SIR,

I AM well aware, that in order to form a steady decision on the prospects of Spain, a man ought to have resided in that country for a considerable time, and to have made himself acquainted with the different characters of its different provinces. I am aware likewise, that when expeditions have been sent out on impracticable services, and the event has turned out as might have been foreseen, it is the temper of the English nation to throw off the blame, as much as possible from themselves, by

bitter complaints of the cowardice or misconduct of their allies. This tendency in the public mind is not however occasioned by any blind admiration of the Ministers at home, who planned and fitted out the expedition; but from an amiable jealousy for the character, and a keen sympathy with the sufferings, of the gallant officers and soldiers to whom the execution of the plan was committed. The officers themselves, sore with recent disasters, provoked by the unkindness or insensibility which they have themselves witnessed during their campaign, and irritated by the disappointment of expectations, which, however irrational they were, their own government had authorised, may be easily pardoned for confounding the temper of individuals anxious for the preservation of their own little property with that which the people at large and even the same individuals would display, if they were organized by an efficient government, and put in the condition of receiving and communicating a public spirit, the sense of common injuries, and the consciousness of united strength. Alas! Sir, it is the character of human nature, and not of the Spaniards alone: when a man sees but himself, he feels only his own weakness, and the nobleness of his heart is subdued by his own particular anxieties and interests.

'Tis the high tide that heaves the stranded ship,
And every individual's spirit waxes
In the great stream of multitude!

But this error, though venial and almost inevitable, has tended more than any other cause to the depression of our hopes, and the alienation of our friendly feelings from the Spanish cause. The impression made by each officer on his relatives and connections spreads in ever-widening circles; and from the nature of our imagination, a few particular facts attested by an eye-witness of our own acquaintance, will produce a livelier conviction for, or against, a whole cause, than the clearest general reasonings, though confirmed by a hundred weightier facts that have been communicated through the common channels of public information. If this disposition were not far more powerful than reason, who would purchase in the lottery? who would buy a quack medicine?

I have said, Sir, that the result of our expeditions into Spain *might* have been *foreseen*. But I ought to have affirmed, that it *had* been distinctly *foretold*, and not by a lucky guess, but by incontrovertible deductions from causes universally admitted to exist. I refer to the invaluable Letters published in the COURIER, about the beginning of November last, with the signature of X. Y. Let any candid Englishman peruse those Letters at the present moment, and then ask himself whether it would not be a wise as well as generous conclusion, to attribute the failure of our hopes to the original hopelessness of our plans, instead of cherishing unkind and contemptuous feelings against a people, whose

resolve, (uncertain as they were of assistance from Great Britain, and utterly hopeless of aid from any other quarter, with 120,000 French soldiers in possession of their country, and when all their passes and strongest fortified towns had already been delivered up to them,) whose heroic RESOLVE, Sir! under all these discouragements, to withstand the whole power of the French empire, filled every British heart with enthusiasm! — against a people, Sir, who (and for Heaven's sake let not this be forgotten!) *persevere* in this resolve; who, with all their faults and omissions, have both performed and endured more than all the other European nations put together; who, according to Sir John Moore's own confession, must have been contending for the last twelve months with four or five large armies amounting in all to 170,000 men *certainly*, and more probably to 200,000, all disciplined troops, and headed by the ablest commanders; and who, nevertheless, still retain three-fourths of their country unsubdued, and what is of far more importance, the *mind* of the country unconquered! The French know and feel, that their possession of what they possess does but renew the emblem of the man's foot on the loose ox-hide, which can only change the place, but not increase the relative quantity of its pressure. So must it always be, when armies wage war against a resolved people: the enemy is every where and no where; it is a contest between obstinacy and perseverance, not between force and

force. In common justice, Sir, before we accuse the Spaniards so bitterly for their omissions, we should first consider what they *have* performed, what sufferings they *have* undergone, what sacrifices they *have* made, and then compare the account with the performances of Prussia and Austria, mighty empires with large and disciplined armies, equal or superior in number to those of the French, fully officered, and led on by veteran commanders, and yet conquered in a short campaign, conquered, not only as to the soil under their feet, but subjugated, with the exception of the noble Tyrolese, in the hearts and souls of the inhabitants, from the prince to the cottager! Do let us recollect the panic struck through Great Britain by the French threats of invasion. Were we not told, that 80,000 French would be sufficient to conquer the country? that all our forces, the regulars excepted, would be mere depositories of panic! and that our Volunteers would call upon their shops to cover them? From my inmost soul I believe these to have been most atrocious libels on the British nation; but I am not the more inclined to this belief by our present increasing disposition to depreciate, as an excuse for abandoning, those Spaniards who have been strugling against three times the number that could ever be landed on our own coast, without the twentieth part of our means of resistance. If there be so little steadiness of principle among us, if our imaginations are so easily dazzled by the splendour of

French success, with regard to Spain, that we fall into a dead palsy of hope, unless we are kept in a state of intoxication by embattled armies and decisive victories, things inconsistent with the sort of warfare which a *people* ought to carry on; what security can a thinking man have that the public feeling will not be attacked by the same ague fits, should ever the war be transferred to our own shores? I should not say this, Sir, nor even think it, if in the various religious and political papers and journals which have lately conspired in the abuse of the Spanish patriots, or if in the more temperate work by the brother of our lamented General, I had found any regular and consistent charge against the Spaniards, in which it had been fairly stated: first, what might, and ought to have been done by a people so circumstanced; secondly, what from the frailty of human nature and the experience of former nations engaged in a similar contest, might reasonably have been expected. I should not have said or thought this if the faults of the Spanish *government*, which are remediable, had been kept distinct from the faults attributed to the nation at large; if a candid deduction from both had been made for our own errors; and lastly, and above all, if there had been a fair enumeration of what has been done, and of what will appear even more important, if we would but turn our thoughts to the villanies which accompanied and facilitated the subjugation of Prussia and Austria, WHAT HAS

NOT BEEN DONE. It is a cruel calumny, with whatever parade of religion and vital Christianity it may have been introduced, that the efforts of Spanish resistance consist only in a few insulated facts; but it is most true, and matter of endless praise to the natives of the Peninsula, that the crimes of treachery, and the baseness of voluntary submission and hasty subserviency to their merciless enemy, do indeed consist only in a few insulated facts! The very district, the inertness of which occasioned it, has since then been the foremost in confuting Sir John Moore's remark, that "*the wisdom of the Spaniards is not a wisdom of action;*" and what has taken place since then, either in Galicia or any other province of Spain to invalidate the conclusion of the sentence, "*yet they are a fine people!*" But my feelings have hurried me beyond my purpose into observations, which will come with greater force, and perhaps be listened to with more attention, when I have prepared the way for them by supplying, in part at least, those several points of information which, as I above stated, it was incumbent on the depreciators of Spanish merit to have previously furnished.

Whatever knowledge, Sir, is to be acquired without a residence in Spain, (I say *residence*, for every intelligent officer will agree with me that the facts which present themselves to an army during its march, or retreat, are neither numerous, nor such as we can safely draw any important conclusion

from,) such knowledge I possess equally with the rest of my fellow-countrymen. The public documents are in common to us all: nor have I been without additional intelligence from the oral or written testimony of independent witnesses both in the military and diplomatic capacities. And greatly has it consoled me, that such as went into the Peninsula with those habits of reflection and that preparatory knowledge, which are not less requisite for accurate observation of facts than for just deductions from them, have been in every case the persons who spoke most honourably of the Spanish people, and with least despair concerning the ultimate result of their efforts. Having thus put myself in possession of all the direct information which could be obtained by a private individual, the sole remaining light was that of analogy furnished by similar events in past ages. My general remembrances determined me to seek this light in the history of the insurrection of the Belgic provinces against Philip the Second; and well aware that modern histories are for the greater part little more than philosophical comments on a few prominent facts, I consulted in preference the chronicles of contemporary writers for the very cause which renders them unattractive to the general reader; namely, their exclusive adherence to the order of time and their minute relation under each year of the events which took place in it, regardless of their greater or lesser importance. In the following de-

tail I trust to the recollection of your readers to fill up an imaginary column opposite to it with the corresponding facts of the present contest.

S. T. COLERIDGE.

Grasmere.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE COURIER.

LETTER III.

(Saturday, December 9, 1809.)

SIR,

PHILIP the Second received from his father, Charles the Fifth, an army accustomed to victory; in number, discipline, and the fame of its commanders, the first in Europe, beyond all pretensions of rivalry. The haughty spirit of liberty in his immediate subjects had been gradually *wanting* under the two preceding reigns, and was already in its last quarter. Their republican enthusiasm had passed into a passion for military glory, and an ambitious pride in the splendour of their sovereign, and in the growing extent of their vast empire. The lofty temper and romantic greatness which actuated the Arragonese in their usual harangue to their elected king, "*(We, who are of as great worth as you, and can do more than you, do elect you to be our king, upon such and such conditions)*," were now gratified by "*The sun never sets on the empire of our monarch!*" The emasculating effects of arbitrary rule had not yet displayed themselves. As

far as concerned the power of the kingdom, despotism manifested itself chiefly by unity of plan and promptness of execution. The foreign relations of Philip were not less favourable. France, the sole formidable rival of the Spanish monarchy, had been humbled, and was still weak from civil discords. After the death of Mary, Philip had still all the Catholics of England, in number perhaps the majority of the inhabitants, for his partisans; Hungary, Austria, and the greater part of Catholic Germany stood in the closest alliance and connection with him, and Italy was either a part of his own empire or in subservience to it. The most warlike parts of the old world supplied recruits for his armies, and the rich mines of the new world poured their wealth into his treasury. By the industry of the Inquisition, and by executions amounting to massacres, the tyrant had eradicated from his Spanish dominions *the weeds of heresy*, that is, the principles of Protestantism, which had spread through all ranks of his subjects.* And if many of his Belgic provinces

* The progress of the Reformed religion in Spain has been less attended to by ecclesiastical historians, than the subject deserved; though the number and fortitude of its martyrs deserved a foremost place in the records of martyrology. It seems incredible, yet is asserted by Catholic writers, as well as those of the Reform, that Charles the Vth. in the course of his reign, delivered over a hundred thousand of his German subjects to legal execution, solely on the score of their religious opinions. And yet it is highly probable that he

were roused and prepared for insurrection by their attachment to the Reformation, yet the Catholics remaining every where numerous, and in the Southern provinces forming the great mass of the population, this religious discordance could scarcely fail of undermining their political unanimity. Accordingly it did both perplex the measures of the Prince of Orange and his successors, and rendered their ultimate success incomplete. The Flandrian States, the richest, and at that time the most populous of the Netherlands, sacrificed their independence to their superstition, and finally remained the property

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himself died a convert to Lutheranism. M. Aitsinger's work being rare, some of your clerical readers will be gratified by the following extract. As the chronicle is dedicated conjointly to Rudolph and Philip, and the author a declared partizan of the Spanish government, and a zealous Catholic, the account cannot be suspected of exaggeration. It may not be amiss to observe, that Philip, at the time he issued these orders and enjoyed the luxury of the spectacle, was only in his twenty-eighth year. But we need not go back to tyrants of *former* times for proofs, that *age* is not required to render a tyrant's heart impenetrable to pity or remorse.—1559. 1 Sep. Fuit Regis præsentia valdè necessaria Hispaniæ multis de causis, sed imprimis, quia Angliæ et Germaniæ semina religionis Catholicæ contraria, in Hispaniam quoque penetrarant, ac radices agere cœperant in animis multorum præstantiorum procerum Hispanorum, cum paulatim ab avito cultu, ritibus Catholicæ Romanæ ecclesiæ, multi defecissent ad novam religionem, nisi opportuna remedia fuissent adhibita. Rex itaque ad convellenda surgentia, pallulantiaque semina morbi, antequam malum latius serperet, anim-

of their oppressors. Immense therefore as the disproportion of power between Bonaparte and the Spanish nation must be allowed to be, in as great a degree was Philip the Second an over-match for the Dutch at the commencement of *their* insurrection; and were it only, that the principle of internal weakness, above stated, does not exist in the *present* contest; but on the contrary an additional bond of concord from uniform faith, and an access to patriotic fervour from religious zealotry, the prospects of Spain ought to be deemed much *less* hopeless, than those of the Netherland confederacy were. The power, which raised up, established, and enriched the Dutch

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advertit in devios et obstinatos, siviliæ graviter, in plateâ ampliore, tam in fœminas quam mares. Nonnulli quum errores in quos inciderant, cognovissent, extremorum suppliciorum periculum devitarunt. Ubi vero ventum est in Pintiam (quod oppidum est imprimis nobile Gallogrecorum, Lucensium in tractatu Tarraconensis Hispaniæ) animadversum est in alios multos. Nam spectante vel ipso Rege Philippo, multisque proceribus, viginti et veto nobilissimi ferè totius regionis concremantur: Ilis vivis in platea publicè appensi sunt pectoribus sacculi pleni pulvere sulphuris, atque sæpientibus struibus lignorum mox injectus est ignis: ita cum magnis horrendisque (* *vorxationibus?*) palis alligati sunt concremati. Multis aliis gravia supplicia variis diebus sunt injuncta. Illis data est venia qui suos errores cognoverunt, ac pedem ab iis retraxerunt: *quorum parvus fuit numerus.* Sicque ob acerbitatem suppliciorum, sectariorum semina vel per fugam, vel per cladem extincta sunt. *Leo Belgicus*, p. 30. 31. Several words in this extract seem corrupt. S. C.

* Forsan, *vociferationibus.*

republic, the same mighty power is no less at work in the present struggle of the Spanish nation, a power which mocks the calculations of ordinary state-craft, too subtle to be weighed against mere brute outward force, too different from it to admit of a comparison. A power as mighty in the rational creation, as the element of electricity in the material world; and, like that element, infinite in its affinities, infinite in its modes of action; combining the most discordant natures, fixing the most volatile, and arming the sluggish vapour of the marsh with arrows of fire; working alike in silence and in tempest, in growth and in destruction; now contracted to an individual soul, and now, as in a moment, dilating itself over a whole nation! Am I asked, what this mighty power may be, and wherein it exists? If we are worthy of the fame which we possess as the countrymen of Hampden, Russel, and Algernon Sidney, we shall find the answer in our own hearts. It is the power of the insulted FREE-WILL, steadied by the approving CONSCIENCE, and struggling against brute force and iniquitous compulsion for the common rights of human nature, brought home to our inmost souls by being, at the same time, the rights of our betrayed, insulted, and bleeding country! It is the lot, Sir, of *some* nations only to be at once a state and a country. Kingdoms and empires exist without the patriotic feeling, even in Europe, as the Germans now feel, and as the wise and good among them have long confessed and bitterly la-

mented. But wherever this ennobling privilege is inherited, every citizen has a power within him, of which he himself in ordinary times is not aware. We all love our country: oh, Sir, we know not *how* much we all of us love it (the poorest and rudest oftentimes even more than the wealthy and refined), or what we are capable of doing and suffering when the hour of its danger is come, and the piercing outcry of the common mother awakens the filial instinct. This power (which in the war of the Netherlands was counteracted by another of the same kind, and, like it, acting *upon* and *through* the conscience, namely the influences of religion) this power is acting without a rival in the present contest, nay, strengthened and sanctified by those influences. To this fact, Sir, I call the reader's serious attention; that it was not the mighty armies of the Spanish monarchy, not the superior discipline of its invincible infantry, not the skill and enterprise of its famous commanders, which, after a war of more than seventy years, detached the southern states from the new republic—but a diversity of *principles* in the provinces themselves, an ally that fought for the tyrant in the *consciences* of the confederates! It is a painful truth, Sir, that those men who appeal most to facts, and pretend to take them for their exclusive guide, are the very persons who most disregard the light of experience, when it refers them to the mightiness of their own inner nature, in opposition to those forces which they can see with their eyes,

and reduce to figures upon a slate. And yet, Sir, what is history for the greater and more useful part but a voice from the sepulchres of our forefathers, assuring us from *their* united experience, that our spirits are as much stronger than our bodies as they are nobler and more permanent. The historic muse appears in her loftiest character as the nurse of HOPE. It is her appropriate praise, that her records enable the magnanimous to silence the selfish and the cowardly by appealing to actual *events* for the confirmation of those truths, which they themselves first learnt from the surer oracle of their own reason.

It is hard to be a tyrant and not a traitor. In contempt of treaties, in contempt of a solemn oath, Philip introduced the Inquisition into the Netherlands, and placed garrisons of Spanish soldiers in the chief fortified towns. A general commotion was the consequence, and the spirit of the people was authorized by the chief nobles, who, after fruitless petitions and remonstrances, subscribed a solemn and affecting act of confederation. The erection of new bishoprics had completely destroyed the former constitution of the country, the furies of religious persecution were let loose, and the petition of five hundred nobles, aided by the remonstrances of the Catholics equally with the Reformed, had no other influence on the tyrant than to hasten his adoption of the sanguinary counsels of Alba, Spinosa, and the Inquisitor General; namely, that it was necessary

for the preservation of the sovereign majesty, that war should be waged against the provinces, and that the inhabitants should be made a dreadful example to all posterity. The execution of these bloody orders was entrusted to the Duke of Alva, who proceeded to Belgium at the head of a Spanish army (Aug. 1567). At the first tidings of his approach, the most respectable and distinguished of the landholders and a multitude of the people fled their country. Prince William of Orange and his brother Lewis of Nassau went into Germany to seek supplies of men and arms from the Protestant states, justly alarmed by the plan of universal monarchy, which the partizans of Spain did not pretend to disguise. Then, as now, infamous sophists were found, who both in conversation and from the press, declaimed on the advantages of submission, and the vanity of resistance. United under one head, Christendom was to enjoy unbroken peace; the unrivalled power of the Spanish monarch was a declaration of the divine will in his favour; and then, as in the present day, *England* was held up to the abhorrence of the continent, as the chief obstacle to the accomplishment of these mighty blessings; the foretaste of which this elect of heaven bestowed on his own provinces, by impoverishment and desolation, by the scaffold, the stake, and by military massacres. Yet affrightful as this tyranny was, to human prudence there appeared no prospect of redemption. The popular mind was fermenting with religious, rather than

political notions; the most fanatical outrages were committed on the churches and their images; and though some of the nobles secretly favoured these tumults, the greater number were alarmed, and not a few alienated by them. For many of the most distinguished and influencive of the patriotic party were zealous Catholics, not less desirous to maintain the faith of their forefathers unviolated than the constitution of their country. The Spanish and Italian troops had been most judiciously cantoned throughout the states, and in the most important cities, new citadels were built, securing the obedience of the burghers, and new fortifications provided against the attacks from without. The estates of the emigrants were sold, and the produce given to the Spanish soldiers and officers. The more there emigrated of the proprietors, the more easily were those that stayed behind kept in subjection; and yet after the execution of Counts Egmont and Horn, and the seizure by night of Strael, the wealthy and powerful consul of Antwerp, few of the nobles could think their lives safe without emigration.

A generous despair supplied the place of hope, and frenzy answered the purposes of wisdom. The emigrants returned with troops and other supplies: and the first affair of consequence was a victory gained (May 23, 1568), by the confederates near Winschoten, over the troops of Alva, commanded by the Count Aremburg, who was himself slain: an outset of the contest, which will remind the reader

of the commencement of the Spanish struggle by the victory of Castaños over Dupont. Alva in revenge proscribed the person and confiscated the estates of the Prince of Orange, and seized and sent into Spain many noblemen who had not yet joined the confederates, but whom he suspected of secretly favouring their cause. The butchers of mankind and the oppressors of nations are all disciples of the same black master, and Bonaparte and his agents faithfully repeat the lessons and exercises of their predecessors in the school of darkness. The victory at Winschoten was but a flattery of fortune. The troops brought from Germany were not only, like the Spaniards at present, ill-disciplined: they were hirelings, with the hearts of hirelings. In the July following, the troops of the confederacy, under Count Lewis of Nassau, suffered a complete rout near Groningen. How incapable they were of meeting the Spaniards in the open field, and in how dastardly a manner they must have behaved, we collect at once from the immense disproportion of their loss to that of the conquerors. Of twelve thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, seven thousand are said to have been left dead on the field of battle, while the loss on the part of the Spaniards amounted to only eight missing and as many wounded. This account is perhaps greatly exaggerated; but the improbability will appear less gross to military men, than to the ordinary reader. Yet Lewis, who with difficulty escaped, again collects forces, is followed by Alva, and against his

brother's advice, sustains another battle. His soldiers again misbehave, and he himself escapes with difficulty by swimming across the stream which passes the village of Gemingen. Alva receives fresh supplies of money from Spain, and ten thousand veteran troops: the Spanish soldiers are equally successful in the south, suppressing and dissipating a large but irregular body of forces raised at Dalen by De Villiers: and notwithstanding assistance sent to the Prince of Orange by the Prince of Condé from France, yet his soldiers becoming more and more mutinous from cowardice and want of pay, he was at length forced to retire into France, and in January, 1569, Alva considered Belgium as completely in his power, and the hopes of the patriots as dead, without the chance of resurrection.

S. T. COLERIDGE.

Grasmere.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE COURIER.

LETTER IV.

(Friday, December 15, 1809.)

IN the pride of security Alva convened the Estates with the same purposes as Tiberius was wont to meet the Roman Senate, namely, to enjoy their terror and expose their insignificance. He levied a heavy contribution, the tenth of all moveables sold, the twentieth of immoveable property

alienated, and a property tax of the hundredth penny: and assuming a plenary power in the civil concerns of the Provinces in March 1570 he forbad the introduction and currency of all other money than what was minted and stamped in the name of King Philip. In May following, he passed an edict prohibiting all printing presses, with the exception of a few in the service and under the immediate controul of the government: and in July the whole of Belgium appearing passive and terror stricken, and after having himself boasted of the incredible number whom, under pretext of heresy or sedition, he had delivered over to the executioner or to the flames, he passed an act of amnesty, which the wits, anagrammatizing the word Pardona, called Pandora. If those of our contemporaries, whom the first reports of Spanish defeats (which it was fatuity not to anticipate as things of course) reduced at once to incurable despondence, had lived in that age, under the influence of the same feelings and convictions, what madmen would they not have deemed those, who had dared to hope, that the cause of Belgic independence might yet be ultimately successful, and the perseverance of freemen at length weary down the obstinacy of tyrants! In Belgium, as in the North of Spain recently, the Provinces were overrun and brought to submission quickly and without trouble: the true untameable spirit of resistance was first roused into effective action by the conduct of the conquerors and the

experience of a foreign yoke. It is equally instructive and interesting, to observe how trifling in appearance were the first symptoms of that rekindling spirit, which was never again to be quenched.

As in Germany and Spain of late, so in Belgium nearly two centuries and a half ago, the symptoms of national indignation first shewed themselves in the Universities: and though the incident is trifling, yet it exhibits in the character of Alva a soreness of vanity, a pettiness of resentment, and a vulgarity of moral being, so strongly recalling the same traits in the character of our contemporary, the Corsican, that it cannot be read without some interest, were it for this only, that it proves that Bonaparte owes the baseness of his nature to his being a remorseless tyrant, and not to his low birth, or to his consanguinity with the assassins and banditti of the notorious Corsica. We find the same meanness in the high-born Spanish Grandee. At the University of Louvain, in December 1570, on the eve of St. Thomas, the Professor Delrio, in what were called the quodlibetical questions, had chosen for the subject of his oration the triumphs of the Duke of Alva over the Moors, the French, the Italians, the Germans, the Belgians, &c.; but he had scarcely finished the introduction and annunciation of his odious theme, when there commenced from the whole body of Students such an universal and persevering hiss of indignation and abhorrence, varied only by exclamations of "*sycophant! traitor!*

liberticide," &c. as forced him to desist, and retire in confusion. Shortly afterwards the Dóctors Longolius and Namesius were sent by the University of Louvain to Alva, then at Brussels, for the purpose of entreating the removal of some inhibition, or the revival of some of their privileges. They were admitted into the presence of the Duke, and commenced their address. But scarcely had the speaker finished his second period, before the Confessor of the Duke, standing by his chair, interrupted him with a loud and continued hiss. — The grave doctors were of course no little confused and terrified, and on humbly imploring an explanation, that knowing in what points they had given offence they might be able to make due atonement, they were answered, that the deserved praise of that godlike hero, in whose presence they then stood, had been received at Louvain with the same envious and serpent-like noise: and that this insult still remained unpunished and unnoticed by the heads of the University. Thus, no reply being permitted, they were dismissed from the presence-room. Permit me to say, Sir, that it is in trifling incidents, like these, that we best see the true character of men, and detect the real and bosom motives of their more important actions: and it is the omission of these, as below the dignity of history, which makes the works of our modern historians, in spite of their balanced periods, their ambitious circumlocutions, and their sententious generalities,

less valuable as materials for philosophic reflection, than even the dry and minute journals of the old plain matter of fact chroniclers.

These first symptoms were soon followed by more serious demonstrations. The infamous tax of the tenths not only produced tumults at Brussels, and continued skirmishes between the citizens and the Spanish soldiery; but throughout Belgium, or rather throughout all Europe, made Alva and the Spanish oppressions the object of general detestation, and greatly favoured the plans of the proscribed and emigrant nobles, furnishing them both with the opportunity and the pretext of returning to the relief of their country. Limes, with a party of emigrants, surprised the sea-port of Briel; Lewis of Nassau mastered Mons in Hainault, and the Prince of Orange Ruremond in Guelderland. All parties joined, Protestant and Catholic, and the chief cities every where fell off from Alva. I have been thus particular on this head, because it is in the surprisal of towns and the maintenance of strong positions chiefly, that a *People* forced to arms can carry on a war successfully against regular troops. Noble principles, and the preference of death to slavery, are excellent *materials;* but time and experience only can form them into an army. Disorganization, want of unity in plan, want of concert in the execution, misconduct in the field, fluctuations and swoonings of public zeal—all these are *fallacious* symptoms of mortal decay and ultimate failure.

They are the inevitable consequences of human frailty, and in a greater or less degree have been found in every struggle of a people against an organized tyranny, however successful and glorious the result has been. All these were found in the war of the Netherlands, and in the war of the American Colonists. All these (but as it appears to me to a far less extent) have taken place in the Spanish Peninsula, and will occasionally continue to betray themselves. But where fortresses and fortified towns are abandoned with cowardice or given up by treachery, as was the case in Prussia; *this* is indeed a mortal symptom! Whatever praise the contrary excellence in its highest perfection can deserve, and whatever rational hopes it may inspire (and worthy it is of the highest praise, and a ground on which wisdom builds her strongest hopes,) all that praise, all those hopes, were earned for themselves and for their cause by the Belgic Patriots; and need the advocates of Spain in her present agony of glory shrink from this test? Answer — Saragossa, Gerona! To this test, as ennobling the principles of man, Belgium owed its immunity from despair during a long succession of disasters. For the first measures of the renewed insurrection were unprosperous. The attack of the Prince of Orange on the camp of Alva at Valenciennes ended in a severe defeat. His soldiers were at all times mutinous; bold in demand of their arrears, as might be expected from mercenaries, but little to be relied

on in the field. These evils were, however, more than counterbalanced by two most important events, which made the year 1572 the true birth-year of the Dutch Republic. The first was the meeting of the States of Holland at Dordrecht, with the election of Prince William of Orange for their Stadtholder; and the second the conduct of the Spaniards at Naerden. While I was writing this last sentence, a friend has informed me from the Courier, that the Spanish Cortes has at length been actually convoked, and that the first of January next is the day fixed for their meeting. I resign myself to the feelings of unmixed joy, inspired by these auspicious tidings, and defer the proof and illustration of its importance from history and the nature of the human mind to a following letter, when, without interrupting the course of my narration, I may consider the subject more at length. I pass on therefore to the second event.

It is one of the many curses which, happily for mankind, cleave to tyrants, that their successes are scarcely less ruinous to them in the sum of their consequences, than their defeats. Thus the soldiers of Alva soon became a dreadful pest even to those of their own party: and every victory, while it increased their insolence and rapacity, increased the means of resisting them, by uniting the jarring factions, and swallowing up all their differences in the one common wish, to be freed from the Spaniards. Never was the truth of this observation

more strikingly instanced than in the result of the massacres committed at Naerden. In contempt of faith solemnly pledged to the townsmen, in contempt of the articles of capitulation signed by Alva and his Son, the Spaniards, sparing neither age nor sex, made a promiscuous massacre of all the inhabitants, and then reduced the whole town to ashes or ruins. The effects were most auspicious for the right cause. The noble-minded were armed by it with an indignant pity, and a thirst for honourable revenge, which set death and danger at defiance. The religious beheld in the atrocity of the fact, a proof and signal that God had abandoned the Spaniards, and acted henceforward with zeal and confidence against men, for whose punishment they thought the justice of Heaven itself pledged. Even the sluggish and cowardly were made bold and active by despair; for no credit could be given henceforward by the weakest of men to the most solemn promises of the tyrant, or his most sacred engagements. The influence of the fate of Naerden was soon shewn in the siege of Haerlem, June 1573. Alva's Son, before he pitched his tents round the city, sent an officer to summon the citizens to surrender. The citizens replied in a single word, NAERDEN! They deemed it more prudent, as well as more glorious, to die in the defence of their country, than to trust their lives, and the honour of their wives and daughters, to the faith of a perjured tyrant, equally without faith, without pity, or without remorse.

After a siege, which will be famous to the end of time, Haerlem was at length taken by extremity of famine. With our present recollections it must be pleasing and affecting to observe, that the contemporary historian could find no more adequate expression of its sufferings and perseverance, than an epithet allusive to the ancient history of Spain: for who can now think of Saguntum or Numantium, and not connect with them their recent counterparts, Saragossa and Gerona? "It will astonish posterity," says Aitsinger, "when they read of the constancy with which the citizens of Haerlem, the women not less than the men, endured the horrors of this siege, and a more than *Saguntine* famine. Not a single living animal was found in the city after its surrender, not a single root in all their gardens, not a leaf or twig upon their trees." The Spaniards then laid siege to Alkmaar, which was endured with equal constancy and a happier result. The Spanish General was at last obliged to raise it with great slaughter on the part of the besiegers. In the same year the Belgic Patriots were inspirited anew: first by the defeat and capture of Alva's fleet, under Sancho Davila, by the naval force off Vlissingen (this on the 8th of April,) and in the October following, Bossu, Alva's Admiral, fighting by orders against his own judgment, from fear of the imputation of cowardice, was taken with his whole fleet in the Zuyder Sea. In the same month the privateers of the Prince of Orange brought

home a million sterling from prizes taken at sea belonging to Portuguese merchants; and a few weeks after, namely on the 12th and 13th of November, the rich Spanish flota was captured by ships belonging to English merchants after an obstinate engagement.

I have now detailed a sufficient number of facts for the ground-work of my argument. The progress and conclusion of the struggle, compressed into a small space, will form the subject of my next letter, with the addition of some miscellaneous remarks on the use and abuse of vituperative language, in historical and political disquisitions. But as a postscript to the present letter, I annex a short digression, which may not, perhaps, be uninteresting to the student of English History.

I remain, Sir, your obliged,

Grasmere. S. T. COLERIDGE.

P. S. I have unfortunately no other Histories of England by me but Hume's and Echard's, both of which give an account of a seizure of four hundred thousand crowns lent by the Genoese merchants to Philip, and by him sent to Alva: the vessels on which the money was embarked, having been attacked in the channel by some French Huguenot privateers, and forced to take shelter in Plymouth and Southampton. "The commanders of the ships pretended that the money belonged to the King of Spain; but the Queen, finding, upon

inquiry, that it was the property of Genoese merchants, took possession of it as a loan; and by that means deprived the Duke of Alva of this resource in the time of his greatest necessity." — (HUME, *Octavo Ed.* vol. v. p. 194.) Hume places this event in the year 1571, while Echard places it two years earlier. And yet the former mentions the interception of this money not only as anterior to Alva's impost of the tenths, &c. but states it as the very circumstance which compelled him to that ruinous measure. If Hume be accurate in this, he must certainly be erroneous in his date, for these taxes were levied on the 7th of January 1569. But there is no doubt that Echard's is the true date; for the faithful and minute Aitsinger, who appears evidently to have kept a *Diary* of the events of the Netherlands, places the seizure of the English merchants by the order of Alva in revenge for this detention on the 18th of August, 1569. Of the splendid victory and capture of the Spanish flota in November 1573, both Hume and Echard preserve a total silence. They were, it is plain, ignorant of it. I shall therefore give Aitsinger's account in a literal translation, subjoining the original Latin in the note. " And thus not only did the campaign turn out most unfortunate for the Spanish Monarch in his own Belgic Lion, inasmuch as his forces engaging with those of the Prince of Orange, and suffering a defeat of no little importance, both by land and sea, appeared scattered and utterly routed;

but the affairs of Spain were additionally calamitous, in that the fleet, which was navigating the British Channel, was routed and captured by the Britons or English. For as the fleet, which is called the flota, consisting of many armed vessels belonging in part to the royal navy, and in part the property of various merchants, was sailing from Barcelona to the Netherlands, this being made known to the Britons by spies, there was collected a great number of British ships of burthen, completely fitted out with all things necessary for battle. The Britons soon met the Spanish fleet, and commenced a fierce and bloody engagement. The contest is supported on each side most courageously, with an uninterrupted discharge of great guns, missile fires, and all kinds of weapons. But the Spanish fleet, inferior both in the number of ships, and in the size and multitude of guns, and being not so well manned, was at length routed and compelled to surrender to the Britons. The Commodore was carried prisoner to Britain with a vast booty of guns and ships and merchandize."*

* Atque ita non solum, tum infeliciter pugna successit Hispano Regi in Belgico suo Leone, quum acies illius, commisso prælio cum copiis Auriacis, accepta terra marique non levi clade, fusæ profligatæque videbantur: Sed etiam illa calamitate affectæ sunt res Hispanæ, quum et classis quæ navigabat in mari Britannico profligata, et à Britannis sive Anglis capta sit, nam classis, quæ flota vocatur, constans è multis armatis navigiis, partim Regis, partim variorum

To the Editor of the Courier.

Letter V.

(Wednesday, December 20, 1809.)

Sir,

THE Belgic insurrection first put on a steady countenance of hope and promise, with the meeting of the states at Dordrecht. This fact I stated in my last letter, and at the same time hailed the auspicious intelligence that the junta had fixed the day for the meeting of the Spanish Cortes. I am not ignorant of the objections which hacknied

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Mercatorum, Barcinone navigans in Belgium, cum per exploratores significata fuisset Britannis, collectus est magnus numerus navium Britannarum Onerariarum, quæ rebus omnibus necessariis, ad pugnam egregiè fuerunt instructæ. Mox Britanni Hispanæ classi obviam progressi, planè atrocem et cruentam pugnam committunt in oceano: certatur utrinque magna virtute, crebris bellicis tormentis, et missilibus ignibus, et omni telorum genere. Sed Hispana classis et numero navigiorum, et magnitudine et multitudine tormentorum, et propugnatorum inferior, eversa atque profligata in potestatem Britannorum denique pervenit. Cujus Imperator captivus abductus est in Britanniam: capta sunt multa preciosa spolia, et tormenta, et navigia, et diversa mercimonia quæ in illis vehebantur. — If this account be deserving of credit, it is surely a most important fact, from the influence it must have had in encouraging the English, and preparing them for the Spanish Armada: not to mention that it must have held no insignificant place in the list of provocations which occasioned that expedition, so glorious for England, and so fatal to Philip's plan of universal monarchy.

diplomatists and the mere men of office make to popular assemblies at all times, but especially in times of public danger. The reason is evident. The evils and inconveniences of popular assemblies are observable numerically, and may be instanced in single and definite facts: while their favourable influences are indefinite, because they are incessant: because their effects vary with the dispositions of men, and are different in every different mind: and above all, because their main action consists, not so much in planning or bringing about this or that particular measure, as in producing that general sense of rightful authority, and that diffused public spirit, without which the wisest measures would be advised to no purpose. For what avail the best laid plans, if the human instrument be defective, if the very materials are wanting on which they are to be realized. Besides the very circumstance, that lessens and counteracts these inconveniences, makes them more obvious and palpable to common minds. Delays, time wasted in pertinacious debates, faction, and treason itself, are at least as likely to exist, and have as often actually existed, in a privy council as in a representative assembly; but in the former we can only *deduce* their existence from the calamitous events caused by them, first discovering the poison by its deadly operation often too late for the application of a remedy; but in the latter we see the things themselves, previous to, and independent of their natural

consequences which may thus be intercepted, and which are besides not seldom baffled by the very indignation and bitterness, which disposes us to exaggerate them. In order to gain an influence in a public assembly, a traitor, whether an agent of the enemy, or of his ambition, must of necessity have assumed so fair and generous an outside, that the very principles which he has disseminated in his public harangues, aided by the contempt and abhorrence which apostacy inspires, furnish both shield and sword against himself. The history of all free states confirms this observation. It furnishes not a single instance of an individual establishing a tyranny by his influence over a representative senate. Under extraordinary circumstances of national terror, Robespierre indeed used the frenzy of the Parisian populace to terrify and enslave the national assembly; but he was sacrificed to public vengeance before he had disclosed any plan of permanent usurpation, and at this hour it remains uncertain whether the monster died a fanatic or an impostor. And how, and where, was he hurried off to execution? In the National Assembly, and by the courage of its members. Cromwell would never have been Protector if the Parliament had been the sole scene of his hypocrisy: he found even the mock parliaments of his own election unmanageable tools. Neither the victories, nor the oaths, nor the bombastic harangues of Bonaparte, nor even the more powerful presidential

authority of his brother Lucien, would have saved him from the sentence of the legislature, or the hastier daggers that leapt forth to avenge its insulted majesty, had not his dragoons protected him, and the army joined the conspiracy against freedom.

No individual, Sir, or handful of individuals, whether a regent, a general, or a junta, can be the representative of a public cause in a season of peril and uncertainty—Least of all a general. It is unnatural for individuals to sustain any higher character than that of public functionaries, each in his own department the executor of the national will. As an individual, his character will, however reason and justice may object to this criterion, be affected by the event of his measures, and therefore if he appears as the sole outward representative of the cause, as its visible fountain-head, and yet at the same time the responsible agent in the measures for its protection and promotion, the cause will inevitably be confounded with the measures; and as these will be judged of according to the event, so will the cause likewise. But where there exists a parliament, a congress, or a cortes, the things which are most subject to the caprice of fortune, and the accidents of treason or incapacity, as military expeditions, battles, sieges, &c. are referred to the responsible individuals; while the public body elected by the public will, and the representative of the public cause, remaining distinct from the particular measures, remains aloof from the influ-

ence of their results. Nay, the existence of such a body, preserves or recalls the public mind from despondency by presenting always an object of hope to which the people turn for the remedy of calamity and the punishment of misconduct. During the American war, there was a period of universal consternation; the militia broke up and retired each man to his home, and Washington was almost abandoned. Had there not been a congress, to which the people had delegated the power of the state, whose *right* to be obeyed their consciences compelled them to admit, a congress whom they had already accustomed themselves to obey; or if that congress had then deserted its post; little would the influences of Washington's own character have availed in dispelling the panic, or rallying the Americans once more round the standard of independence. The same fortune which suspended his success could have paralysed his authority; those whom he could not induce to remain with their colours, while they were yet embodied under him as their *general*, he could never have brought back again from their separate homes and hiding-places, as an individual *citizen*. Washington would probably have perished as the ring-leader of a rebellion, and thousands, who afterwards fought and conquered under the auspices of the ASSEMBLED FATHERS OF THE LAND, thousands, whom he, as servant of the congress, himself afterwards led on to victories, would have anxiously detached their names from him and

from the cause, by early submission and compensatory acts of loyalty.

It is not possible, Sir, that any small number of individuals should possess equal means of inspiring the general enthusiasm, of guiding the public opinion, of counteracting the proclamations of the enemy, or the insidious reports of its agents, of rousing, informing, and undeceiving the people, which a large body of representatives will possess, both collectively and as individuals, having each his own sphere of additional influence.

Why need I add the facility which a national assembly affords to the disclosure of great talents, the stimulus it supplies to their exertion, and the opportunity it gives to stirring spirits of reconciling ambition with patriotism and with virtue? or why mention, that their very debates, becoming of necessity the topic of general conversation, and the constant incitement and nourishment of public curiosity, will at length blend the interests of the state with the feelings and concerns of private life, and give the *country* a place at each domestic fireside? Suffice it to say, Sir, that it is with a national assembly as it is with the common air of heaven. If it be corrupted, it is the sorest visitation of offended Providence: if its equipoise be suddenly and violently destroyed, its tempests are terrifying, and every man has a tale to tell of their fury; but they are purifying likewise, and of *that* few men think! But in its ordinary and natural

state, Sir, it is food to our food, and life to our life: and the very inequalities of its temperature, and the struggles to preserve or restore its balance, are the breezes that fill the sails of the country, and speed the vessel onward in its voyage of industry, or its chase of glory and of vengeance. Whatever may result from the Spanish Cortes, its convocation will be welcomed with delight by every reflecting mind: for whatever this assembly may do or may not do, it will at all events furnish the best data for rational judgment concerning the fate of Spain and the event of the present struggle, by letting us know what stuff the Spaniards are made of, and what quantity of knowledge, wisdom, and public spirit they can bring together as the flower and representative of the national character.

At present, Sir, we can only hope or fear: judge we cannot. I feel a pride in avowing, that my own hopes are high. The fortunes of the Netherlands from the time that the provinces were first organized into a free state, by means of a representative body, afford a colour, if they do not lend an authority to my anticipations. The whole sequel of the Belgic contest is one continued proof, that a nascent commonwealth (*i. e.* a people, among whom the spirit of liberty has been newly collected and embodied in an elective senate), possesses an obstinacy of life, that enables it to make progress under the most cruel wounds, and a vigour of reproduction, which baffles the strangest mutilations. Tyranny, on the

contrary, under looks of florid health, conceals a morbid habit of body, a constitutional predisposition to dissolution, which is sure to render any one deep wound fatal, and not seldom makes a mere scratch terminate in a general mortification. Frequent were the defeats of the Belgic insurgents, jealous and parsimonious the aids of their main ally, many and important their own errors from inexperience and party spirit. The assassination of the Prince of Orange *glanced by* the very heart of the cause! Yet the spirit of freedom and national independence triumphed over all, save only that it yielded a portion of its conquests to the repulsive power of another spirit equally with itself residing in the hearts of men! Only at the presence and intervention of religious antipathy,

——— ——— jam brachia contrahit ardens
Scorpius, et cœli justâ plus parte reliquit!

How striking a contrast with the measures of the remorseless Philip! The false step at Naerden was felt by the Spanish government; the impolicy of its sanguinary measures in general, was at length perceived; Alva was recalled, and like the dragons in romance, retired breathing smoke and flames.—But when his successor, Requesens, adopted the tones of gentleness, and tried the effect of liberal promises, those tones, those promises found no materials to work on: for the confidence of Belgium was irretrievably lost, stabbed to the heart by the

perjuries of his predecessor. The amnesty was not believed, and if it had been, it was not an *amnesty* that would now satisfy the Belgians. They determined to have *security*, which neither the words nor oaths of the Governor or of Philip himself could supply. Bitter experience had taught them to read the tyrant backward, and to interpret his declarations, as so many dreams, by their contraries. Even the splendid victory of the Spaniards on the Monker-heath, by Nimwegen, was not only fruitless; it produced worse effects than a total defeat could have done by increasing the insolence of the soldiery to a madness which inflicted promiscuous ruin on friend and foe, and thus overpowered terror by terror! The northern Provinces, whose hostility to the Spanish Government was preserved steady and fierce by the conjoined influences of patriotism and the reformed religion, suffered comparatively little; while on the hesitating and half friendly southern provinces the storm fell with desolating fury. The horrible sack of Antwerp, and the bloody massacre of its most respectable citizens by the mutinous troops, united north and south in the pacification of Ghent, which was to have secured the ancient rights and privileges of the provinces without detaching them from the Spanish monarchy. John of Austria, who succeeded to the government at the death of Requesens, solemnly sanctioned this contract in the, so called, perpetual edict; but the old

well-grounded distrust still hovered over the one party—They insisted that all Spanish and foreign troops should be withdrawn from the country, previously to their acknowledgment of the governor's authority: and the states of Holland and Zealand refused to re-establish Philip's supremacy till the grievances of the country were redressed, and the national rights actually restored. As little did the old spirit of falsehood and treachery desert the other party. Was it indeed to be supposed that the tyrant would sign in good earnest a confession of the folly and iniquity of his own measures? It was soon found, that John of Austria was trifling with their hopes; and the southern provinces themselves recommenced the war against Philip.

That the whole Netherlands did not form one independent state, which might have been the bulwark of European independence at this day, was owing, not to the terror of Philip's power and resources, but to the diminution of that terror which permitted whatever was heterogeneous in the provinces themselves to shew itself, and gradually to destroy that union, which was unhappily incongruous with internal circumstances. In the northern states the party of the Reformed religion was triumphant, in the southern the Catholic party; in the former the clergy were deprived of all political power, and no longer existed as a distinct estate in the legislature, in the southern the abbots formed the most opulent and powerful party; in the former

the house of Orange engrossed the direction of the public affairs almost without a rival, in the latter there was many an illustrious family which in wealth and influence held itself equal to the house of Nassau; and above all in the northern states, the religious principles were congenial with a republican form of government, in the southern the spirit of popery found a more natural ally in the forms of monarchy. A particular union therefore of the northern provinces was at length concluded at Utrecht, at first in subordination to the confederacy of Ghent and as an *imperium in imperio;* but soon assuming a separate existence, and finally shaping itself into the rich and powerful republic of the United States, the nurse of religious toleration, and the parent of commercial importance, to the blessing of all Europe!

I remain, &c.

Grasmere. S. T. COLERIDGE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE COURIER.

LETTER VI.

(Thursday, December 21, 1809.)

SIR,

INTRODUCTORY to my final remarks, I would fain obviate a charge, to which I have laid myself open in my former Letters by the use of *hard words* concerning "*the French Emperor*," as a certain party, outrunning the will of their country,

so readily style the present oppressor of the Continent. A similar offence in different numbers of THE FRIEND has already provoked some severe animadversions, as a thing injurious to the interests of reason, and degrading to my own character. If the objectors do not think Bonaparte a perjured liberticide, an usurper, and a tyrant, who finds the lives and comforts of millions as dust in the scale, compared with the gratification of his own boundless ambition (and we must suppose, Sir, that they do *not* think him such; for how else can we reconcile their apparent partiality for this man and his proceedings with their vehement professions of superior zeal for Liberty and the rights of Man?) any defence of myself, which *they* would hold valid, is altogether out of the question: for what apology can be made for falsehood and calumny? Or if I attempted to prove that such representations were not slanderous, to what facts could I appeal, which are not as well known to them as to myself? If they are not convinced by the direful espionage systematized throughout Europe, by the armies of revenue officers, by the interdict laid on the continental press, and by the late edicts in Germany, which made it death for men to relate what they themselves had seen, and danger even to listen to the relation — if, in short, with the incredulity of the Egyptian King, they will neither believe the plague of the locusts, nor the plague of the thick darkness, nor the rivers of blood, nor the destruc-

tion of the first-born of the families * throughout France and the kingdom of Italy, it would be equal presumption and folly for me to do aught but wonder and remain silent. But if they agree with me in the matter of fact, and their objection regards a point of decorum only, the following, Sir, is my reply. There is an anger, I admit, which is the offspring of fear; and loud railing at a distance is the characteristic language and appropriate weapon of cowardice lashing itself into a bravery of rage. Had the terms of contempt and reprobation, which in these Letters, and in scattered passages of the FRIEND, I have applied to Bonaparte, been inspired by the sense of his immense power and its threatening aspect to Great Britain, though the employment of such terms might be justified in a caricaturist for the multitude, I should confess it to be altogether unworthy of a philosopher, and inconsistent with my own professions as a teacher of moral wisdom. I must, however, remind the classic correspondent, who has adduced a passage of Demosthenes against me, that the great orator does not blame his countrymen for railing at Philip, but for doing nothing else but rail at him, and if he does not find in any equal number of pages of the

* Bonaparte's wars are said by recent travellers to have made a chasm of a whole generation in France. The destruction of the first born throughout Egypt could do no more.

Olynthiacs and the other Philippics, three times the number of "*hard names*" applied by the orator himself to the King of Macedon, that I have applied to Bonaparte, I agree to abandon all attempt at further defence; though I by no means consider my cause as standing on the same moral footing as that of the great Athenian.

Again, Sir, if I had been one of those who first clamoured for peace with France at the very time, when the war first became just and necessary; or if during the experimental truce of Amiens, I had hurried with the crowd of English Patriots to the Usurper's levee, and had offered to him every tribute of respect which could have been paid to a Washington, however defensible I might deem the terms themselves, I should have no right to complain though the worst motives were imputed to me personally for my inconsistency in using them. I am proud, Sir, that I employed that interim very differently, in rousing, warning, and alarming my countrymen concerning the dangers of a peace, which was doubtless in a high degree beneficial, but beneficial only as the means of making all parties unanimous for the renewal of open hostility: and if, as Mr. Fox affirmed, the war was a war of newspapers, a war at the instance of the *Morning Post*, I glory in having been no tame or feeble coadjutor of its disinterested Editor, to whom I consider all good men as indebted for having set the example of conducting a widely influensive Morning Paper

without faction and without servility, as exclusively the partizan of *principles* and of his country. But not even then, Sir, did I blacken the French Ruler as the enemy of Great Britain; but as the enemy of whatever makes not only Great Britain but life itself worth fighting for; as the enemy of our common nature in its dignity and in its loveliness; as the murderer of the hopes of good men; as the tyrant who has waged an unceasing war against all the principles of human grandeur, and all the supports of human frailty. — Would these objectors expunge from the dictionary of our own and all other languages, every phrase, every word, which does not represent some external fact, but only expresses the feelings of complacency or aversion which arise in all well-constituted minds from the contemplation of certain facts? Or if we are permitted to call white white, will they please to assign their reason, why black should not be called black? If when a Washington, having purchased the *independence* of his country by far-sighted patience and enduring courage as a warrior, and then established and watched over her *freedom* with the wisdom of parental love, unmoved by the entreaties of his fellow-citizens, lest by yielding to them he should form a precedent injurious to their posterity, retires to the unambitious duties of private life, and disclaiming all titles but those given by domestic love and reverence, bows at length his dear and venerable head to the emancipating angel, and restores

his spirit to that great Being, whose goodness he had both adored and imitated — if for such a man we collect all terms of honour and affection, and fondly involve his name in phrases expressive of his virtues, must we remain mute, and stifle the feelings which the *contrast* to all this must needs awaken in us? and even though this contrast should furnish a humiliating proof, that the slaves of iniquitous ambition can carry guilt to a height which dwarfs the best virtues of the best and most heroic of men in the comparison? Or are we, Sir, to confine both our sentiments and our expression of abhorrence to *petty* villains trembling beneath the foot of the law, and have nothing but *candour* and *respect* for the Traitor who has abused the reputation won for him by the enthusiasm for equal laws to set himself above the laws, nay, to trample all law, human and divine, beneath the bestial hoof of military despotism? Bear with me, Sir, and do not confound the warmth of general feeling with the arrogance of personal presumption, if I abandon the character of a defendant, and speak with the spirit of a man, who knows that he has performed a duty and a service, and claims the esteem due to him for such performance. The error, which of all others most besets the public mind, and which yet of all others is the most degrading in its nature, the most tremendous in its consequences, is an inward prostration of the soul before enormous POWER, and a readiness to palliate and forget all iniquities

to which prosperity has wedded itself; as if man were only a puppet without reason and free will, and without the conscience which is the offspring of their union, a puppet played off by some unknown power! as if success were the broad seal of the divine approbation, and tyranny itself the Almighty's inauguration of a Tyrant!

> Planned merely, 'tis a common felony;
> Accomplished, an immortal undertaking!
> And with success comes PARDON hand in hand:
> For all event is God's arbitrement.—WALLENSTEIN.

The main strength of Bonaparte, Sir, is in the imaginations of men, which are dazzled and blinded by the splendid robes and gaudy trappings which have been purchased by guilt for its own disguise. Is it to be borne by good men without an attempt on their part to stem or counteract the delusion, that the power and prosperity, which derive their very being from excess of wickedness, should secure for that wickedness an immunity from our hate and execration? But if the detestation be right, can the utterance of it be culpable? Is it not the nature of man, that all inward feelings will languish and go out, if not fanned and fuelled by their outward and visible signs? Has Providence given us our senses and sensitive nature as the means of imposture only, and to be exclusively the tools of villains? There is a book, Sir, which we have not yet learnt to treat with contempt, that abounds with examples of words and phrases that seem on fire with anger,

and indignant reprobation, and these used by inspired Wisdom itself to scare the vicious as with thunders, and to kindle the hearts of good men like the blast of a trumpet calling them to battle against the giants that war against Heaven. For assuredly against Heaven doth that man wage war, whose whole career is in defiance of all the principles which alone give a meaning to our erect form, and entitle us to look toward Heaven as to our natural and destined country. I have styled the present Ruler of France a Wretch and a Monster, but on what occasion? Were these phrases provoked by his *Veni-vidi-vici* victories over the armies of Russia, Prussia, and Austria? No! I have denounced him as a remorseless Tyrant, and the enemy of the human race. But was it because he had sworn the ruin of Great Britain, and had exhausted all the resources of his stupendous power in preparations for its invasion? No! I exulted, indeed, that his army of England lay encamped on his coasts like wolves braying at the moon, and that he is condemned to behold his vast flotillas as worthless and idle as the sea-weed that rots around their keels. I exulted, indeed, as became a Briton; but I neither reviled nor even blamed him. But that in order to gratify his rage against one country, he made light of the ruin of his own subjects; that to undermine the resource of one enemy, he would reduce the Continent of Europe to a state of barbarism, and by the remorseless suspension of the commercial

system, destroy the principal source of civilization, and abolish a *middle class* throughout Christendom; for this, Sir, I declared him the common enemy of mankind! For this, Sir, and for the murder of Palm, and for the torture and private assassination of Wright, of Pichegru, and Toussaint, (the latter a hero as much his superior in genius as in goodness;) for his remorseless behaviour to the Swiss and to the Tyrolese, and for his hatred of liberty everywhere; and lastly for his ingratitude, perfidy, baseness, and fiend-like cruelty, for this amalgam of all vices, in the one vice of his conduct towards Spain. I have spoken of him, and of his power with abhorrence, because it is only by a clear conception of its foul and dark foundations that this power can be effectually resisted. In what other terms, than those of execration, could I describe a power, which subsists, for the greater part, in the consistency and systematic perfection of its possessor's vices; crime corresponding to crime, villany entrenched and barricaded by villany? An additional motive was supplied by the necessity of directing the public attention to the *moral* consequences of his tyranny, and that these are far more to be dreaded than the worst of those outward and calculable evils, which *chiefly* shock the imaginations of men. What *good* will the Tyrolese do themselves by their heroic resistance? exclaims one man. What are the Spaniards fighting for? exclaims another — as if man were made only to eat

above ground, and be eaten; as if we had no dignity to preserve, no conscience to obey, no immortality to expect.

I have spoken with contempt likewise, because it is "a duty which we owe to the present moment to proclaim — in vindication of the dignity of human nature, and for an admonition to men of prostrate spirit — that the dominion, which this enemy of mankind holds, has neither been acquired, nor has been sustained by endowments of intellect which are rarely bestowed, or by uncommon accumulations of knowledge; but that it has risen from circumstances over which he had no influence; and that no qualities of his have availed so much in carrying it to its present height, as the barbarian impotence and insolence of a mind lagging in moral sentiment and knowledge three hundred years behind the age in which it acts. This should be declared: and it should be added, that the crimes of Bonaparte are more to be abhorred than those of other denaturalized creatures whose actions are painted in history; because the author of those crimes is guilty with less temptation, and sins in the presence of a clearer light." — (Wordsworth's Pamphlet "Concerning the relations of Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal," to which I should be proud to consider these Letters as an Appendix).

There is a class of men, Sir, who make a point of rejecting or disregarding all arguments that are enforced with warmth of feeling and illustrated by

the lights of imagination. (The latter is indeed the effect of the former; for the boldest figures of speech are the natural language of profound feeling and a heart affected in good earnest.) These persons seem to rank wisdom and truth among the Alpine flowers, which can flourish only amid ice and snow, and where all other qualities of intellect are notoriously wanting, they charitably clothe the naked with the substantial praises of judgment and calm good sense. But woe to that man, who on circumstances which vitally affect the weal and woe of the whole human race in time and for eternity, can reason in as cold-blooded a tone, as if he were demonstrating a problem in geometry. The warmth, which the development and disclosure of such truths occasions, is altogether different from the heat of passion; and by the frivolous and unfeeling alone will the earnestness of a deep conviction be confounded with the irritability of self-mistrusting positiveness. A complete tranquillity, a cold self-possession, in the contemplation and defence of man's highest interests and most awful concerns, is the commencement of that depraved indifference, that deadness of the moral and religious sense, which (a morbid accumulation being the usual consequence of an unnatural obstruction) so easily passes into the brutal and stupid revolution-phrenzy, and then having raved out its hour of madness, sinks to sleep in the strait-waistcoat of military despotism. For myself, both in the intercourse of private life,

and in the performance of my public duties as the Editor of a Work, the main object of which is to refer the opinions of men to their proper principles, and the passions of men to their proper objects, I shall always deem myself acting most judiciously when I employ those feelings, which the Supreme Wisdom has interwoven with my existence, in the enforcement of those truths and duties, the acknowledgment and performance of which the same Wisdom ordained to be the characteristic of our nature, and the end and object of our being.

" O Friend and Father of the human mind,
Whose Art for noblest ends our frame design'd!
If I, though fated to the studious shade,
Which party-strife, nor anxious power invade—
If I aspire in public virtue's cause
To guide the Muses by sublimer laws:
Do thou the authority of truth impart,
And give my labours entrance to the heart!
Perhaps my voice may rouse the smother'd flame,
And snatch the fainting Patriot back to fame;
Perhaps by worthy thoughts of human kind
To worthy deeds exalt the conscious mind,
Or dash corruption in her proud career,
And teach her Slaves that Vice was born to fear."

S. T. COLERIDGE.

Grasmere.

To the Editor of the Courier.

Letter VII.

(Friday, December 22, 1809.)

Sir,

It is difficult to conceive a more unhappy and perplexed creature than man would be, if he possessed no other guide for his actions than his own previous calculation of their consequences. Unhappy he must needs be from the limited sphere and uncertainty of his foresight even when it exists in its utmost perfection, and still more so through the obliquities caused in it by his passions. The intervention of accidents "between the cup and the lip" is the subject of an hundred proverbs in all languages, and our incapability of praying wisely for any particular object of our desire among the primary articles of all rational religions. Nor would his unhappiness be greater than his perplexity, and the inevitable result of both would be the abandonment of the faculty itself, as far as this was possible, or the exertion of it for the exclusive purposes of an immediate and brutal selfishness. For in such calculation of consequences, how far are we to proceed? Where are we to stop? Is it to include our children and our particular friends? Is it to be confined to these? or, is it to embrace the interests of our country and mankind? If the latter, the result of our calculations must depend altogether on the nature of our convictions concerning the final causes

of the world. For if our actions derive their sole value from the sum total of their consequences to the *optimist*, all actions must be equally good; while to him, who thinks the world controuled by a malignant destiny, or by chance, all actions would be evil in the one case, and in the other indifferent, that is, as likely to be bad as good; and *vice versa;* or would we confine the calculations to our own persons and times, the same difficulties will present themselves—whether, for instance, we are to calculate for the whole number of years, which it is *possible* we may live, or for some shorter period: till, the circle of selfishness narrowing at every round, our forethought would at length fall in to the present hour as to its natural centre; and we should sink into the condition of brutes with the same sentence in our mouths, which, when we start from the true principle of human action, gives us spirit and cheerfulness to persevere in our highest duties—"Enough for the day is the evil thereof." So strangely do extremes meet and yet preserve the contrariety of their natures undiminished! If the reader would wish to see a spirited and exact portrait of a thorough-paced moral calculator, I advise him the next time he feels his moments hang heavy on him "*in —— a church*," to turn to the second chapter of the Wisdom of Solomon in the Apocrypha; there he will find THE CALCULATOR'S PROGRESS from self-confiding philosophy (or rather *psilosophy*) which refuses the aid of all moral instincts, and laughs at

"the voice within" as a superstition—his progress, first, to sensuality, that infallible heart-hardener; and thence to oppression and remorseless cruelty.

What other result indeed could we expect, when a creature valuing its own understanding beyond the wisdom of its creator, deranges and inverts the natural order of its faculties, and substitutes for the dictates of its conscience the conjectures of that *prudence*, which deserves its name then only, when it is employed as the agent and organ of a nobler faculty? It may be objected, that prudence itself, enlightened by experience, and proceeding on the injurious *general* consequences of regulating our conduct, universally and exclusively, by a previous calculation of *particular* consequences, does itself command an *implicit* faith in the clear and positive determinations of the conscience; nay, justifies even an occasional surrender of the soul to that high enthusiasm, which acknowledges no other necessity than that of acting justly and generously, be the consequences what they may. (R) For these persons cannot blind themselves to the fact, that without this enthusiasm nothing pre-eminently great or advantageous has been obtained for mankind, either as the members of a particular state, or as citizens of the world. But surely, Sir, these reasoners are not aware of the contradiction involved in making *that* the principle and *primate* of all morality, the first dictate of which is, that itself should be sometimes suspended, and always obeyed in *subordination* to

some other principle. It is no doubt most true, Sir, that the actions of an adequately enlightened self-love will in general, (perhaps, always) coincide with the precepts of the moral law. Where then lies the difference? In that, Sir, which is worth all the rest told ten times over, in the worth and essential character of the *agents!* Need I add the inherent unfitness as well as the direful consequences, of making virtue, by the possession of which the weal and woe of *all* men are ultimately determined, (the simple peasant's not less than a Newton's or a Verulam's,) depend on *talent*, a gift so unequally dispensed by nature, the *degrees* in which it is given being indeed different in every different person, and the development and cultivation of which are affected by all the inequalities of fortune? This is one proof, Sir, among many, that there is a natural affinity between despotism and modern philosophy, notwithstanding the proud pretensions of the latter as the emancipator of the human race, that their present connection, therefore, is not a mere accident; and that the genuine spirit of liberty and equality is exclusively derivable from the acknowledgment of the existence and absolute supremacy of a law in the mind, "whose service is perfect freedom;" of a law common to all men, and to all men equally evident, those only excepted who have themselves wilfully obscured it through pride or depraved inclinations. *The aristocracy of talent*, is therefore no unmeaning phrase in itself, execrable as was its purport in the minds

of its first framers: it exists, Sir, wherever the understanding, or calculating faculty, which is properly the executive branch of self-government, has usurped that supreme legislative power, which belongs *jure divino* to our *moral* being.

By men of reflection, Sir, who have traced the progress of speculative opinions for the last century, and who have perceived their influence in the prevalent practical systems of our contemporaries (often where the persons themselves are unconscious of the source,) these remarks will be deemed neither *common-place*, nor unseasonable. By the disciples of Hume, Paley, and Condillac, the parents or foster-fathers of modern ethics, they will be rejected at first sight as stoic-paradoxes or exploded superstitions; while the MANY, without troubling themselves whether they are true or false, will put on a grave face, consider the letter as a sort of a sermon, and wonder how it came to be in a newspaper! But oh, Sir, if ever there was a time, when those fundamental truths, those groundworks of thought, feeling, and action, which sermons *ought* to teach us, should mingle with our opinions, and influence our conduct relatively to political questions and public events, that time is now present! for we live in an age of trouble, anxious expectation, and fearful uncertainty: and now, if ever, we need that faith and those principles, which contain in themselves the power and spirit of prophecy! which are in themselves an *implicit* prudence! a moral algebra, that assures

us of the final result, though the process remains undeciphered! those principles, which, when realized in action, *involve* in the very act the more important (to the *agent*, at least, the more important) part of its consequences, namely, the ennobling of his own nature, and have Omnipotence itself as the pledge for the remainder!—Oh! there is a profound philosophy in the text—WE LIVE BY FAITH!

But independently of right and wrong, there is a power given by principle itself to every cause, in which it is acted upon, a consistency in the plans, a harmony and combination of the means, and a steadiness in the execution, which can never be successfully resisted, except by an equal firmness and unity of principle in its opponents. The preceding observations are by no means digressive. For to the complete defence of the Spanish contest, which is the theme and object of this and the preceding Letters, it is indispensable, that men should have clear conceptions of what the main power of a remorseless tyrant, such as Bonaparte, consists in. This cannot lie in vice as vice, for all injustice is in itself feebleness and disproportion; but, as I have elsewhere observed, the abandonment of all principle of right enables the soul to choose and act upon a principle of wrong, and to subordinate to this one principle all the various vices of human nature. Hence too the means of accomplishing a given end are multiplied incalculably, because all means are considered as lawful. He, who has once said with his

whole heart, Evil, be thou my good! has removed a world of obstacles by the very decision, that he will have no obstacles but those of force and brute matter. The opponents of the Spanish cause may be reduced to three classes. The first, those who, contemplating the tremendous power of the enemy, consider all attempts to resist it as vain, and the hope of ultimate success for the Spaniards as little less than madness. To this class I have already replied by arguments deduced from the general nature of things, and (which they will be more likely to respect) by analogous facts of experience derived from history. The second class comprehends those, who (perhaps in addition to the despondency of the former) ask, *what* the Spaniards are fighting for? The third is composed of such, as admitting the strength and justice of the motives which impel the Spanish patriots, and not altogether denying the possibility of their success, if, only the Spaniards acted in all respects as they ought to do, have thrown up the cause in consequence of the errors, defects, and vices, which they attribute promiscuously to the people of Spain and to their government.

The sentiment expressed or implied by the second class, can only be accounted for, either from their unfairly attributing to the Spaniards a want of those feelings, which they would deem it an insult to be thought deficient in themselves, as Britons; for instance, the rage and indignation at having a government or sovereign forced upon them at the point of

the bayonet, by a nation whom they regarded with habitual antipathy, and a low-born adventurer, for whom both their prejudices and their virtues had inspired equal horror and contempt: or, secondly, from their having confined their views of a nation's sufferings to visible and bodily evils. The present season, consecrated by our religion, may perhaps apologise for a graver train of thought than is usual in a newspaper. Some of your readers may possibly be content to inflict the perusal of this letter on themselves as a sort of penance for having failed in their attendance on their parish-preacher. But, I trust, that one dull essay can do no injury to the character of a paper so well established and so generally interesting as the COURIER: and (to speak in a more serious tone) be assured, Sir, that you will be amply repaid in your own feelings for the risk of making a column or two of your paper tedious, if a few only, if but one, should in consequence of these remarks emancipate their understandings from the tyranny of their senses, and recollect that reason and an immortal soul were not given us for no purpose. Actuated by these motives, and these only, and as intimately connected with my subject, I would willingly be permitted by you to press on the attention of your larger and more various public, the considerations contained in the following paragraph, which has been already submitted to the readers of THE FRIEND.

"Often have I reflected with awe on the great

and disproportionate power, which an individual of no extraordinary talents or attainments may exert, by merely throwing off all restraints of conscience. What then must not be the power, where an individual of consummate wickedness can organize into the unity and rapidity of an individual will all the natural and artificial forces of a populous and wicked nation? And could we bring within the field of imagination, the devastation effected in the moral world, by the violent removal of old customs, familiar sympathies, willing reverences, and habits of subordination almost naturalised into instinct; by the removal of the mild influences of reputation, and the ordinary props and aidances of our infirm virtue, or at least, if virtue be too high a name, of our well-doing; and above all, if we could give form and body to all the effects produced on the principles and dispositions of nations by the infectious feeling of insecurity, and the soul-sickening sense of unsteadiness in the whole edifice of civil society; the horrors of battle, though the miseries of a whole war were brought together before our eyes in one disastrous field, would present but a tame tragedy in comparison. Nay, it would even present a sight of comfort and of elevation, if this field of carnage were the sign and result of a national resolve, of a general will, *so* to die, that neither deluge nor fire should take away the name of COUNTRY from their graves, rather than tread the same clods of earth, no longer a country, and themselves alive in nature but dead in infamy. What is Greece at this present moment?

It is the COUNTRY of the heroes from Codrus to Philopœmen; and so it would be, though all the sands of Africa should cover its corn fields and olive gardens, and not a flower were left on Hybla for a bee to murmur in."*

In my next (which will be my *last* communication, relatively to this subject at least), I shall address myself to the third class: and with the acknowledgment of your courtesy, for the insertion of so many letters, shall remain your constant reader and occasional correspondent.

S. T. COLERIDGE.

Grasmere, Dec. 18.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE COURIER.

LETTER VIII.

(*Saturday, January* 20, 1810.)

SIR,

SO long an interval having passed between the publication of my seventh Letter and of the present, it will be necessary to remind the reader, that I am now to address the third class of the *Anti-Iberians:* those, namely, who justify the abandonment of their hopes respecting Spain, by the disappointment of their expectations respecting the conduct of the Spaniards. My first objection was, that the complainants had made no proper deductions

* *Vol.* 1. pp. 158-9. *Essay* xvi.

on the score of our own errors, whether in the *execution* of our plan, or its original impracticability. From instances of the former I shall abstain as much as possible, it being no part of my purpose to awaken painful recollections, or imitate the spirit of a party. One fact, therefore, shall be the representative of all; Colonel Symes's account, in his incomparable Letter to Sir John Moore, of the manner in which the Spanish forces were armed, or rather unarmed, compared with the magazines of unused arms sent from Great Britain, which fell into the hands of the French army; I say, arms that would have sufficed for the equipment of 50,000 Spaniards, *sent* by us, but without any scheme or precaution to secure their proper distribution. For the proof of the latter, that is, the original impracticability of the plan itself, I referred at the time to the communications of your correspondent X. Y. (Courier, Nov. 1808), and shall now content myself with recommending the perusal or re-perusal of those letters to all such, as conscientiously desire to frame for themselves rational articles of belief concerning a contest only second in importance to our own struggle against the same enemy, and by many relations necessarily affecting the choice or approbation of the measures which may be adopted for the conduct or conclusion of this struggle. In the ultimate grounds of judgment, the Spanish cause is indeed *identified* with that of Great Britain, as might have been conjec-

tured from the known fact that the same persons, who think a speedy *submission* to Buonaparte the best proof of wisdom which the Spaniards could give, attempt at the same time, by every species of sophistry and mis-statement, to bribe or scare Great Britain into a nominal *peace* with the tyrant, which is but another word for submission.

Yet I cannot persuade myself that the Edinburgh Reviewers themselves (the fact of whose opinions on this point I assume wholly on the credit of the controversial article in your paper of Dec. 9, 1809); I cannot persuade myself, I say, that either these writers, or any other intelligent men of that party, do in their own minds believe that any peace which Buonaparte would consent to make with us, would be endured by this country. It is sufficient for their purposes, if by some sad and bitter truths, and many vague representations of dilapidated resources, a war without attainable objects, or (if such there were) a Cabinet without ability to attain them, they can raise such a clamour for peace as will transplant their friends and patrons into the ministry, in order to commence a mock negotiation; and then, when the French *ultimatum* had awakened the indignation of the people, and re-confirmed the necessity of war, to break it off with the acquisition of a two-fold popularity to themselves: first, for their humane aversion to the horrors of bloodshed, and for the keen sympathy which the authors of the property tax profess to feel with the burthens of an

oppressed and impoverished nation; and finally, for the genuine British spirit which prompted them to reject peace itself, when it was to be procured at no lower price than that of dishonour and national degradation. For these men are not ignorant what the sense and voice of the British nation will be when the affair is brought to the point; but they likewise know that the men who talk most in the interim, and who exert an influence far beyond the value of their arguments, are of that increasing class, whose goodness, or (if I may be allowed to coin a word, which the times, if not the language, require) whose *goodiness*, consists for the greater part, in the constant assumption that death and bodily inconveniences are the greatest of human evils. And to this low and vile trick are to be sacrificed the unexampled unanimity and the high tone of principle, with which the British nation recommenced the war with France after the experimental truce of Amiens!

Whatever other objections I adduced in my second letter, to the nature of the charges against the Spaniards hitherto made, either carried their own evidence with them, or were immediately followed by their appropriate proofs, two only excepted, the enforcement of which is the object of this my concluding letter. The first was, that the complainants had furnished no statement of the conduct of Spain, in which the faults of the *Government* were uniformly preserved distinct from the

faults attributed to the nation. Now, Sir, recall to mind the details of our own history during the reign of Charles I., but more especially the events which took place from the time that the Parliament first got possession of the king's person, to the restoration of the brotheller, tyrant, and hireling of France, Charles II. Above all, recollect the more recent scenes which have been acted before our own eyes in France, from the first meeting of the States in 1789, to the introduction of a military despotism by their First Consul and present Emperor; of him, at least, in whose Emperorship the *Great* Nation is a *co-partner*. Either my mind is framed differently from that of other men's, or the result of these recollections will be a deep and affecting sense of the great merit of the Spanish people, in universally submitting at once, without tumult or discord, to any government at all. Surprised, betrayed, deserted, all their strong holds in the possession of their infamous enemy, with more than a hundred thousand remorseless executioners resting on their arms, watching for the first appearance of opposition, and eager to enforce terror by massacre. Spain itself divided, and its inhabitants contra-distinguished into so many separate provinces, which had once been separate kingdoms, and each of which was disjoined from the other by natural boundaries; yet all these provinces, keenly sensible of the manifold injuries and oppressions which they had endured under their own govern-

ment, disgusted and sick at heart at the crimes, corruption and imbecility of their unworthy sovereigns, who, for at least a century past, had entrusted their authority to a succession of intriguing and unprincipled adventurers, and had almost erased the Spanish name from the list of effective nations. Let us revolve these and similar particulars in our consciences, no less than in our understandings, and to what cause shall we attribute their immediate and quiet formation of provincial juntas? the fairness with which they gave them a sufficient trial? and when these were proved inadequate, their universal obedience to the central government, which was substituted for them? and finally, the firmness with which they demanded, and the patience with which they are waiting, for the convocation of the Cortes, as the only efficient restorative of their national grandeur, as the means of disclosing the various talent dispersed through Spain; and above all, as the authority which alone could substitute the sanctity of permanent law for provincial edicts; which alone could sustain indignation by hope, and wed the cause of national independence to that of civil liberty and radical reformation? Shall we ascribe this general conduct of the Spaniards to general torpor and indifference? This solution might, perhaps, have been endured a year ago, by those at least who can comprehend no energy that does not manifest itself in bustle and riot. But, surely, all the late events prove a tendency to the

opposite fault, a rashness and undisciplined eagerness tempting them from their only proper mode of warfare, in which they should be everywhere to annoy, and nowhere to be fought with, into the splendid indiscretions of pitched battles and decisive engagements. The best fought battle in which the enthusiasm of the high-minded Spaniards could struggle with superior numbers, discipline, skill, and that inveterate courage which results from constant conquest and a familiarity with massacre, would present to my mind a less sublime spectacle than that of ROMANA wandering among the mountains with his ever-varying forces; who fought against hunger, thirst, and nakedness; often deserting their colours, but always returning to them, because their temporary resolutions were not yet emancipated from a dependence on the animal spirits, and like an irregular spring dried up and filled again; but the *principle* of their action was seated in the reason and the conscience, and still repelled and rallied them, as a wise mother receives her truant child, whom after a brief rest and refreshment she forces back again to school. Still, however, the imprudent rashness which I am blaming in this heroic people, implies the falsehood of the former charge. But why should I recur to particular facts for its confutation? Is it against a torpid and indifferent nation that Buonaparte finds it necessary to send myriads after myriads, and to people the Pyrenean passes with successions of re-

cruits? Are torpor and indifference the things which have made his official paper more than once adopt the language of despair as to the subjection of the Spaniards as a nation, and announce the plan of dividing the Peninsula into twelve districts, each to be preserved in non-resistance by a military Prefect and a French army? But if they have shown no torpor towards the enemy, but on the contrary, an indestructible elasticity of resistance and resolution which yields only to the immediate pressure, and inevitably rises again at its removal, —to what causes must we attribute their meekness and long forbearance to all the defects and errors of their own governors, wherever they have not suspected treachery, if not to their wisdom and virtue?

I am well aware of the doubt which these words will inspire in thinking minds, when applied to a whole people: wisdom and virtue, they will say, are qualities of too awful and too individual a growth to be intelligibly used, as *national* characteristics. And truly, if I had meant precisely that wisdom and virtue which derive their name from their superior degrees, and which, displaying themselves regularly through all the various details of duty, distinguish an individual from the multitude of his countrymen, the scruple would have been well founded, the objection unanswerable. But that there is an invisible spirit that breathes through a whole people, and is participated by all, though

not by all alike; a spirit which gives a colour and character both to their virtues and vices, so that the same actions, such I mean as are expressed by the same words, are yet not the same in a Spaniard as they would be in a Frenchman, I hold for an undeniable truth, without the admission of which all history would be a riddle. I hold likewise that the difference of nations, their relative grandeur and meanness, all, in short, which they are or do, —(not indeed at one particular time, under the accidental influence of a single great man, as the Carthaginians under the great Xantippus, and afterwards under their own Hannibal,) but all in which they persevere, as a nation, through successions of changing individuals, are the result of this spirit; and when this spirit dies, the tree may indeed stand on by its weight and mechanic equipoise; but, though itself the nursling of storms, though it had grown and strengthened and become vast with the music of tempests in its branches, it waits but for the first gust to level it with the earth. For seventy years, through a continued alternation of adverse and prosperous events, did the United States sustain an incessant war against the most powerful Monarchy then on earth, humbled that Monarchy, and raised itself into the first rank of European powers. The national spirit which inspired them, was gradually poisoned by their colonial tyranny and guilt, and by the genius of trade and commerce not duly poised by an agricultural interest, or ren-

dered generous by a landed nobility. In three months Louis XIV. overran this same country, and, but for the other European powers, would not have left even the name of Holland to swell the list of Napoleon's iniquities. But the most remarkable instance of this spirit is that of ancient Rome. Struggle from without and from within, says the inestimable work,* for the publication of which

* *Geist der Zeit*, or the Spirit of the Age. Has this work been translated? It was delivered to me for this purpose, and, it was added, under the authority of one of the Royal Family. I first perused the work, and that with delight and admiration, and though I foresaw the difficulty of making it intelligible throughout, even to thinking Englishmen (indeed, to translate it well, is not possible for any man not familiar with the philosophy of Fichte and Schelling), and though I felt at the same time, that it would be a task of less length and labour to compose two equal sized volumes of original matter, yet I feel it my duty to undertake it;—for in few uninspired works had I found so much wisdom comprised, such a profound commentary on the history of past ages and nations, so just an insight into the present state of the different countries of Europe, and such a prophetic forecast of the future; and the whole conveyed with the utmost eloquence of anguish-stricken feelings, sustained and elevated by philosophic thought. When I was ready for the press, I informed (by letter) the bookseller who had delivered the work to me, but never received any answer. The reviewer of Mr. Wordsworth's pamphlet in the London Review has quoted from this work the beautiful and prophetic passage respecting Spain, but as rendered by himself. If any translation of the whole does exist, I earnestly recommend it, Sir, to your perusal, and that of your readers. The original work is a foolscap 8vo. of 460 pages, with from twenty to twenty-four lines in a page.

Palm was murdered, this is the life of individuals and of States. Where do we find more of both than in Rome? But if this struggle goes on for centuries in order to find a political equipoise, if it does *not* find it, and yet the nation subsists nevertheless, and proceeds in its career of power and glory, *then*, I affirm, that people must have a high *national* sense and unusual virtues, the firmness of which must have compensated for the unsteadiness of their political constitution.

Scarcely were the tyrants chased away, and that the dangers of a foreign yoke had vanished, than a new oppression raged in Rome itself. For one tyrant the people had gotten many, and the families which had summoned the Romans to freedom, were themselves become despots. The freemen lay prostrate under their cunning and their avarice, and were to be slaves because they were poor. They retired in a body from Rome. Out of this formidable sedition grew the tribunes of the people, ceaseless combatants for the plebeians against the aristocracy! As the state increased, and the people became more civilized, the necessity was felt of a settled code of laws. The ten men appointed to introduce this code conspired for the election of a tyranny. The state was shaken to its very foundations. Hereon commenced and continued for almost a century, the struggle between the patricians and plebeians. In spite of all the stratagems and policy of the old aristocrats the plebeians con-

quered, and wrested from the nobles the highest magistracies, with the auspices, and even the priesthood. What preserved the people during all these concussions, excesses, and stoppings of the state machine? General courage and patriotism. Soon came the Gauls, who weighed the Roman gold in the presence of the Capitoline Jupiter. Rome was crushed, but not destroyed. No! Now first began its greatness, and after a fifty years' contest with the Samnites the way was opened for the dominion of all Italy. The rest of the world must gradually follow; for the bravest fought, and the wisest planned. But whence and how came there so many wise and brave men? Writers have spoken much of the *luck* of the Romans: they, like the French at present, had their *fortuna victrix*. But luck in itself is nothing; it is permanent only with the brave. Over all these things, over the auspices, the wisdom of the state (or by whatever other name we choose to call that, to which we would attribute the preservation of Rome, amid these storms, and her empire over the civilized world), there breathed a far higher spirit, a *Roman* character, which explains, and cannot be explained by, the influence of their imperfect institutions. Though we should admit that between the senate and the tribunes, as deliberative bodies, there existed a real countercheck, that the power which the latter derived from the mass of the people and their own tremendous *veto*, and that which adhered to the former from

superstition, from old traditional wisdom, and from the recollection of their own and their ancestors' exploits, balanced each other, yet what curbed the ambition, the personal hatred, the family cabals of so numerous a body as the senators themselves? What struck silence on all individual interests, as soon as the *country* was in danger? And the executive power—whence came the energy, the steadfastness of their plans, and in the execution of them, if it was not in the heads and hearts of the whole people? Year after year fresh regents among the people, that exercised dominion far and wide, and waged war far and wide, and still the new men trod in the steps of the old! And those all-powerful consuls and dictators, who had conquered nations, and led kings in triumph, continued for centuries obedient, and at the appointed hour laid down tranquilly the majesty of their power at the foot of the almighty Jupiter, and retired again into the rank of citizens! What overawed in these the sweet lust of dominion? Verily, not the constitution, but an invisible feeling of the civic virtue and dignity of their countrymen. The life of this republic was not in the senate, not in the auspices, not in the well-balanced relation of the governing powers to each other; it was in the *Roman character* of the Romans themselves.

Still more forcibly, if possible, does this apply to the Spaniards. With a corrupt and all-corrupting despotism vested in a series of weak and half-idiotic

sovereigns, with the worst laws the worst executed, with the landed property in vast immoveable aggregates, and cultivated under the unwisest tenures; and lastly, with a blind and domineering Priesthood, and with the most idolatrous superstition protected by the sleepless Dragon of the Inquisition, the Spaniards lost indeed their national influence and their national rank among the European powers; they became an impoverished and ineffective people; yet, when their character is compared with that of the Neapolitans, the similarity of the circumstances renders the difference of the men the more striking. Not only did the national spirit of Spain resist the poisonous atmosphere in which it moved,—it even ennobled, and in some sort transmuted, the very evils, with which it struggled. Slavery was changed into a romantic loyalty; superstition into an imaginative abstraction from the immediate objects of sense; the familiar worship of the Virgin Mother and her choir of female saints gave a wild elevation to the youthful passion of the sexes; and a proud spirit of honour and self-devotion continued to make the name of Spaniard honourable, when that of Spain had sunk into insignificance. Hence their neighbourhood with France and the intimate alliance of the two nations for a century past has scarcely lessened the contradistinctions of the French and Spanish character, so exquisitely detailed by one of our writers in the reign of James I., and which, trifling as they may

appear, are a mighty bulwark of national independence, a constant fuel of aversion to feed their present struggle, and therefore a datum of hope for its ultimate success. I have transcribed the very amusing passage to which I allude, and hope that on your first vacant day you will give it a place on the back of your paper. I dare warrant, that it will furnish entertainment to *all* your readers, and to many, I trust, matter for serious reflection. For let us look to ourselves! The language and peculiar customs of a country are an important part of its fortifications; and a Briton, taught from his infancy to speak the French language, admire French books, and imitate French manners, is already half a Frenchman in his heart. Nay, a country in which, as was the case in Prussia, a majority of the higher ranks consisted of persons thus *Gallicised*, was subdued in effect, before the French army put the last seal on the conquest by the battle of Jena.

Be pleased Sir, to observe, that all my reasonings have been hypothetical. I have not contended, that Spain *will* succeed—that must be left to Providence to determine, and to all-revealing time to disclose. But that Spain will not be conquered by armies merely, will not be conquered while she retains her present feelings and principles, and unless she commits or suffers to be committed grosser errors than as yet are justly chargeable to her (and among such possible errors I should consider, as the greatest, the suffering the promise

for convoking the Cortes to be broken or trifled with), for this, Sir, I *have* contended; and should continue to do so, though the whole country were for the moment overrun by the armies of Bonaparte. The only startling omen which I have yet heard of is the address of the Marques de la Romana to the Supreme Central Junta, in your Tuesday's paper, which I have received since I wrote the preceding paragraph. How little I am disposed to judge ill of the Marques, I have given proof even in this letter. But as I find by your leading paragraph, that you have not seen it in the same light with myself, and yet prepare myself to throw up my brief, if I should be made to know that the principles contained or involved in it, are predominant among the Spanish gentry and educated classes, I am compelled, against my intention, and almost against my will, to request of your kindness the insertion of an additional letter, in which, after a few remarks, in explanation of the uneasiness occasioned in my mind by Romana's address, I may sum up the whole, and close my correspondence with a somewhat more orderly conclusion, than the limits of the present Letter will allow.*

S. T. COLERIDGE.

Grasmere.

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* This letter did not appear. S. C.

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